Liberalisation and regulation in European network utilities. by Gassner, Katharina
LIBERALISATION AND REGULATION 
IN EUROPEAN NETWORK UTILITIES
Katharina Gassner 
London School o f Economics and Political Science
D ecem ber 2001
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements o f the degree of 
Doctor o f Philosophy at the University o f London.
UMI Number: U16B034
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U163034
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
TH£S£S
F
7F7^
S ^ 6 / kS
To my family
True as it is one cannot find the 
philosopher’s stone, it should rightly he 
sought: in the process, some beautiful 
secrets are found, unlooked-for.
Fontenelle
ABSTRACT
This thesis considers different aspects of the liberalisation and simultaneous 
economic regulation of network utilities in the European Union. Two groups of 
arguments justify that regulation is maintained in these industries after the removal 
of barriers to competitive entry. The first group of arguments is linked to the natural 
monopoly characteristics displayed by such services. These imply that competition 
cannot be relied upon to restrain the dominant position of network operators. The 
second group of arguments relates to the social dimension, or public service nature, 
of utility services. The essential role played by these services justifies government 
intervention in form of price controls, universal service obligations and other 
qualitative regulations.
The thesis has two parts of different nature, each part comprising two chapters. In the 
first part, an introductory chapter describes the framework within which the 
economic regulation of network utilities is inscribed, and discusses key trade-offs 
between different regulatory policy objectives. The second chapter analyses how the 
regulatory framework for liberalised network industries developed in the UK 
compares to the framework in place in Germany. Germany has embarked on reform 
of its network utilities considerably later than the UK, and displays unique 
characteristics in its industry structures, in particular a strong federal element. The 
German case illustrates how the general economic principles underlying the 
liberalisation and regulation process are interpreted in the European environment, 
and are adapted to national characteristics.
The second part of the thesis focuses on specific aspects of liberalisation and 
regulation using econometric techniques. In chapter 3, access price elasticities in the
fixed telephony industry are estimated on the basis of a pseudo-panel. The main 
question addressed is whether the rebalancing of tariffs that has taken place in the 
wake of liberalisation has had the potential to deteriorate household access to the 
fixed telephone network. The last and fourth chapter looks at patterns and 
determinants of supplier switching in the domestic gas and electricity markets in 
Great Britain using data from a true household panel. Its main conclusion is that the 
likelihood of supplier switching is influenced more strongly by variables linked to 
cost savings than by socio-demographic factors such as income.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The liberalisation of network utilities in the UK began almost 20 years ago, with the 
corporatisation and privatisation of British Telecom (BT) at the beginning of the 
1980s. Parallel to the government’s withdrawal from running the fixed telephony 
business, a system of regulatory controls was conceived to ensure that the anticipated 
benefits of liberalisation would indeed translate into greater consumer welfare1. After 
the telecommunications industry, other UK network utilities including gas and 
electricity, public transport and water went down the same road of liberalisation and 
parallel regulation.
The regulatory reform initiated in the UK in the 1980s has led to a fundamental 
change in regulatory theory and practice through the implementation of three key 
ideas—the introduction of competition in formerly monopolistic service supply; the 
use of incentive price-cap regulation; and, finally, the establishment of independent 
sector regulators.
The rationale underlying the idea of liberalising formerly monopolistic industries 
through the introduction of competition is that monopolistic supply should be limited 
to the core network activities only, that is to the part of the supply chain 
characterised by veritable natural monopoly features. Typically, this concerns the 
running of transmission and distribution grids in electricity, of the pipeline network
1 The role o f Professor Littlechild in defining the ideas that were to shape UK utilities regulation needs to be 
highlighted here. His report for the Department o f Industry in 1983 on the subject o f regulating BT’s profitability 
set out the principles for regulatory reform that were to be applied across all utility sectors (see Littlechild, 1983).
in water, and of the track system in rail transport. For all other services upstream or 
downstream of the natural monopoly, or ancillary to its operation, competition is to 
be introduced wherever possible.
The motivation behind fostering competition is that the incentives provided by the 
market are the best way to achieve efficiency gains and maximise customer welfare. 
To a large extent because of information asymmetries between regulator and 
regulatee, the regulation of economic activities will always be imperfect. 
Competition is introduced into former monopolistic network utilities in order to 
minimise the scope of activities where such imperfect regulation is needed. By 
separating the core monopoly elements of the supply chain from potentially 
competitive activities, the path to minimising regulatory intervention is set. Naturally 
monopolistic network activities will always need to be subject to regulation because 
their nature makes them capable to extract monopoly rents from consumers and other 
companies. Access to their networks needs to be monitored in order to prevent 
monopolistic pricing or denial of access to competitors.
However, potentially competitive services—for instance power generation or water 
metering—should only be subject to sector-specific regulation as long as competition 
is not fully established, and in particular, as long as entry barriers persist and there is 
a dominant incumbent likely to abuse its market power. After the transition to firmly 
established competition is complete, only ex-post regulation following the general 
competition law should be implemented.
The second key idea of UK regulatory reform is the introduction of price-cap 
regulation. The aim of regulation is to bring about an outcome as similar to the 
competitive outcome as possible, and therefore to correct an existing market failure.
The idea behind price-cap regulation is to mimic the incentives to cost reduction that 
are created in an unregulated market by competitive forces, while at the same time 
protecting the customer from abusive price increases and provide a stable 
environment for investors. In order to achieve this, the regulator sets a pricing rule of 
the general form RPI-X, which is revisited every four to five years in periodic 
reviews.
Littlechild (1999, pp20-21) summarises the advantages of incentive price-cap 
regulation in the following manner:
'The RPI-Xprice cap allows prices to increase (or requires prices to decrease) 
at Xper cent below the retail price index, which is a measure o f  inflation, for a 
specified number o f years. This gives assurance to investors, managers and 
customers. It also gives greater efficiency incentives to companies in the short 
term. Customers benefit from the prospect o f the resulting increased efficiency 
being passed to them over time, when the price cap is reset. Where necessary, 
prescribed minimum standards can ensure that cost and price reductions are 
not at the expense o f quality o f service. ’
The last of the three pillars of UK reform is the setting up of independent sector- 
specific regulators. Their primary duty is the protection of consumer interests, a duty 
pursued wherever possible through the promotion and protection of competition, and 
subject to ensuring the financial viability of the regulated company.
This thesis has two parts of different nature, each of them comprising two chapters. 
In the first part, chapter 1 sets out the key principles of UK regulatory reform and 
offers an overview of the theory underlying the liberalisation and parallel regulation 
of network utilities. It also discusses some of the lessons learnt from the UK reform
process and identifies issues critical to the design of successful regulation. Among 
the latter count the recognition that different types of competition exist and are 
appropriate for different parts of utility networks and different sectors. In addition, 
transitional issues, such as sunk costs and the unwinding of cross-subsidies need to 
be addressed at the outset of reform, and finally, structural issues such as the vertical 
or horizontal restructuring of an industry need to be considered in order to maximise 
the potential for competition in the liberalised sectors.
The regulatory regime set up in the 1980s in the UK has had a profound impact on 
the reform of utility networks in the European Union. The three key principles 
introduction of competition, incentive price-cap regulation, and independent sector 
regulators, have shaped EU liberalisation directives in telecommunications, 
electricity and gas, railways, postal services, and water. However, the exact 
interpretation of the regulatory principles is constrained by the unique national 
characteristics of a country. Different historically grown industry structures at the 
outset of reform, different existing legal and institutional frameworks, and different 
national reactions to the distributional issues raised by reform, imply that there is no 
unique European answer to network ownership and restructuring.
European regulators are nevertheless constraint to find a harmonised approach to the 
regulation of their utility networks if the project of an integrated single European 
market is to be realised, and co-operation between national regulatory bodies has 
emerged as important feature.
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a concrete example of the influence of national 
characteristics on the implementation of regulatory reform in EU countries. Based on 
the theoretical principles of UK reform set out in chapter 1, and on the framework
employed in the fundamental review of the regulatory regime undertaken in the UK 
in 1998 (see DTI 1998a and 1998b), a questionnaire has been compiled. This 
questionnaire is reproduced in this thesis between chapters 1 and 2. It has been used 
in order to investigate how key features of regulatory reform have been interpreted in 
the context of the reform of electricity, telecommunications, and railway services in 
Germany. In addition to the utilisation of primary and secondary literature sources, a 
number of key officials and company representatives in Germany have been 
interviewed on the basis of the questionnaire. A list of the interviewees is given in 
Appendix 1.
The results of the investigation into regulatory reform in Germany regarding the 
three utility industries are presented in Chapter 2. While not one of the pioneering 
countries of utility reform, Germany has in recent years embraced reform measures 
propelling it among the European countries where liberalisation is most advanced. 
Germany is a particularly interesting case study not only because of the size of its 
market, but also because it displays an unusual decentralised market structure in 
some of its network utilities. This decentralised structure is reflected in the 
regulatory institutions for the surveyed industries, and has been maintained to a large 
extent in the process of reform over the past decade.
One of the main conclusions of chapter 2 is that in particular in the case of 
electricity, the decentralised market structure plays a key role in the liberal approach 
towards regulation adopted by the German authorities. In this market, full supply 
competition was introduced in 1998 in a single step for all, even the smallest, 
consumers. Nevertheless, in a decision unique among European member states, the 
German government has decided not to set up a sector regulator and to rely on
industry self-regulation. This decision was based on the argument that the 
fragmented industry structure would mean that a large number of companies would 
compete against each other from the outset of liberalisation, and therefore only 
regulation by the general competition authorities would be needed.
Germany illustrates the argument of the diversity of regulatory approaches between 
countries, but is also an example for different approaches adopted for different 
industries within a country. In the telecommunications industry, regulatory reform 
has closely followed the path outlined by the UK and by the European directives, 
and a sector-specific regulator has been put in place.
Chapter 2 of this thesis has been published in Henry, C., M. Matheu, and A. 
Jeunemaitre (eds.) Regulation o f Network Utilities— The European Experience, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Chapter 3 and 4 form the second part of this thesis. The analysis presented in them is 
based on formal data analysis, and their character differs therefore from the first two 
chapters which focus on the theoretical and institutional aspects of utility regulation 
and are more descriptive by nature. Chapter 3 and 4 each concentrate on a specific 
question raised by the liberalisation of traditionally monopolistic industries. The 
distributional impact of the transition from monopoly to competition is at the centre 
of chapter 3, while chapter 4 deals with customer behaviour in a market where the 
withdrawal of regulation is considered.
The liberalisation of fixed telephony services has put an end to the system of internal
cross-subsidies between different services provided by a single company. A
rebalancing of tariffs followed the introduction of competition, slowly closing the
gap between the costs of efficient service supply and prices charged to customers. In 
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chapter 3, the question whether this rebalancing of tariffs has had a detrimental effect 
on marginal, mostly low-income, users is discussed. The annual British Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) is used to estimate a demand function for access to the 
fixed telephone network in the UK. The chapter was motivated by the absence of 
econometric studies regarding telephone access price elasticities using European 
data. This absence is caused by the particular form of European data compared to 
North American data. Econometric studies using North American data can take 
advantage of price variations across different states due to the fact that a multitude of 
operators offers telephone access. In contrast, European operators have traditionally 
applied a policy of uniform access charges for the entire country, making it 
impossible to estimate price elasticities on the basis of cross-sectional data.
In chapter 3, a pseudo-panel approach based on the FES data is adopted to address 
this data issue, and access price elasticities for the period 1985 to 1996 are estimated. 
The results of the analysis corroborate findings of North-American studies and 
indicate that access demand reacts, albeit weakly, to changes in the tariff structure. 
Moreover, the elasticity measure is markedly higher for low income than average 
income households. All other things equal, this results leads to the conclusion that 
tariff rebalancing does indeed affect marginal user groups. However, a number of 
caveats apply to this result. The overall reduction in the cost of fixed telephony 
services brought about by technological progress and increased competition is likely 
of offset the negative effect of tariff rebalancing. Moreover, the period surveyed 
precedes the extraordinary success of mobile telephony, and in particular the advent 
of pre-pay mobiles, which have made access to telephony services affordable at very 
low prices. Access to the fixed telephony network remains however an issue for
access to the internet, and the possible detrimental impact of high connection charges 
and their distributional dimension should not be neglected in this context.
Chapter 3 of this thesis has been published, in a slightly abridged version, under the 
title ‘An estimation of UK telephone access demand using pseudo-panel data* in 
Utilities Policy 7(3), 143-154.
The last chapter of this thesis is set in the context of an industry where the transition 
from monopoly to full competition is considered close to complete. Chapter 4 
considers the pattern and determinants of supplier switching in the domestic gas and 
electricity markets in Great Britain. The analysis is based on data from an ongoing 
household panel (the Oxera Energy Panel), spanning six quarters from the first 
quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2001, and comprising 2,110 households.
The main question addressed in chapter 4 concerns the determinants of domestic 
supplier switching and the relative importance of socio-demographic household 
characteristics compared to other factors, in particular variables linked to cost 
savings, such as payment method or subscription to dual-fuel deals. A probit model 
yields the result that the latter group of explanatory variables impacts more strongly 
on the probability of switching than the former. This result corroborates less formal 
evidence, in particular the latest competition review results published by the industry 
regulator Ofgem (Ofgem, 2001c), in two areas. First, the econometric results suggest 
that marginal customer groups, in particular low-income households, are taking 
advantage of switching opportunities as much as average households. Second, direct 
debit users and duel fuel subscribers have a higher probability of switching which 
suggests that these customer groups have been able to realise the most important cost 
savings over the period surveyed. However, in the case of gas, the results also show
that pre-payment customers have lower switching probabilities than average. 
Payment by pre-payment meter in gas still concerns a large proportion of customers 
in debt, and only recently has the range of competitive price offers for this customer 
group increased, therefore lowering barriers to switching for this customer group.
Finally, the results of the analysis also show that switching rates are strongly 
influenced by previous switching experiences, and that households headed by older 
persons are likely to switch less.
The thesis ends with some general conclusions.
Chapter 1: Liberalisation and Regulation of Network 
Utilities -  An Overview
1. Introduction
Network utilities such as gas, electricity, water, rail and fixed link telephony, occupy 
an important place in national economies. The value added of the privatized UK 
network utilities in 1995 was 5% of GDP, employment was 422,000, fixed assets at 
historic cost were 13% of GDP, and the stock market shares on 10 September 1995 
was £90 billion, or 15% of GDP (Newbery 2000, pi 9).
In addition, network utilities have attracted particular attention in economic literature 
because they provide some of the clearest examples of natural monopolies, that is, 
cases where a single firm can satisfy the entire market demand for the range of goods 
or services at lower total cost than any other combination of firms2. For natural 
monopolies the claim that free markets maximise welfare fails -  if the natural 
monopoly is sustainable, it will exploit the rents offered by its monopoly position 
and consumers will have to face monopoly prices and restricted output; if it is not 
sustainable and entry occurs, then the wasteful duplication of facilities occurs, 
raising costs and prices. Either way, the market will fail to satisfy consumer needs at 
least costs.
The natural monopoly characteristics of network utilities are therefore intimately 
associated to the notion of market failure. Market failure in turn justifies state 
involvement in these industries, either taking the direct form of state ownership, or
the indirect form of regulation of network utilities (public or private). For most of 
this century, state ownership has been the preferred public policy option and was 
predominant in most European countries. Establishing protected state monopolies 
did not only prevent the wasteful duplication of facilities and provided a restraint on 
prices, it also offered a solution to dealing with a set of additional features that set 
utilities services apart from other goods and services provided in an economy.
Utility services are seen as essential services, or merit goods, in modem society and 
governments have made it their aim to provide universal access to water supply and 
sewage services, to electricity and gas supply, as well as to public transport and 
communication services. Public ownership resolved the potential conflict between 
private and public interests in the provision of these services and allowed for the 
incorporation of distributional objectives. These were often pursued by means of 
cross-subsidies, allowing geographically balanced prices or subsidised access 
charges to encourage take-up of services.
Moreover, public network utilities provided an instrument for a number of wide- 
ranging other social and political aims, often linked to the correction of externalities. 
So was the pursuit of environmental objectives integrated in the running of water and 
transport utilities, or public electricity companies were part of industrial strategies 
seeking to obtain domestic energy independence, e.g. through the exploitation of 
nuclear power.
2 Sec for instance Sharkey (1982) for a discussion of natural monopoly theoiy.
Today, natural monopoly, distributional objectives, and externalities are still the 
underlying reasons for state involvement in utility industries (Vass 1999 and 2001). 
The form this state involvement takes has however undergone profound changes in 
the past two decades, and state ownership has been replaced by independent 
regulation of often privatized, and often restructured, industries.
In the 1980s, state ownership in the UK was gradually abandoned for a number of 
ideological, budgetary and economic reasons3. However, the change in ownership is 
only one element of the fundamental transformation that UK network utilities have 
undergone. The most outstanding element of the UK regulatory reform is arguably 
that it has questioned the boundaries of natural monopolies and has introduced the 
concept of supply competition in utility services.
The basic idea underlying the model that has come to govern UK network utilities is 
that regulation should be limited to the core natural monopoly service only, typically 
the ‘true’ network element, i.e. transmission or distribution wires or pipelines, or the 
railway tracks. For all other services provided upstream or downstream of the 
network operation, competition should be introduced where possible. The regulation 
of the competitive services would arguably be necessary for the transition period 
only, until the establishment of effective competition between the incumbent and 
new entrants. In other words, it should only serve as ‘stop-gap’ and disappear 
gradually with the advent of competition.
Regarding distributional and other social objectives pursued in the context of utility 
networks, their aim and scope were to be spelt out in an explicit manner in the new 
regulatory model, and their funding ensured in such a manner as to minimise 
distortions to competition.
In the 1990s, the change of policy initiated in the UK4 has spread to the European 
Union, and the concept of liberalisation, that is, the abolishion of entry barriers to 
allow competition in previously protected industries, has become an essential part of 
EU policy in network utilities. The so-called liberalisation directives for 
telecommunications, electricity and gas, all provide for the separation of natural 
monopoly activities and potentially competitive services and make the promotion of 
competition the main regulatory objective.
The aim of this framework chapter is to outline the main concepts underlying the 
regulatory reform of network utilities developed in the UK (Section 2), to draw some 
lessons from the experience so far (Section 3), and to sketch some of the policy 
issues relevant for the European member states (Section 4).
2. Liberalisation and regulation
The regulatory reform initiated in the UK in the 1980s has led to a fundamental 
change in regulatory theory and practice through the implementation of three key 
ideas. The first of these ideas was liberalisation, that is the introduction of
3 See Newbery (2000, pp5-9) for a comprehensive discussion of the factors leading to the wave of privatisation 
undertaken by the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher.
competition into many of the services previously thought of as monopolies. The 
second was incentive price-cap regulation, to replace the then common rate-of-retum 
regulation; and the third was the establishment of independent sector regulators. In 
this section we look at each of these key concepts in more detail.
2.1 Regulatory failure and liberalisation
The primary duty imposed on sector regulators in the UK is to protect the interests of 
all consumers, both existing and potential5. Two basic requirements can be identified 
in this context for any regulatory regime. The first is that regulated utilities should be 
able to finance their activities, including investments, and meet the demands made 
upon them by the consumers. The simplest way to ensure an adequate supply of 
funds would be to give the utility a protected franchise monopoly. However, the 
second regulatory duty concerns ensuring efficiency in operation, and responsiveness 
to new technological possibilities in order to make sure customers do not pay more 
than necessary for the fulfilment of their needs. The most effective way to ensure 
operational efficiency is competition, but this is in apparent conflict with the 
franchise monopoly.
One key innovative idea of UK regulatory reform was combining monopoly 
regulation with liberalisation. In a process of gradually peeling back the different 
layers of activities in which the network utilities were engaged, and assessing the 
competitive potential of each of them, the core natural monopoly was exposed. True
4 Outside Europe, restructuring and privatisation had also started under different guises in the USA and in South- 
America (Chile).
natural monopoly characteristics of economies of scale and wasteful duplication of 
facilities are typically limited to the transmission and distribution wires of electricity 
and fixed telephony, to the pipeline network of gas and water services, and to the 
tracks of railway services.
As outlined above, regulation of the core monopoly services is necessary because of 
the market failure they are linked with. However, the supply of services over these 
networks is potentially competitive, even if the network operation as such is not, and 
the beneficial incentives of competition on efficiency and innovation can therefore 
be put to use. It is clear that renewed faith in market forces was a major motivation 
behind the regulatory reforms in the UK in the 1980s. Perhaps equally important was 
however that economists had increasingly pointed out that regulation, the response to 
market failure, could never be free of failure either. Regulation should therefore only 
be considered when the cost of market failure it addresses exceeds the cost of 
intervention.
2.1.1 Regulatory failure
Helm (1996) identifies three intrinsic regulatory failures, associated with, 
respectively, the incentives of regulator and regulatee, and the problem of 
information asymmetry.
The economic theory of incentives in regulation opposes normative and positive 
aspects, i.e. it examines the question of how regulators actually behave as opposed to
5 The primary duty of the protection of consumer interest is stated in the Utilities Act 2000.
how they ought to behave6. The basic idea underlying the incentive theory is that, in 
the same manner as politicians and managers, regulators should be seen as rent- 
seeking and motivated by more than the objective aim of maximising social welfare. 
Regulators face direct and indirect rewards. Direct rewards in form of income are 
often delayed until after leaving the regulatory office, but then substantial benefits 
can arise from joining the private sector, notably the regulated company. Indirect 
awards can take the form of public visibility and the gratification of ‘trying out’ 
economic theory in the real world7.
It should be noted that the private incentives the regulator faces are to a large extent 
compatible with effective regulation of a sector, as both the direct and indirect 
rewards will increase with a regulator performing well.
The regulated company in turn will act under the incentive of maximum profits. The 
best way of achieving this will depend on the regulatory rules imposed on it. Under 
rate-of-retum regulation, it is likely that the company will increase its capital base to 
inefficient levels in order to boost its profit base (the so-called Averch-Johnson 
effect, after the seminal paper by Averch and Johnson, 1962). Under price-cap 
regulation, it will try to inflate costs to obtain higher price allowances (see also the 
next section for a discussion of rate-of-retum and price cap regulation).
6 In the regulation literature, two schools o f thought have developed the general theory of self-interest -  the 
Chicago School (Kahn, 1971 and Stigler, 1971) and the Virginian School (Buchanan 1972).
7 This can be particularly attractive to academics.
The reason why the regulated company can be successful in pursuing rent- 
maximising strategies is the intrinsic asymmetry of information that exists between 
the regulator and the regulated company. The regulator will almost always rely on 
the regulatee for information. However, given the profit incentives, the regulatee will 
have an incentive to present the information selectively.
In practice, ways to weaken the information asymmetry exist, and they have been 
extensively used and refined by the British regulators. The most widely accepted 
means for addressing the information problem is the use of comparator companies, 
either nationally or internationally. This remedy to the information problem is 
perfected in the use of yardstick competition*, where the regulator sets the regulatory 
rules according to the information revealed by the company’s competitors. Another 
way of improving the information problem is by adjusting future predictions of the 
company’s cost on the basis of the difference between past predictions and actual 
performance, thereby gradually reducing the scope for uncertainty.
Regardless of the remedy adopted, it is generally admitted that the information 
problem can be eliminated only partly, and that the remaining bias will allow 
companies to derive information rents, specially during the initial years of 
regulation, and thus gain supernormal profits. The second key element of UK 
regulatory reform, incentive price-cap regulation, has been hailed as remedy to the 
inherent regulatory failures linked to incentives and information asymmetry. Its basic
* The theory o f yardstick competition is set out in Shleifer (1985).
principles, as well as some of the remaining difficulties, are discussed in subsection
2.2 below.
2.1.2 The ownership question
The process of liberalisation is often associated with privatisation and, in particular 
in the UK, the two are intimately linked. Indeed, of all the major UK network 
utilities, only Consignia, as the former Post Office is now called, has not been 
privatised yet.
For the basic ideas of regulatory reform privatisation might not indispensable—one 
can imagine a public firm in a competitive environment and subject to price 
regulation—nevertheless, for a number of reasons the transfer of ownership can 
facilitate reform. This is in particular true for the potentially competitive activities. 
For the regulated core monopoly networks, the ownership question seems somewhat 
less clear cut.
Competition is introduced into former monopolistic network utilities in order to 
minimise the scope of activities where imperfect regulation is needed. In market 
oriented economies, privatisation of the competitive part of the business becomes 
logical as the argument of public ownership because of market failure no longer 
applies. Klein (1998) also argues that competition can only be effective if firms can 
fail. There is therefore a natural complementarity between privatisation and 
competition, and an important role is played by capital markets. They provide an 
incentive for efficient management of private companies. Moreover, if policy makers 
want to avoid distortion between competing private and public companies, 
privatisation also imposes itself, as the latter are able to gain cheaper access to 
capital through the public backing they enjoy.
However, Newbery (2000) points out that public ownership can take different forms 
and that for instance in an environment where municipal or regional public utilities 
have to compete for capital and customers on a national or international market, the 
ownership question might be answered differently. Privatisation also seems less of a 
necessity in the case of the core monopoly services, where competition is per 
definition not possible. Depending on the particular circumstances, policy makers 
have sometimes chosen to maintain public ownership of the network assets. One 
example of continued public ownership is provided by Germany’s federal rail track 
system, where public ownership is inscribed in the Constitution. In the UK, the 
private versus public debate has come to the forefront in the wake of Railtrack’s 
failure in 2001. Another example of state ownership are the public system operators 
that have been set up in various liberalised electricity markets in Europe.
Evidence seems to suggest that many utility industries around the world show a 
markedly improved performance after privatisation. One convincing explanation of 
this has been linked to the labour market. The corporatisation of utilities that 
precedes privatisation has often led to increased labour efficiency because staff is no 
longer granted protected civil servant status. In addition, internal re-structuring 
programs aimed at increased efficiency are often undertaken before the initial public 
offering of shares in order to increase the sale revenue for the treasury.
2.2 Price cap regulation
In competitive markets, firms seek to maximise long-term profits via innovation and 
the acquisition of temporary monopoly, and short-term profits via the minimisation 
of costs. Entry is prompted by the existence of a profit margin between production 
costs and retail price, and causes the erosion of the same profits through a decrease 
in prices.
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By definition, in the case of natural monopolies the welfare maximising features of 
competition cannot be relied upon. The objective of regulation is to bring about the 
same beneficial outcome as competition and therefore to correct the inherent market 
failure. In the recent past, this regulatory objective has been pursued notably by the 
two regulatory regimes of rate-of-retum and price-cap regulation.
2.2.1 Price cap versus rate of regulation
Rate-of-retum regulation was the traditional way US authorities regulated in the 20th 
century the private monopolies under which many of their utility services were 
provided. The logic underlying rate-of-retum regulation is to restrain the company 
from earning supernormal monopoly profits. In this manner, the profit conditions of 
a company operating in a competitive environment are mimicked, and the 
exploitation of the captive customers is prevented. The regulator will determine what 
is deemed the ‘normal* rate of return on the assets of the regulated company. Should 
the utility earn excess returns over and above the set rate of return, these are clawed 
back by the regulator after the annual examination of accounts.
The US system of rate-of-retum regulation has been widely criticised for allowing all 
cost pass-through, thereby providing little incentive for efficiency. Moreover, the 
system fosters gold-plating, that is the inefficient expansion of the asset base. A 
larger base will allow higher nominal profits for a given rate-of-retum.
Price-cap regulation was the innovative British response to the inefficiencies of US 
regulation. It has through its apparent theoretical and practical superiority gradually 
replaced rate-of-retum regulation, even in the US. Price-cap regulation intends to 
mimic the incentive to reduce costs experienced in competitive markets. In order to 
achieve this, the regulator sets a pricing rule of the general form RPI-X, which is
revisited every four or five years in periodic reviews9. Under the assumption that the 
cost base of the company is decreasing and that efficiency gains are possible, the 
pricing rule guarantees a steady price reduction for the consumers of the utility 
service. In addition, and here lies the novelty of price-cap regulation, the incentive 
for cost minimisation is maintained. In the years between pricing reviews, the 
company can keep all profits resulting from its outperforming the regulator’s 
forecasts of its future costs. Only at the review will the rent resulting from efficiency 
gains be passed on to consumers. Put simply, in a incentive price regulation regime 
profits today are lower prices for consumers tomorrow10.
Littlechild (1999, pp20-21) summarises the advantages of incentive price-cap 
regulation in the following manner:
‘The RPI-Xprice cap allows prices to increase (or requires prices to decrease) 
at Xper cent below the retail price index, which is a measure o f inflation, for a 
specified number o f years. This gives assurance to investors, managers and 
customers. It also gives greater efficiency incentives to companies in the short 
term. Customers benefit from the prospect o f the resulting increased efficiency 
being passed to them over time, when the price cap is reset. Where necessary,
9 In the formula, RPI stands for the retail price index, and X for the efficiency factor, the latter representing the 
cost savings the regulator estimates the company can realise over the review period. The formula implies that the 
regulated company can raise its prices in tune with inflation, but needs to reduce them in tune with efficiency 
savings.
10 For a recent and comprehensive discussion of the mechanisms underlying price-cap regulation, as well as its 
accounting implications see Vass (2001).
prescribed minimum standards can ensure that cost and price reductions are 
not at the expense o f quality o f service. '
More recently however, the infallibility of price-cap regulation has been questioned. 
Prices must not be set so low that the financial viability of the company is 
endangered, nor should they be set so high as to allow extraordinary profits that are 
not the result of efficiency gains. In order to set the prices at the ‘right* level, the cost 
basis used by the regulator is crucial. The key elements included in the assessment of 
the regulated company’s costs are the operating expenditure (OPEX), the capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), an evaluation of the asset base, a depreciation rule, and, 
finally, an estimation of the cost of capital. The regulator is obliged to adjudicate on 
all these elements, and the scope for error is considerable. The information 
asymmetry will make the exact determination of the key cost elements difficult, 
specially at the beginning of regulation11. Moreover, it has been argued (Newbery 
(2000), Helm (1996)) that the greater the mistakes made at the moment of the initial 
price setting, the more difficult it is politically to avoid corrective interventions 
taking place before the next review. However, once the company anticipates that 
regulatory interventions to claw back extraordinary profits are possible between set 
reviews, the incentive to reduce costs is blunted, and the difference between price- 
cap and rate-of-retum regimes vanishes.
11 The UK regulators have arguably learnt a lot about the costs of the companies they are regulating over the past 
decade or so, and they have made creative use of yardstick competition to address the information problem.
2.2.2 The scope of regulation
In theory, once liberalisation is complete only the core natural monopoly activities 
need to be regulated. For the essential network services, the terms of access as well 
as the level of the access charges need to be closely monitored in order to make sure 
that all players present in the market benefit from a level playing field12. Price caps 
imposed on access charges are permanent as long as the natural monopoly conditions 
of the network prevail.
However, one of the characteristics of network utilities at the moment of 
liberalisation is that the incumbent continues to dominate the market even in the 
newly competitive parts, and that entry will only gradually lead to effective 
competition. Because of the dominant position the former monopoly enjoys, 
regulation to strengthen competition is necessary for a transition period. This implies 
a range of regulatory tasks from the regulation of retail prices in captive market 
segments, to abolishing remaining entry barriers and countering anti-competitive 
practices by the incumbent.
The architects of the new regulatory framework for network utilities intended this 
pro-competition part of regulation to wither away with the advent of competition13. 
While the transition process has taken longer than many had initially expected, the 
end of retail price regulation in liberalised services has occurred for large parts of the
12 The risk of discriminatory behaviour against third parties in industries where the network company has 
simultaneous interests in the competitive parts o f the supply chain and the danger this represents for the creation 
of a level playing field is one o f the main arguments advanced for vertical separation.
13 Littlechild (1999, p.22) reiterates what he has written in his 1983 government report on BT’s regulation, that 
is, that RPI-X would only be a means of ’holding the fort’ until competition arrived.
UK gas and electricity retail market, and is discussed for telecommunications in 
2002.
2.3 Independent sector regulators
The third innovative element of UK regulatory reform that has left a profound 
impression on the current regulation of network utilities in Europe and world-wide, 
is the establishment of independent sector regulators. In the UK, the privatised 
utilities were granted licences formalising their obligations. Simultaneously, newly 
established Director Generals were appointed for each of the reformed sectors. The 
Director Generals were given statutory duties and powers and became the custodians 
of the licences. Their primary duties were to ensure that the utilities could finance 
their functions, and the promotion of competition (except for water). In addition, 
they pledged to protect customers, promote efficiency and to prevent discrimination 
on the markets.
When the Labour government came into power in 1997, a fundamental review of the 
regulatory framework for utilities was undertaken (see DTI (1998a) and (1998b) for 
an outline of the issues involved). The discussion of the reform process goes beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but at the end of the review, the regulatory framework in its 
general principles as it had been established in the 1980s was found to respond in a 
satisfactory manner to the demands placed on it. In particular, the principles of 
customer protection as primary regulatory objective and of independent sector
regulators were maintained14. The same reasons that ensure the continued existence 
of the independent sector regulators in the UK, have also led to such institutions 
being set up by the European governments in their efforts to reform network utilities.
It should be noted that the independence of sector regulators should not be 
interpreted as independence from all public authority, only independence from the 
executive powers of the state is required. Regulatory decisions have to be taken 
within general duties and powers defined by the legislative powers. In order to 
safeguard the legitimacy of the regulatory institution, the regulator has to be subject 
to control by the legislator and its decisions should be able to be challenged by the 
courts.
Among the reasons that have made independent sector regulators the preferred 
option for liberalised utility sectors count the following (Henry and Matheu, 2001). 
First (and this is of particular relevance in many European countries where 
privatisation has not, or not yet, accompanied liberalisation), independent regulators 
solve the dilemma of ‘the State as shareholder and judge’ and offer a transparent 
solution to the inherent conflict of interest. Moreover, the arm’s length relationship 
between the government and independent regulators might make it more difficult for 
a dominant public operator to capture the regulator. In the case of privatised 
industries, an independent regulator might be better equipped to arbitrate between 
newcomers and the former monopoly.
14 The reform process has resulted in a new Utilities Act to be adopted by Royal Decree in Summer 2000.
The second group of arguments supporting independent sector regulators centres 
around the assumption that sector specific regulators bringing together specialist 
skills and working without government interference will be able to investigate 
regulatory issues and disputes more efficiently and rapidly than, say, the general 
competition authorities or the legal court system.
Let the following two comments conclude this section. First, despite the general 
preference for independent sector regulators and their apparent advantages, this 
option has not been adopted universally. In Europe, Germany has for instance 
rejected the establishment of an independent sector-specific energy regulator for its 
liberalised electricity and gas market and has opted for making the general 
competition authorities the regulatory agency responsible for the sector. New 
Zealand provides another example, where competition issues occurring in the 
context of telecommunication services are settled by the courts. Second, questions 
have been raised about the future of sector specific regulators. Not only is there the 
issue of dealing with the increasing number of multi-utilities, raising cross-sectoral 
regulatory questions, and therefore debate about multi-sector regulators. On a more 
fundamental level, one can also question the continuing relevance of specialised 
regulators for sectors where liberalisation is close to complete.
3. Lessons from the UK regulatory reform
In the introduction to their 1998 book, Helm and Jenkinson argue:
‘As with privatisation, the idea o f competition has driven politicians to 
embrace policies frequently without sufficient attention to the details o f 
implementation. [...] Competition is not an end in itself but a means to higher
welfare. Its applicability to particular circumstances depends upon relevant 
costs and benefits.'
Amstrong et al. (1994, ppl00-101) offer further discussion of the issues surrounding 
both the normative question of the desirability of competition, and the positive 
question of its feasibility. They conclude that there are many cases with conflicting 
interests where careful weighing of the costs and benefits of introducing competition 
has to occur.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, this section outlines some of the issues that the 
UK experience has revealed to be critical for the design of successful regulatory 
reform. First, different types of competition are relevant for different parts of utility 
networks and different sectors; second, a number of transitional issues need to be 
considered at the moment reform is designed in order to minimise its costs; and 
third, the importance of structural reform is highlighted.
3.1 Types of competition
Four basic types of competition applicable to liberalised network utilities can be 
identified: output competition, input competition, franchise competition and, finally, 
competition stemming from capital markets (Helm and Jenkinson (1997))15.
Output competition is the type of competition most clearly identified with the 
potentially competitive activities of the network utilities. It refers to the abolishion of 
franchise monopolies in electricity and gas, or the free service provision policy in
telecommunications. Depending on the structure of the industry in question, the 
definition of output can vary and range from the competitive supply of end 
customers of energy or telephone services, to competition in upstream generation 
and between gas shippers.
However, competitive mechanisms can also be put to use in connection with the core 
monopoly areas of the network utilities. Input competition uses the mechanism of 
benchmarking, whereby the utility is required to test its own production costs against 
the market. This form of competition has predominately been used in the UK water 
industry, where the scope for output competition is limited. Another use for input 
competition has been found in the context of input procurement. So has for instance 
Railtrack tendered out maintenance and civil engineering contracts to achieve 
efficiency savings. Input competition can also be seen as an instrument that helps to 
overcome the informational asymmetries between the regulators and the regulated 
companies.
Another form of competition related to the core monopoly services is the competitive 
bidding for monopoly licences. The competition in this case is for a monopoly right 
and in theory bidding should transfer the potential monopoly rent to customers or 
government. Such franchise competition has been applied most extensively in the 
UK rail reform. Where subsidies are involved, the bids are aimed at minimising the 
Treasury contributions.
15 See Klein (1998, pp42-43) for an alternative classification of different types of competition.
The final form of competition is provided by the capital market and applies to both 
potentially competitive and core monopoly activities. Competing sets of owners and 
managers can take over assets and licences of utilities, and, given a price-cap, 
attempt to reduce costs to maximise profits. In the UK, the regional electricity 
companies experienced a wave of take-overs after 1995, when the golden shares the 
government still held in these companies expired, and still today the mergers and 
acquisition activity in the sector is high.
The various types of competition will apply to varying degree in different parts of 
the network supply chain. Competition is often introduced gradually, but will depend 
on the underlying structure of services and may change over time with technological 
progress (see also below). The design of a competitive market will vary from 
industry to industry, according to the kinds of market failure identified.
3.2 Transitional issues
It is practically impossible to transform instantaneously a state monopoly into a 
competitive undertaking, whether it is privatised or not. Transitional issues which 
experience has revealed to be crucial in the reform process include contracting 
problems and distributional issues due to the unwinding of cross-subsidies. 
Moreover, technological progress has often played a decisive role in re-defining the 
scope of competition in different industries.
3.2.1 Contracting problems- stranded contracts and assets
Because of the large sunk capital costs of network industries, vertical integration was
the preferred form of organisation of the former state monopolies. Monopoly 
franchises offered certainty of retail markets, and investments in production units 
could be undertaken in a relatively risk-free environment, as costs could be passed 
through to captive customers. In some industries, in particular the electricity and gas
industries, long term vertical contracts took the place of physical integration between 
upstream and downstream activities.
The introduction of supply competition for utility services removes the certainty 
regarding the retail market. At the moment of liberalisation, British Gas has found 
itself burdened with long term contracts with gas shippers, the terms and conditions 
of which corresponded to monopoly conditions but proved to be extremely onerous 
in the context of competitive supply. Similarly, state electricity generators have built 
nuclear power stations the decommissioning of which raised issues that had to be 
resolved at privatisation.
When deciding on the path regulatory reform should take, governments have to 
decide how to deal with the stranded contracts and assets of incumbents, and how to 
distribute the burden of their costs. In the case of British Gas, the shareholders had to 
shoulder the costs of long-term take-or-pay contracts. The expensive contracts BG 
was saddled with proved however to be the singularly beneficial for entry as they 
were easy to undercut. Failure to specify at the outset of the reform process how the 
distributional issues related to stranded costs are resolved can lead to costly delays in 
the transition period. Contractual issues were one of the reasons why progress on the 
European directives concerning the liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets 
took several years to materialise. In the end, the stranded cost issue received explicit 
treatment in the directives.
3.2.2. Cross-subsidies
In the quasi-totality of the developed world, utility services are regarded as essential, 
or merit, goods, i.e. universal access to them is considered part of the more general 
welfare state. When services were provided by state-owned, vertically integrated
companies, supply could be extended to high cost areas, for instance very remote 
areas, and to marginal customers, such as rural communities, without recovery of full 
costs from these areas or customers. With the help of cross-subsidies, for example 
access charges to utility services were kept deliberately low in order to promote 
universal access, and policies of geographically balanced tariffs disregarding cost 
structures could be implemented if so desired.
However, such distribution objectives are only sustainable as long as there is 
monopoly supply. Cost-oriented entry will undermine the cross-subsidies by making 
it impossible to over-charge for services where competitive entry is possible. The 
introduction of competition therefore leads to winners and losers compared to the 
monopoly situation. The political sensitivity of this distributional issue has in some 
cases led to great resistance to liberalisation. However, the debate provoked has also 
resulted in the definition of mechanisms that allow the pursuit of public service 
obligations in a competitive environment, for example universal service funds in 
telecommunications. Moreover, part of the debate has been disarmed by the overall 
lower prices that competition has brought about. The protection of marginal 
customer groups remains nevertheless one of the most publicised objectives of the 
regulators16.
16 See for instance Ofgem’s duties under the Utilities Act 2000. The special regard the regulator needs to have to 
the interests of customers who are disabled or chronically sick, of pensionable age, o f low income or those living 
in rural areas, is explicitly mentioned.
3.2.3 Technological progress
For many utility services, competition requires complex information technology to 
make a competitive market possible, that is, a market where customers can switch 
freely between suppliers. In telecommunication, gas and electricity, only the advent 
of new technology has made the data handling, metering, and billing services 
possible that are needed to deal with thousands of customers switching each week. 
The installation of costly electricity or gas meters for households willing to switch 
has provoked regulatory debate because of the barrier to switching it represents. The 
development of standardised load profiles for households, making individual meters 
obsolete, has presented a solution to this problem.
In the case of electricity, technology has also played an important role for system 
balancing and the development of spot markets which are seen as alternative to 
vertical integration and long-term contracts17. In telecommunications, where 
technological progress has perhaps played the biggest role as catalyst for 
liberalisation, alternative transmission technologies have led to a questioning of the 
continued relevance of monopoly networks and infrastructure competition is today 
fast advancing.
3.3 The importance of structural reform
In the previous section, the logic underlying the separation of core monopoly 
networks and competitive service provision over these networks has been outlined. 
Structural reform of the often vertically integrated former state monopolies is in this
17 See Klein (1998) on the subject of spot markets.
context often an essential part of the liberalisation and regulation process in network 
utilities.
Essentially two ways exist to separate the core monopoly network from competitive 
activities, the first being the physical vertical separation of the activities, the second 
liberalisation of access coupled with account unbundling. From a regulatory point of 
view, the first option of vertical separation will make the task of creating a level 
playing field for competition easier. As long as the essential network facilities and 
competitive services are provided by the same company, the incentive for 
discriminatory behaviour towards third parties requesting access and competing with 
the integrated company on the liberalised market remains strong and requires 
extreme regulatory vigilance. Entry can be deterred not only through real 
discriminatory action from the part of the integrated company, but often through the 
suspicion of such behaviour alone.
The question whether or not structural reform should take the form of physical 
separation ultimately depends on the assessment of the costs of such a step compared 
to its benefits. The costs of disintegration comprise most notably the loss of 
economies of scale and co-ordination, its benefits an improvement of the conditions 
for competition and a narrowing down of the need for regulation. There is no unique 
answer, and in practice different solutions have been adopted in different industries 
and countries.
In the UK, British Telecom and initially also British Gas, were privatised as 
integrated companies. BG was split up at a later stage, but the telecommunications 
industry has remained integrated and access obligations have been imposed on the 
network parts. One reason for refraining from imposing vertical restructuring on the
telecommunications industry might have been the potential for network competition 
that had already emerged at the moment of privatisation. In contrast, and partly 
because of the problems encountered with the continued integrated structure of the 
gas industry, the UK electricity industry was vertically and horizontally split up 
before its privatisation. The UK water companies in turn were privatised as 
integrated regional monopolies.
One important lesson that has been learnt from the British experience is that it is 
important to solve the question of the industrial structure most likely to bring about 
efficient competition before privatisation (in so far as this is possible given the 
uncertainty linked to technological change). With hindsight, it is clear that a lengthy 
and costly transition period in UK’s gas industry would have been avoided had the 
pipeline business been split from the supply business at the moment of privatisation. 
In the electricity sector, not so much the vertical industry structure, but the horizontal 
market power of the near duopoly of NationalPower and PowerGen in the generation 
market posed regulatory problems.
In companies where the different elements of the supply chain remain integrated, the 
establishment of separate legal entities within a holding company is often 
prescribed18. Such legal separation provides the second best solution to physical 
separation, improving the position of third parties with respect to the incumbent. The 
need to regulate the terms and prices of access to the essential network is a major
regulatory task in network industries and will necessarily be hindered by the 
information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated company discussed 
in section 2. Legal and account separation improve this problem and are intended to 
help the regulator set up non-discriminatory transfer prices between the activities.
4. Regulatory reform in Europe
The approach European authorities have taken with respect to the reform of network 
utilities has largely been influenced by the UK experience. The principles of 
promotion of competition, incentive regulation and independent regulators have been 
adopted in EU directives covering the liberalisation of all major network utilities, 
including telecommunications, gas, electricity, postal services, and rail transport.
Despite of the co-ordination of approaches resulting from the adoption of common 
principles, the directives have left considerable room for national manoeuvre. This 
reflects the need on European level to take the differences in the institutional, 
political and cultural environment of each member state into account. At the same 
time, the national differences have led to additional regulatory requirements 
regarding the harmonisation of utility networks interconnected to form a single 
European market.
4.1 The importance of national endowment
The principles of UK regulatory reform have shaped profoundly the European Union 
approach to reform, resulting in a common framework for the European member
18 The EU energy directives for instance refrain from imposing mandatory vertical separation, recognising that 
the costs and benefits of such an act need to be assessed separately for individual national systems. Account
states based on the different sector liberalisation directives. However, regardless of 
the common reform path, national differences in the exact interpretation of the 
liberalisation policies remain.
Newbery (2000, p.l) highlights the importance of national differences in the 
introduction to his recent book:
‘Network utilities pose special problems o f ownership and regulation whose 
solution is constrained by the institutional endowment o f the country. Public 
policy towards these utilities will inevitably reflect deeper political and 
cultural features o f society, as will the institutions which evolve in response to 
these factors. ’
In a recent book edited by Henry, Matheu and Jeunemaitre (eds, 2001), recent 
national approaches to the regulation of utility networks are discussed, further 
elaborating on the evolution of the UK model in other European countries.
The following classification of explanations for national differences between 
European member countries can be suggested: the first set of explanations centres 
around different industry structures at the moment of liberalisation, the second 
around existing legal and institutional frameworks, and the third regards different 
responses to the distributional issues raised by liberalisation and possibly 
privatisation.
unbundling and management separation are however mandatory.
The discussions about ownership and industry restructuring in the previous sections 
have already hinted at the failure to find unique answers to the question regarding the 
optimal model. Depending on the original industry set-up, the assessment of the 
costs and benefits of such fundamental issues vary. The reform measures undertaken 
in Europe’s electricity industries illustrate this point. In Germany, the historic strong 
presence of municipal and regional utilities suggests that public ownership might be 
less of a problem, because competition between public entities is possible on 
national level. However, the decentralised structure also makes restructuring of the 
German electricity industry politically very difficult, as there is no unique public 
authority to impose vertical separation (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion 
of the German case).
In France, breaking up the generation monopoly of incumbent Electricity de France 
was judged by many to be too costly: given the centralised organisation of the 
industry, rebuilt according to a public plan after World War II, economies of scope 
and co-ordination are important, and would have been lost in a break up of the 
industry (see Bureau and Curien, 2001)19. Strong union representation has also made 
privatisation very difficult in France. In contrast, Italy’s government decided to 
divest a large part of incumbent ENEL’s generating capacity and to privatise the 
incumbent in order to encourage entry. In Spain, similar to Germany, the existing 
industry structure already supported a number of electricity generators, and
19 The way the ‘inseparability’ o f the French generation industry has eventually been resolved, is by virtual 
auctions.
abolishing the legal protection of their incumbent positions was deemed sufficient to 
induce competition between them. Moreover, the companies were already under 
private management at the moment of liberalisation.
Regarding existing institutional and legal structures in European countries, it rapidly 
becomes clear that their influence in the reform solutions adopted is strong, in 
particular with respect to the regulatory institutions. Italy has enthusiastically 
embraced the idea of independent sector regulators, arguably in part because of the 
general loss of credibility under which Italy’s public offices suffer (see Bavagnoli, 
2001). In Germany, the idea of an independent regulator was accepted for 
telecommunications and postal services—the structure of which resembles the initial 
UK conditions—, but rejected in the electricity and gas industries, where it was 
deemed that self-regulation by the industry would be sufficient protection for 
competition. Spain, despite having established a regulator for the energy sector, has 
subsequently curtailed its formal powers and independence and the government 
continues to intervene in industry outcomes (see Curien and Matheu, 2001). In 
France, winning the battle for independent regulatory offices has required the strong 
lobbying from the incumbent utilities, with France Telecom and EDF fearing for 
their international reputation and business if they were going to be perceived as 
protected by the State (see Bureau and Curien, 2001).
Last, cultural differences and historical accident matter in the context of resistance to 
reform provoked by the redistribution issues. One particularly poignant example of 
this is France, where the notion of public service and equal access at affordable cost 
is deeply embedded in society. The unwinding of cross-subsidies accompanying 
liberalisation has provoked a public debate that has lasted for close to a decade.
Privatisation proposals have been attacked at every turn by the powerful public 
sector unions defending their interests, and so far only France Telecom has been 
partly privatised. On the opposite end of the spectrum lies Germany, where social 
and redistributional policies have not been pursued by means of utility service prices. 
The fundamental reform measures adopted in this country were certainly helped by 
the relative lack of existing cross-subsidies between regions and users20.
Once the possible interactions between the different economic, institutional and 
political interests at play are taken into consideration, and the scope of the illustrative 
examples of the preceding paragraphs is widened to take all fifteen European 
member states into account, it is easy to see how different combinations of 
circumstances will account for national differences in the reform path taken. In what 
follows, one immediate consequence to the diversity of national characteristics is 
discussed, that is the need for harmonisation and co-operation between national 
regulators in the pursuit of a single integrated European market.
4.2 The importance of harmonisation and co-operation
With the adoption of regulatory reform in Europe, the need for harmonisation has
been added to the regulatory agenda. Not only do European regulators have to 
address the issues that were at the centre of sections 2 and 3, they also need to work 
on the construction of a single market and on the abolishment of national frontiers in 
the provision of utility services. This entails new regulation to ensure the technical
20 There has however been substantial political resistance linked to the subsidies received by the domestic coal 
industry in the case of electricity liberalisation.
harmonisation of national sectors and their interoperability in the face of a growing 
number of operators21.
One way this demand on the new European sector regulators has been addressed is 
through the establishment of regulatory fora, the aim of which is to foster co­
operation on regulatory matters. Vasconcelos (2001) identifies two fundamental 
reasons for co-operation between regulators. First, it improves the performance of 
individual national regulators through the sharing of knowledge and has therefore a 
direct positive impact on the regulated markets. Co-operation also makes it easier to 
assess the performance of national industries by means of international 
benchmarking. Second, the lack of co-operation might hinder the development of 
competition in national markets by making entry by companies from one European 
country into liberalised markets in another country difficult. Thus, the customers in 
the latter country would be prevented from reaping the benefits of liberalisation.
The exchange of information between regulators allows learning from mutual 
experience and the UK regulators are appreciated members in the co-operation 
efforts. Working on common solutions ex-ante also eliminates the need for ex-post 
harmonisation adjustments and improves overall regulatory efficiency. Co-operation 
can also be beneficial in terms of the internal management of regulatory offices 
through the sharing of knowledge and resources and through improving the 
transparency of the regulatory process.
21 This point is forcefully made in a recent French report on the liberalisation and regulation of network utilities.
The increased importance of harmonisation and of knowledge sharing is also evident 
in recent developments in the UK. Cross-sectoral working groups including the 
regulators of all utility industries have been set up, and a common approach has for 
instance been defined in the area of regulatory accounts, where sector approaches 
took a very wide range, from very detailed guidelines published by Ofwat, the water 
regulator, to very little guidance given by Ofgem22.
In addition to these fundamental benefits to co-operation, recent changes in the 
industry structures across Europe call for international collaboration. European 
utilities are at present mutating from national into pan-European players through a 
series of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The regulation of such companies 
requires the exchange of information at the same level. The internationalisation of 
former national champions however also heralds the emergence of a European 
market where supra-national utilities compete, a development that certainly raises 
new regulatory challenges, and strengthens the case for co-operation.
5. Assessment
Partly in recognition of the impossibility to prescribe a complete transition plan, 
sector regulators in the UK were given the primary duty to protect customer 
interests, primarily by means of promoting and protecting competition while 
ensuring that the utility’s function could be financed. In practice, the regulators
See Commissariat General du Plan (2000,), Services publics: perspectives de concurrence et regulation, La 
documentation fran^aise.
found themselves with considerable scope to follow their preferred course of action 
to obtain these objectives23.
It has been argued (Helm and Jenkinson, 1998), that regulatory discretion has led to 
increased uncertainty and risk in the regulated industries and therefore to an increase 
in the cost of capital. The problem created by regulatory uncertainty is serious as it 
can have harmful long-run effects through its impact on investment decisions. One 
of the main recommendations for reform over the past years has been to improve 
transparency and increase public accountability of regulatory decisions, a 
recommendation implemented in the Utilities Act 2000.
However, there is also need to recognise that a certain amount of regulatory 
flexibility is necessary in view of an environment changing with technological 
progress and new industry developments. Regulatory rigidity would undermine 
public consent and investor confidence if it were judged that new circumstances 
warranted a change of approach. In defining regulatory policies, governments and 
regulators need to weigh the incremental benefits of changing a given approach 
against the costs in terms of investment uncertainty and sunk costs created by such a 
change. The key test should be whether the discretion improves regulation tested 
against the objectives and framework of regulatory principles (i.e. changing the
22 For information on common regulatory accounting guidelines see Ofgem (2000), Regulatory Accounts Final 
Proposals, November; or Ofwat (2001), MD171: The 2001 review o f the regulatory accounting guidelines, May 
16th 2001.
23 See for instance Hansard Society (1997) for a discussion of the discretionary powers of regulators.
regime was reasonable, necessary and equitable over time in relation to all 
stakeholders).
The UK experience has also shown that regulation for competition is less transitory 
than expected by many at the outset, and in many cases has led to more, not less, 
regulation over time. New regulatory questions keep arising, a point illustrated by 
two current examples of regulatory debate.
The first example refers to the trend towards re-integration in industries where 
structural separation was part of the reform, notably the energy industries. Also, 
multi-utilities are emerging as a new form of utility service provision, integrating for 
instance telecommunications and electricity supply, or offering dual-fuel (i.e. gas 
and electricity) deals. A regulator expected to promote competition in the 
consumers’ interest, needs to address the question of whether such re-integration is 
ultimately good or bad for customer welfare. Vertical integration can be the market’s 
response to the cost structure prevailing in the industry, and lead to overall cost 
savings. With appropriate regulation, these can then be passed on to consumers in 
the form of lower prices. On the other hand, regulators have to consider the danger 
of re-integration leading to diminished competition and barriers to entry. The trade­
off is one of decreasing costs and diminished uncertainty regarding supply markets 
for the utilities on the one hand, and increasing market power on the other. In 
addition, from an institutional point of view, re-integration raises the question of 
multi-sector regulators.
The second example of current regulatory debate also concerns ultimately the 
optimal industry structure of network utilities. In telecommunications, technological 
progress has fuelled regulatory debate regarding the question whether it is
infrastructure or service competition that will serve the consumers’ interests best. 
The underlying problem is one of incentives to innovation and short term versus long 
term benefits. Providing open access to all network services, including the local 
loop, will in the short run create the most favourable conditions for entry and lead to 
the proliferation of competition in services delivered to the household. Benefits in 
the form of lower prices can immediately be passed on to consumers. In the longer 
term however, imposing access obligations and network unbundling might deter 
investment in network facilities, leading ultimately to an overall deterioration of 
service quality.
Regulatory decisions regarding the terms and price of network access will influence 
whether investment occurs rather in the area of network facilities or service 
provision. The answers to questions of the kind: ‘Where does the innovative 
potential in telecommunications lie -  in the network or in services? Is fostering 
infrastructure competition in telecommunications efficient given the growing 
economies of scale of optic fibre networks?’ are not likely to be universal, and 
require decisions taken in an uncertain environment.
The above paragraphs make it clear that perhaps one of the most difficult issues that 
governments and regulators have to re-assess continuously concerns the extent to 
which regulatory decisions replace market outcomes and therefore make the goal of 
sunset regulation unattainable.
6. Concluding remarks
Many complex issues need to be solved in the process of transforming markets 
formerly supplied by incumbent state monopolies into competitive markets. 
Transition requires acknowledgement that there is no unique solution, but that each
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case for reform will need to be considered in its own context. Competition can take 
on different forms, and which best meets efficiency criteria depends upon the market 
and government failures which arise in each industry and country. Moreover, 
transitional pitfalls are many, and technological progress can change the competitive 
potential of markets along the way. However, despite of all the different individual 
cases, consensus on many regulatory issues has emerged around the UK model of 
regulatory reform. The UK experience has provided valuable lessons for the 
European countries, embarking on the path of regulatory reform in utility networks 
some 16 years after BT was privatised. The well-founded principles of the UK 
regulatory reform -  introduction of competition, incentive price-cap regulation, and 
independent sector regulators -  are echoed in the European liberalisation directives.
QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULTORY REFORM
In chapter 1 the argument has been advanced that the set of principles underlying 
regulatory reform in the UK has guided European efforts in liberalisation and 
regulation, but that unique national characteristics have played an important role in 
the exact implementation of the principles in individual countries. The importance of 
national characteristics is illustrated in chapter 2 in the case of Germany.
Based on the theoretical principles of UK reform set out in chapter 1, and on the 
framework employed in the fundamental review of the regulatory regime undertaken 
in the UK in 1998 (see DTI 1998a and 1998b), a questionnaire has been compiled 
and is reproduced in the following pages. It has provided the analytical framework 
for an investigation of the question how key features of regulation have been 
interpreted in the context of the reform of telecommunications, electricity, and 
railway services in Germany. In addition to the utilisation of primary and secondary 
literature sources, a number of key officials and company employees in Germany 
have been interviewed on the basis of the questionnaire. A list of the interviewees is 
given in Appendix 1.
The results of the investigation are presented in Chapter 2.
Questionnaire
0. Preliminary point: Changes in the legal framework
• Have any new laws, decrees, administrative rules, etc., recently been passed 
(or are they being prepared) in order to liberalise and regulate the sectors 
considered, i.e. telecommunications, electricity, railways and post?
• Are these texts easily available?
1. Institutional aspects
1.1 Independence of the regulator
• Is the regulator merely an office inside a ministerial department?
• Is it a public body protected from the interference of ministerial departments 
and politicians? For example, how is (or are) the director(s) of such a public 
body appointed, how are they protected against arbitrary dismissal, how are 
the necessary resources (staff, funding) provided?
• Is it a ‘chamber’ within a general competition agency?
1.2 Convergence of sectors and boundaries of regulation responsibilities
• How is the convergence between sectors (electricity with gas, 
telecommunications with broadcasting and IT, trains and intercity buses) 
reflected at the level of regulators?
• Are there opportunities for different regulators to compare (and possibly 
harmonise) their respective methodologies when dealing with similar issues
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(for example methodologies to evaluate the cost of capital when setting price- 
caps)?
1.3 Access to relevant information
• There is an inherent asymmetry of information between the regulator and the 
regulated firms. How is it overcome? For example, by special investigation 
powers, by specifying accounting systems for regulatory purposes, by 
changing the incentives firms might have to reveal information?
1.4 Consultation and information procedures
• Who and how does the regulator consult when preparing decisions, in 
particular affected third parties like consumers? Are there formal duties and 
procedures of consultation?
• Does the regulator play a specific role (with dedicated staff and other 
required resources) in informing the consumers about their rights, about 
changes in services provided and prices charged by the operators, about 
possible problems in the provision of services, about how to resolve conflicts 
between a consumer and an operator (possibly intervening as mediator)?
1.5 Accountability and rights of appeal
• To whom is the regulator answerable? For example, to Parliament, or public 
opinion in general, in so far as the regulator has to provide written 
justification for its decisions.
• How and to whom is it possible to make appeals against its decision?
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2. Regulation of the conditions of competition
2.1 Operating licences
• What are the duties and the powers of the regulator concerning the issuing of 
licences to operators, and their subsequent modifications (if required)?
2.2 Access to essential network facilities and to scarce resources
• How is non-discrimination regarding the access to essential network facilities 
ensured? What are the roles of the regulator, as mediator, or as decision 
maker? For example, setting technical conditions for access and access 
charges, or implementing an allocation mechanism for scarce resources?
• Is the regulator in a position to recommend, or even to make decisions, on 
structural changes, for example vertical separation in order to isolate essential 
network facilities?
2.3 Promoting competition
• Is the regulator empowered to prevent and sanction specific anti-competitive 
practices? For example, tacit collusion by the main electricity producers in 
Britain to manipulate the pool price, or excessive switching costs set by an 
incumbent telecommunication operator?
• Does the regulator share with the competition authorities powers to enforce 
the general competition law?
• What duties and powers does the regulator have to play an active role in 
promoting competition? For example, in a sector where there is still a largely
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dominant incumbent operator and some horizontal separation is feasible, or in 
activities where competition is feasible but where there are still rules limiting 
it (as for retail sale in electricity in many European countries).
2.4 Regulation of universal service provisions in so far as they interact with 
the conditions of competition
• How does the regulator ensure compatibility between universal service 
provisions and the pursuit of competition? For example, through the re­
definition of universal service obligations, the way of selecting universal 
service operators, the rules for allocating financial compensations where 
universal service provisions create deficits?
3. Regulation as substitute for competition
Here the regulation of the quality and price of services are considered. The services
can be under temporary regulation in the sense of potentially competitive services
still in the transition between monopoly and competitive supply, or they can be
subject to permanent regulation because natural monopoly conditions prevail.
• Has the regulator the power to set quality targets (and impose penalties for 
non-compliance) and price-caps, or does it only propose to a political 
authority that retains the power to decide?
• Same question concerning the levels of investment (mainly in infrastructure) 
by providers of services under monopoly.
• On which grounds and on the basis of which methodology does the regulator 
choose the levels of quality targets and price-caps?
How does the regulator control for possible cross-subsidies from activities 
under monopoly to competitive ones? What role does he play in devising or 
approving rules for the sharing of common costs?
Other goals that the regulator might pursue
Does the regulator play a role in the definition of universal service 
obligations, or is it a matter reserved to Parliament and Government?
Does the regulator try to enforce a more desirable distribution of the benefits 
of liberalisation, for example in favour of disabled or low income consumers, 
possibly through specific tariff provisions?
Does the regulator pursue social and environmental objectives going beyond 
a narrow definition of universal service provision? For example, 
geographically uniform prices, environmental policies, or educational goals 
(for example, internet access for all schools)?
Chapter 2: Contrasts in Germany: Decentralization, Self­
regulation and Sector-specific Regulators
1. Introduction
This chapter offers an overview of the recent liberalisation of three German network 
utilities and the regulatory framework established in these industries. Legal, 
structural, and institutional changes that have been implemented in the past few 
years in telecommunications, electricity, and railway services are surveyed and the 
success of introducing competition into these industries is evaluated.
The introduction of competition into Germany’s network utilities is part of the 
overall European effort to open up these industries with a view to create a single 
European market. However, besides it obvious size, Germany displays a number of 
characteristics that make it stand out among the European member states. This 
chapter discusses in some detail the unusual decentralised approach that has been 
adopted in the reform both of the electricity and the rail industry. Unlike the 
integrated, monolithic markets that are observed in many European network 
industries, these two German industries display a fragmented structure with a 
relatively large number of companies. Because of this particular initial setting, the 
regulatory regimes that have been established differ in their design from regimes in 
place in other countries.
The German case illustrates that the economic principles underlying the introduction 
of competition into utility networks, such as non-discriminatory access to the 
network, or price regulation, coexist with and are adapted to unique national 
environments. In particular, in the German electricity sector, the presence of 
numerous companies has led to a regulatory framework relying more on self­
regulation than on structural reform. In the railways sector, the regulatory institutions
in place reflect the strong regional and local element present in German public 
transport. So far, an independent, sector specific regulator, modelled after the British 
example, has only been set up for Germany’s telecommunications and postal 
markets.
The idea of this chapter is to survey the multiple changes that have occurred in 
Germany’s utility industries in the recent past, to highlight unique national 
characteristics, and to draw attention to remaining structural problems. It is not a 
goal to explore in great depth any particular issue, but rather to give the reader an 
impression of the factors that shape the way in which German network utilities have 
been liberalised.
Despite of this objective, an important aspect of recent German developments has 
largely been omitted from discussion. Complexity has been added to regulatory 
reform in Germany by the impact of reunification. The costs of this act and the 
associated task of rebuilding the utility networks in the former German Democratic 
Republic were considered by some as reason to request an exceptional status for 
Germany in the European liberalisation efforts. Germany’s policy makers have 
mostly resisted these calls and went ahead with their liberalisation agenda, while 
allocating additional public funds to infrastructure investments. Some transitory 
exemptions to the introduction of competition have also been granted, for instance in 
the case of mandatory third party access to the electricity grid of the new Lander. 
Nonetheless, the debate surrounding the appropriate treatment of undertakings with 
substantial investments in the new Lander illustrates conflicting regulatory priorities. 
The introduction of competition needed to be balanced against the protection of 
investment incentives, as well as against social and political objectives, often linked
to employment issues. The issues raised go beyond the remit of this chapter and are 
not treated here.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, the main 
market characteristics as well as recent liberalisation measures are surveyed for each 
of the three industries electricity, rail and telecommunications. The subject of section 
3 is the regulatory framework that has been set up in the three sectors. Section 4 
provides an account of how the three markets have developed since the introduction 
of competition and section 5 evaluates the success and potential pitfalls of the 
reforms. Section 6 concludes.
2. Market structure and liberalisation
2.1 Electricity
2.1.1 Industry structure
Germany’s electricity supply industry (ESI) possesses for historic reasons a 
decentralised structure which results in a large number of companies on the market24. 
Among the nearly 1,000 German electricity utilities, three different groups can be 
identified. These are distinguished by size and different core activities, however, all 
are vertically integrated. Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the industry 
structure.
24 A summary account of the history of the German electricity industry is found in Milller and Stahl (1996). For 
more detailed discussions regarding the industry structure see also Sturm and Wilks (1997), and IEA (1997).
Figure 1: Structure of the German electricity supply industry
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Source: Schulz (1996), updated by the author: VDEW (1998) and IEA (1997).
Until two recent mergers, there were eight supra-regional utilities that generated 
between them 80% of total electricity production. In June 2000, the mergers between 
the second and third largest of the eight utilities, VEBA and VIAG, and the largest 
and forth largest, RWE and VEW, were approved by the European Commission 
(EC) and the Federal Cartel Office (FCO), the German competition authority.
The supra-regional utilities are also solely responsible for the operation of the high- 
voltage transmission grid. They sell electricity both to large industrial end-users and 
to regional and municipal distribution companies. At regional level, there are around 
80 regional utilities which purchase electricity from the supra-regional producers, 
but which also generate their own power (around 10% of total production). The 
regional utilities are mainly active in distribution and electricity supply, with supply 
activities taking predominantly place in the rural and less densely populated areas.
Finally, there are around 850 municipal electricity companies (<Stadtwerke) which 
deal mainly with distribution and supply to residential consumers. However, they 
also generate a small part of total electricity production (10%). The municipal 
electricity companies often operate as part of municipal multi-utilities.
Sales to end-users are split evenly between the three categories of suppliers; German 
end-users of electricity are divided into ‘tariff customers’ (Tarifkunden), mostly 
households and small commercial users, and ‘special contract customers’ 
(jSondervertragskunden), mostly large and medium industrial and commercial users. 
In 1997, supra-regional utilities had a part of 33% of total electricity sales to end- 
users, regional utilities a part of 36%, and municipal companies a part of 31% 
(VDEW 1998, pi 7).
The ownership structure of the industry is mixed, with public owners being 
overwhelmingly the Lander and municipalities and not the federal government. It is 
also worth noting that the public influence in the industry is often greater than the 
ownership of capital indicates, as the public owners have frequently secured majority 
voting rights, even if their capital stake is minor25.
Another characteristic feature of the German ESI is its high degree of vertical and 
horizontal integration. Cross-shareholdings between the different companies are 
common, and long-term contracts have long been an important part of the
25 An illustration of this is provided by the pre-merger RWE Energie. Its shares were owned 30% by a group of 
70 municipalities and 70% by private investors, but municipalities held 60% of the voting rights. IEA (1997, 
p.96).
functioning of the industry. A large number of regional and municipal companies are 
directly or indirectly at least partly owned by the supra-regional utilities, which also 
act as their main suppliers. Because of cross-shareholdings, only four of the pre- 
merger eight supra-regional utilities were independent from each other. An important 
condition for the approval of the mergers between VEBA and VIAG, and RWE and 
VEW by the European and German competition authorities was a commitment by 
the four companies to divest mutual cross-shareholdings. Significantly, the east 
German supra-regional utility VEAG was jointly owned by the west German 
companies. Following the concessions made by the merging companies, VEAG will 
now be independent from its former owners. VEAG is by size the third largest 
German utility and its independence is hoped to improve the competitive situation in 
the industry.
Beyond the integration within electricity supply, the industry is deeply embedded in 
other sectors of the German economy. There exist vertical links and cross- 
shareholdings to related industries, notably the coal and lignite industry, but some of 
the large electricity utilities are also part of industrial conglomerates with interests 
ranging from the chemical to the telecommunications industries.
2.1.2 Industry reform
Despite the large number of players, the German ESI was far from competitive 
before liberalisation. The legal framework within which it functioned created an 
environment of regional and local monopolies, organised in a cartel-like fashion. A
set of private industry contracts taking the form of vertical and horizontal 
demarcation contracts defined the geographical areas and activities where each 
company could be active. These anti-competitive agreements had developed 
historically and were granted an exemption from the general competition laws26. In 
addition to the demarcation agreements, exclusive concession contracts existed at the 
municipal level. They were grounded in municipal rights of way and created 
monopolies for the supply of end-users. In exchange for rights of way, concession 
holders had to pay municipalities a share of their revenues.
The liberalisation policies emanating from Brussels played an important role as 
catalyst in breaking the long-standing mould of the German ESI. Various previous 
attempts at reform undertaken by the German federal government were dwarfed by 
the many vested interests. Above all, the public-private ownership structure and the 
municipal rights of way are linked to property rights anchored in the Constitution, 
which had forestalled all attempts at reform.
Following the implementation of the European electricity liberalisation directive in 
1997, the new German law for energy markets (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) came into 
force on 28 April 1998, thereby transcribing the European directive into national 
law. With the new law, the totality of the German electricity market, including the 
residential market, was opened to supply competition in a single step.
26 Sturm and Wilks (1997) offer a comprehensive overview of the legal conditions of the pre-liberalisation 
industry.
The new electricity law abolished all demarcation agreements with immediate effect, 
and while concession contracts continue to exist at municipal level, they are no 
longer exclusive, giving end-users the possibility to bypass the local distribution 
network. Simultaneously with the abolition of the demarcation contracts, the German 
Competition Act was amended and the protected status of the industry ended. An 
essential facilities clause was introduced declaring unlawful the unjustified denial of 
access to an essential infrastructure. The amendment of the competition law was 
strongly supported by the Federal Cartel Office, which became the main regulatory 
institution for the industry (see also section 3.1).
2.2 Rail services
2.2.1 1ndustry structure
Similar to electricity, an element of decentralisation is present in German rail 
services, with non-federal rail undertakings playing an important role regionally and 
locally. Their owners are mostly federal states or municipalities, with a small number 
of private operators also being present27. However, a distinct asymmetry between the 
federal and regional players exists. The federal rail operator Deutsche Bahn AG (DB 
AG) is not only by far the largest rail service operator, it also owns over 90% of the 
public rail infrastructure. One of the most interesting aspects of the reform of the 
German rail sector undertaken between 1994 and 1996 is arguably that it has 
strengthened the regional element at the expense of the federal operator in a 
devolution of responsibilities.
27 Hass-Klau, C. and Environmental and Transport Planning (1998) provide an extensive account o f the history 
and present structure o f the German rail system.
2.2.2 Industry reform
The federal rail industry was the first German network utility to experience far- 
reaching reform in the 1990s. High subsidy payments and accumulated debt were the 
main drivers for change. In 1989, a multi-disciplinary government commission was 
charged with the task of finding a new structural concept for rail transport. 
Reunification and the investment demands generated by the modernisation of the 
public transport network in the new federal states accelerated change, as did policy 
emanating from Brussels. The reform of the German railways sector was 
implemented in 1994 with a new Railways Act (Eisenbahnneuordnungsgesetz). The 
new Act was possible after a change in the German Constitution had been voted in 
1992, abolishing the federal monopoly of Deutsche Bundesbahn.
The rail reform was based on three main elements: separation of commercial 
activities and public domain obligations; separation of network operation and service 
provision; and, last, regionalisation of short distance passenger services.
The separation of commercial activities from other obligations falling into the public 
domain was achieved through the complete re-organisation of the incumbent public 
federal rail operator Deutsche Bundesbahn. On 1 January 1994, all commercial 
activities were transferred to the new corporation Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG), a 
private company. The capital of DB AG is for the moment entirely held by the 
federal government, but privatization is planned.
The non-commercial obligations of the federal railways were honoured through the 
creation of two new public administrations. The first was the Fund of Federal 
Railways (Bundeseisenbahnvermogeri), which took over all debt and other public 
obligations from the former federal operator, which represented at this stage the
merged east and west German operations. The obligations concerned for instance the 
management of the pension fund of former civil servant staff. Thus, the new 
commercial undertaking DB AG could start business without being burdened by 
historic liabilities. The second public body created in the course of the 1994 rail 
reform was the new Federal Office for Rail Services (Eisenbahn-Bundesamt, EBA). 
It became functional on 1 January 1994 and is in charge of key regulatory tasks such 
as licencing (see also section 3.2).
While the first element of the reform dealt with reforming the financial basis of the 
rail sector, the objective of the second element was the creation of an environment 
favourable to the introduction of competitive forces into the sector. The separation of 
network operation and provision of services was implemented through the 
establishment of separate legal units within the new operator DB AG. In 1994, 
Germany’s policy makers decided against structural separation and different owners 
for network and competitive activities. However, the privatisation of the separate 
business units of DB AG was always planned for the moment their financial health 
had stabilised. Only the infrastructure unit, DB Netz, is to remain permanently under 
public ownership. Continued public ownership can therefore be seen as the strongest 
regulatory instrument used to constrain the monopoly position of the infrastructure 
operator.
The third element of the German rail reform reinforces the regional element of the 
rail service. With the objective of improving overall efficiency, quality, and co­
ordination of regional services, the Lander have been granted responsibility for 
regional passenger rail transport in terms of finance and planning.
Traditionally, urban and sub-urban public passenger transport (tram, bus, 
underground, and light rail) is controlled by a number of local or regional authorities, 
the most important of which are passenger transport authorities known as ‘ Verkehrs- 
Verbunde\  These are legal bodies co-ordinating, but not owning the public transport 
operations of their members. A typical Verkehrs-Verband comprises the respective 
local public transport operator or operators, DB AG (who runs and operates 95% of 
all sub-urban and regional rail passenger services), and possibly a small number of 
private bus companies28. By 1997, Germany had 28 Verkehrs-Verbunde covering 
about 47m people and new authorities were still being created in the new Lander.
On 1 January 1996, DB AG transferred all activities related to regional passenger rail 
service to the Lander29. Some differences exist in terms of how the Lander have then 
chosen to pass on this newly acquired authority. In some cases, the Land has kept all 
control over regional transport, or responsibility will be transferred to local 
authorities only at a later stage. Still other Lander have devolved power to the local 
authorities of the major cities only. However, in most cases the Verkehrs-Verbunde 
have seen their power increase. The reform has notably increased the bargaining 
position of local and regional authorities vis-a-vis DB AG. Prior to reform, all 
regional railway costs were reimbursed by the federal government via DB AG. The 
federal operator was a powerful partner who could veto or amend new investment or
28 There exist however great differences between different Verkehrs-Verbunden. The Verkehrs-Verbund Rhein- 
Ruhr for instance comprises IS cities covering over 100,000 inhabitants and their respective public transport 
operators.
2 Regional passenger services are defined as journeys taking less than an hour or covering a distance of under 
50km.
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planning decisions. Today, regional rail is integrated into the existing regional 
transport programs, the funding of which is assured by federal, regional and local 
finances without passing via DB AG. A substantial share of the tax revenue 
generated by the energy tax is transferred to the Lander to fund regional transport 
services.
In order to achieve quality and efficiency improvements of regional public 
transports, the decentralised transport authorities dispose of considerable flexibility 
and autonomy (see section 4.2 for an example of regional transport initiatives). 
Funds can be transferred between modes of transport, leaving the local authorities to 
decide which means of transport services a given route most cost-effectively.
2.3 Telecommunications
2.3.1 Industry structure and reform
While decentralised market structures prevail for German electricity supply and rail, 
the pre-liberalisation German telecommunications services were organised in an 
integrated national market. Both telecommunications and postal services were 
provided by a single operator, Deutsche Bundespost, which formed part of the 
Federal Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. As a general rule, the 
liberalisation of the German telecommunications sector has closely followed 
European legislation in the domain.
The German government proceeded to restructure the Federal Ministry in 1990. 
Three public companies, responsible respectively for telecommunications, postal 
services and the financial services of the post, were split from the ministry. In 1994, 
an amendment to the Constitution, necessary to implement the changes requested by 
Brussels in view of the liberalisation of the sector, was voted. The three public 
companies created in 1990 were transformed into private corporations and their
statutory monopoly rights to service the telecommunication and postal markets 
exclusively were abolished. The private company that took over the 
telecommunications business from the public operator is called Deutsche Telekom 
AG (DT AG).
In August 1996, the new German Telecommunications Act came into force. All 
telecommunication services with the temporary exception of voice telephony were 
opened to supply competition30. The law also abolished the infrastructure monopoly 
of DT AG with immediate effect and a number of alternative network operators 
appeared at this stage, often basing their networks on existing facilities such as rail 
or electricity infrastructures. Competition developed first for services such as data 
transfer and corporate networks. In 1996, the government sold the first slice of 26% 
of DT AG in a public offering.
The last step of the liberalisation of the telecommunications market was taken on 1 
January 1998. In accordance with European prescriptions, the monopoly for fixed 
voice telephony was ended. At the same date, the first and so far only sector specific 
regulatory agency in Germany, the authority for telecommunications and post 
(Regulierungsbehorde fur Telekommunikation und Post, RegTP), started its activity.
3. Regulatory framework
For each of the three industries discussed in this chapter, the regulatory institutions 
monitoring the introduction of competition and regulating monopoly network
operators differ. In electricity, the historically fragmented industry structure with 
mixed ownership pattern has led to the unique establishment of a system based 
largely on self-regulation, with the Federal Cartel Office acting as watchdog over 
competition. In rail, an important regulatory role is still held by the federal 
government through its continued ownership of the network operator. A federal rail 
authority has been set up, however, its brief concentrates on technical rather than 
economic regulation. Perhaps most importantly, reform has strengthened the role of 
regional transport authorities which foster competition on regional level. Only in 
telecommunications has a sector-specific regulatory authority been put in charge of 
regulating DT AG and promoting competition as one of its primary duties.
3.1 Electricity
The decentralised structure of the German ESI is reflected in the existing regulatory 
institutions. At the federal level, sector policy is devised, and legislation elaborated. 
The larger part of energy policy is the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology, although the important area of nuclear energy policy 
falls under the competence of the Ministry of Environment. Federal and regional 
legislation is implemented on Lander level through regional government offices. The 
Lander authorise new plant, and approve the retail tariff customers are charged. 
Municipalities, for their part, have retained the right to levy concession charges in 
exchange for rights of way. This basic regulatory set-up has not changed with the 
opening up of the industry to competition.
30 Only fixed telephony services are considered here. Mobile voice telephony had been provided in a duopoly
3.1.1 Network access
The new German electricity law emulates the key ideas of the EU electricity 
liberalisation directive. It is based on the vertical separation of the different functions 
of the ESI, that is upstream generation, transmission, and downstream distribution 
and supply. However, neither the directive, nor the new German electricity law 
impose structural or ownership separation of naturally competitive and potentially 
monopolistic activities. Only the management separation of businesses and the 
functional unbundling of accounts is required, and liberalisation has done nothing to 
change the integrated nature of the German ESI31.
In a decision unique in Europe, the German government decided to grant the industry 
the right to self-regulate in the crucial area of network access. Simultaneously with 
the elaboration of the new electricity law, the main parties involved in the industry 
have concluded an access agreement (known as Verbande- Vereinbarung, or V-V32), 
which forms the basis for negotiated third party access to the transmission and 
distribution grids. Only if the self-regulation of the industry fails and the 
development of competition is judged insufficient, has the Federal Ministry of 
Economics reserved itself the option to legislate for access, and move de facto to a 
system of regulated third party access.
market since 1990.
31 Sturm and Wilks (1997, p.22) argue that such a structural reform would have been virtually impossible given 
the ownership structure in the industry.
32 The agreement was negotiated between the association of electricity producers (Vereinigung Deutscher 
Elektrizitatswerke, VDEW), the association o f German industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), 
and the association of the industrial energy sector ( Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft, VDC).
The V-V sets out the rules for negotiated third party access33. It lists the cost 
elements to be included in transporation charges, but does not set any price levels. 
These are the subject of negotiation between the network operator and the third party 
requesting access. Indicative transportation prices are to be published by all network 
owners six months after the implementation of the agreement.
The V-V has already been re-negotiated once since 1998, with the new version, V- 
V2, in place since the beginning of 2000. The V-V2 responds to criticisms of the 
first agreement, simplifying significantly the structure of the transmission charges. 
However, initially, the highly contentious distance element in the charges did not 
entirely disappear with the new agreement. V-V2 divided Germany into two trading 
zones, North and South, with a surcharge levied on all net traffic between the two 
zones. The same surcharge was intended to apply to transmissions over the national 
border, a fact that has angered foreign suppliers. Only the negotiations surrounding 
the approval of the two big mergers discussed in the previous section have led to the 
disappearance of the distance charge for transmissions within Germany.
It should also be noted that in parallel to the concessions gained by the competition 
authorities, negotiations aiming at a harmonised cross-border tariff system for all 
European countries by the so-called Florence forum took place. Once the Europe- 
wide cross-border tariff agreement overseen by the European Commission comes
33 For a very complete analysis of the first V-V, see Brunekreeft (1999).
into force, the German access agreement will lose its relevance for cross-border 
transactions.
3.1.2 Consumer price regulation
A federal law on electricity tariffs (Bundestarifverordnung fur Elektrizitat) sets out 
the principles of retail price regulation for tariff customers, but there exist 
differences in the interpretation of the law between different Lander. Moreover, the 
regulatory process is far from transparent. Utilities submit their tariff proposals and 
any requested cost information to the relevant regional authorities, but only the 
approved tariffs are published. Attempts to introduce elements of yardstick 
regulation into the system have proved only very moderately successful so far.
With the liberalisation of the ESI, the official stance taken by the government with 
respect to retail price regulation has always been one of abolishing the remaining 
regulations once competition has taken root. With the fast (and larger than expected) 
advent of price reductions also for residential customers (see also section 4.1), a 
representative of the industry association VDEW has confirmed that the regulated 
prices are maximum prices which have lost their significance.
3.1.3 Environmental and social obligations
An important role in the regulation of the German ESI is played by environmental 
regulations. Besides the subsidy program for domestic coal34, it is the increasing
34 This complex issue goes beyond the scope of this chapter. See IEA (l 998) for an overview of the coal subsidy 
program.
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support given to renewable energy sources and severe emission controls that have 
most influenced the industry in the last decade.
In 1990, the so-called Electricity Feed-in law (Stromeinspeisegesetz) was adopted to 
promote the use of renewable energy sources. It guaranteed access to the public grid 
for hydro, wind, and solar generators. These received a standard payment of 90% of 
the tariff customer retail price for all electricity they fed into the public grid. The law 
has had a particularly significant impact on wind based power generation, making 
Germany the most important producer of wind based electricity world wide. On 1 
April 2000, a new renewables law (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) became effective, 
replacing the Electricity Feed-in law. The new law expands the range of input fuels 
eligible for support. Importantly, it also ruptures the link between the price utilities 
have to pay for ‘green’ electricity fed into their grid, and the retail price. Under the 
new renewables law, electricity suppliers are held to purchase renewables generated 
electricity at fixed prices varying as a function of the generation fuel between 13 and 
19 Pf/kWh. In comparison, according to the industry association VDEW, the price 
for wholesale traded electricity in Germany was below 10 Pf/kWh in April 2000.
In addition to the promotion of renewable energy sources, the imposition of some of 
the most severe emission controls world-wide have over the last decade played an 
important role in Germany’s notoriously high pre-liberalisation electricity prices. 
The success of the environmental policies is however also apparent. Between 1987 
and 1997, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions of public electricity suppliers fell by 23% 
from 339 mt (million tonnes) to 261 mt (VDEW 1998, p.53).
In contrast to the extensive environmental regulation, no social obligations are 
imposed on the German ESI. The protection of vulnerable consumers is part of the
general social security policy. Geographical averaging of electricity prices has never 
been pursued in Germany and a multitude of residential electricity tariffs exist in 
different areas. It can be argued that this lack of social obligations directly linked to 
the industry has reduced political resistance to the speedy liberalisation of the 
industry.
3.2 Rail
A decentralised regulatory structure is also in place in the German rail industry. The 
federal government continues to hold an important role, and a federal rail agency has 
been established in 1994. At the same time however, regional transport authorities 
have seen their responsibilities increase since 1996. Similar to the electricity sector, 
the Federal Cartel Office acts as ultimate guardian of competition.
3.2.1 The Federal Rail Office
The Federal Rail Office (EBA) is an independent authority under the supervision of 
the Federal Ministry of Transports. It acts as representative of the government in its 
function of supervising DB AG’s investment projects. The regulatory brief of the 
EBA comprises foremost technical matters. It issues federal rail licences, which are 
either service licences needed for operators desiring access to the federal rail 
network, or network licences, for the operation of a rail transport network. Related to 
the issuing of licences, the EBA also monitors technical and safety standards and is 
also in charge of accident investigations.
Moreover, the federal rail agency decides upon request on the closure of rail lines. It 
is however important to note that political factors play an important role and local 
and regional pressure groups often prevent the closure of a given route. With the 
regionalisation, a certain number of financially not viable lines have been purchased 
from DB AG by regional transport operators (see also section 4.2).
The EBA is also responsible of supervising non-discriminatory access to the federal 
rail infrastructure, its role is however essentially advisory. It acts as mediator 
between different rail operators and provides clarifications. The EBA intervenes only 
on request, and only in the negotiation phase. Non-discriminatory access for third 
parties is monitored by the agency only with respect to third parties. Preferential 
treatment between different business units of DB AG is considered a problem by 
many observers but goes beyond the remit of the EBA. Enquiries of anti-competitive 
practices are undertaken by the Federal Cartel Office. No price control has been set 
up for network access charges, which are discussed below.
3.2.2 Network access
Under the new legislation, the infrastructure unit of DB AG, DB Netz, is obliged to 
provide non-discriminatory access to the federal rail network on the basis of an 
indicative access price list. DB AG is held to act as commercial undertaking and as 
such is free to set access prices at a level that allow it to cover maintenance costs of 
the network. New investment in infrastructure is funded separately by the federal 
government.
The first track access prices were published in June 1994. Basic charges are cost 
based and as such depend upon the type of train being operated, its weight, 
maximum speed and planning quality (the planning quality allows timetabling by 
attributing different priorities to trains35). Important volume discounts are offered by 
DB Netz with respect to the number of kilometres run, a practice which has been
criticised by competing companies because of the clear price advantage it confers to 
DB AG. The discounts have subsequently been investigated by the competition 
authorities.
Track charges are not inclusive, as further payments are levied for electricity costs, 
using tracks to collect carriages and locomotive, or for leaving a train overnight or 
reimbursing electricity charges. The overall ratio between track access and other 
charges is about 65:35 (Hass-Klau et al., 1998, p.60).
The continued influence of political factors in the sector can be seen in the fact that 
charges for infrastructure services, but also for other services provided by DB AB 
over the network, may be reduced following negotiations between DB AG and the 
Lander. As outlined in section 2.2, the cost of regional rail services are since 1996 
funded by the Ldndery either directly or via local authorities. All these bodies agree 
an overall price with DB AG for the services it provides for them regionally36. A 
Land or Verkehrs-Verband may share the cost of new trains or station improvements, 
and the price per kilometre for services provided by DB AG varies as a function of a 
Land’s own rail investment. Some bodies conclude annual contracts with DB AG to 
increase their bargaining power, others renew their contracts every 2-3 years.
At regional level, the network access principle is combined with competitive 
tendering organised by the regional authorities for exclusive regional or local service
35 For illustrative examples o f the pricing system see Hass-Klau et al. (1998, pp. 57-58).
36 The passenger transport unit o f DB AG still runs 95% of all regional rail passenger services, either on its own 
or on non-federal tracks. It also operates urban and sub-urban bus services.
licences. The tenders are open to all licenced operators. DB AG has lost several 
service licences to smaller companies which were better able to cater for specific 
needs at the local or regional level. Regional operators winning a licence will pay 
access charges for the use of the tracks, which can be either owned by DB AG, or by 
local bodies. Since 1996, a number of railway lines have been transferred from DB 
AG to other network operators, often at a nominal price37.
Price regulation of regional passenger services (no other prices are regulated) are the 
responsibility of regional authorities, and take the form of maximum price caps.
3.3 Telecommunications
3.3.1 The Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Post
The regulatory authority for telecommunications and post (RegTP) is so far the only
sector specific regulatory body in Germany and is in charge of all aspects of 
telecommunication and postal regulation. Regulatory action in the sector is as a 
general rule limited to dominant undertakings, which makes DT AG so far the only 
operator subject to price and quality regulations, both in network and end-user 
services.
The RegTP has taken over the regulatory tasks of the former Ministry for Post and 
Telecommunications and the supervisory role for technical harmonisation, formerly 
the responsibility of the Federal Office for Post and Telecommunications. The new
37 Such routes were often unprofitable for DB AG and local bodies have purchased them to avoid closure, often 
finding innovative solutions to future service provision.
authority has a staff of nearly 3,000, most of whom are civil servants taken over 
from the now defunct federal administrations.
The regulator is organised in five independent ‘decision chambers’ each of which is 
in charge of a different regulatory domain, such as price regulation, dispute 
settlement or network access. This organisational form allows internal independence, 
increases transparency, and limits regulatory discretion38. The role of the Ldnder was 
a contentious issue during the elaboration of the new regulatory framework, and a 
compromise was reached through the creation of an advisory council, which works 
alongside the regulatory chambers. One half of the council’s 18 members are 
appointed by the Ldnder, the other half by the Bundestag, Germany’s federal 
parliament.
3.3.2 Network access and price regulation
The 1996 Telecommunications Act obliges dominant network operators to grant 
network access and to allow its competitors to interconnect to its network on non- 
discriminatory terms. The equal network access regulation implies that direct 
resellers entering the market (offering mostly call-by-call services) are able to offer 
services without substantial investments. Similarly, the interconnection obligation 
means that alternative network providers are able to attain universal coverage 
regardless of the initial size of their networks. From the outset of competition, the 
regulatory decision that number portability had to be free of charge has helped 
keeping switching costs low for consumers.
The interconnection tariffs DT AG is allowed to charge are determined by the 
RegTP. They are cost-based and the initial price levels have been determined by 
international benchmarking in 1997. Since then, two analytical cost models for 
national and local network access have been set up and were the object of an 
extensive public consultation process (WIK 1998).
In addition to network related service prices, the retail prices of DT AG are regulated 
by a price cap. DT AG was held to reduce the average price level for each of two 
separate service baskets by 4.3% in the 2-year span 1998-99 (the first basket contains 
local and long-distance services for private customers, the second for business 
customers). However, vivid competition has made prices fall considerably faster than 
the regulatory rule implied and the retail price cap has proved non-binding for DT 
AG.
3.3.3 Public service obligation
The new German legislation provides for a universal service fund for 
telecommunications, following the approach advocated in the European directives. 
The level of service which has to be made available by service providers to all 
persons requesting it is defined in the Telecommunications Act. Regulatory 
intervention in the market in order to guarantee this level of service is kept to a 
minimum. The regulator only intervenes when the provision of services resulting 
from commercial decisions is insufficient compared to the defined minimal level. In 
such a case, the dominant operator is given the option to provide the missing service
38 The organization in ‘decision chambers’ can also be found in the Federal Cartel Office.
without financial compensation. If it refuses to do so because it judges the cost of the 
service too high, the right to provide the service in question is granted via 
competitive tender, and the service is funded through the universal service fund. All 
telecoms operators above a certain market share contribute to the fund. However, so 
far, the reimbursement scheme has not been used in practice. DT AG remains the 
only universal service provider and so far it has requested no financial compensation.
4. Market development since liberalisation
4.1 Electricity
Since the German ESI has been opened up to competition in April 1998, prices have 
fallen sharply and the industry is consolidating. In a stagnant market, price 
competition is expected in defence of market shares, so it is not the fact that prices 
were falling, but rather the speed at which it was happening that has surprised 
observers.
Germany has for a long time been known for its high electricity prices. This is partly 
explained by the cartel-like organisation of the industry, and partly by the high costs 
of coal subsidies and environmental policies borne by German electricity consumers. 
The abolishment of the protective industry agreements through liberalisation, the 
disappearance of the coal levy in 1996, and the coming to an end of most of the 
environmental investment programs, all have coincided to allow price cuts. 
Moreover, according to a recent report by McKinsey39, the German electricity
39 McKinsey (2000) ‘A shopper’s guide to electricity assets in Europe’, The McKinsey Quarterly, 2000 Number 
2: Europe, 60-67.
industry displays large over-capacities: of a total of 118.0 GW installed capacity, 
only 66% are necessary to satisfy peak demand. This implies that the marginal cost 
of generation is close to zero, and companies can sell at very low prices indeed, at 
least for a limited period.
According to a monthly price survey undertaken by the federal association of energy 
consumers VEA, German electricity prices for industrial customers have on average, 
in the 12 months between July 1998 and July 1999, fallen by 13% with some price 
cuts exceeding 25%40. The re-negotiation of contracts is the main instrument through 
which price reductions are realised for large end-users. One of the most successful 
instruments to re-negotiate contracts has been the emergence of customer pools, the 
largest of which is the Hanover-based association of energy consumers VEA with 
2,500 participants. It succeeded in 1999 in re-negotiating the power supply of its 
members with the regional supplier PreussenElektra at a price 30% below pre­
liberalisation levels for some of its members.
Price competition has also surprisingly fast reached the residential market, and 
competition for small tariff customers is fierce, with a wide range of individually 
tailored tariffs emerging, including ‘green’ tariffs promising variable content of 
renewable-generated electricity. Table 1 gives an indication of the tariff offers 
available to tariff customers in 1999.
40 Average price for different industrial usage profiles. Net prices excluding all taxes. Bundesverband der 
Energie-Abnehmer(1999) VEA-Strompreisvergleich, Stand 01.07.99.
Table 1: Tariff offers for German residential users
Electricity brand Unit price1 
(Pf/kWh)
Difference to average price 
(%)
EnBW 'Yellow1 25.4 -20
PreussenElektra ‘Direkt’ 26.77 -16
RWE ‘Avanza’ 28.15 -11.5
Bayemwerk 'Power1 29.09 -8.5
Federal average2 31.8 —
Notes: 1 Domestic user with 4,000 kWh annual consumption.2 Includes eastern German prices. 
Source: Power in Europe, February 3rd 2000.
Despite the important price cuts offered by electricity suppliers, switching numbers 
for residential customers are so far low. In a recent speech, a VEW board member 
put the number of residential customer switching at 3%. Partly, this low number can 
be explained by initial uncertainty about the terms and prices at which alternative 
suppliers can gain access to residential customers. This uncertainty has since been 
substantially reduced by the pro-competitive stance the Federal Cartel Office has 
taken, refusing so far to accept the denial of access by incumbents and deciding 
systematically in favour of competitive entrants41. Low residential switching can also 
be linked to customer loyalty to municipal suppliers. Many end-users are aware of 
the role revenues for municipal electricity supply companies play in municipal 
budgets and are arguably willing to accept marginally higher prices on the basis that 
they cross-subsidise other loss-making local public services, such as public transport. 
According to a January 2000 report on VEBA/VIAG by Deutsche Bank, price falls
41 According to the information published on the FCO webpage, o f six access cases brought in front of the 
authority in 1998 and 1999, none were decided in favour of the incumbent refusing to grant access.
for all domestic customers, not only those willing to switch, will be 10% in 2000, 
3.6% in 2001 and 1.2% in 200242.
As a reaction to the downward price trend, German electricity utilities consolidate to 
reduce costs. The two biggest mergers were announced at the end of 1999, involving 
respectively RWE and VEW, and VIAG and VEBA. Both German and European 
competition authorities expressed their concern that the two mergers would reduce 
the number of independent supra-national electricity utilities to three (RWE/VEW, 
VEBA/VLAG, and EnWB), with the two newly merged companies effectively 
gaining a duopoly position in the market, controlling between them 80% of power 
supplied over the high-voltage grid. As a consequence, the competition authorities 
have made the divestiture of cross-shareholdings a precondition for the approval of 
the mergers. Parallel to the mergers taking place between supra-regional players, 
many regional and municipal utilities are either being tied in closer with their main 
upstream suppliers, or form consortia to cut fixed costs, such as marketing costs. A 
number of foreign investors have also seized the opportunity offered by the profound 
changes in the industry and have entered the market through acquisitions of large 
municipal companies in Berlin and Hamburg for instance.
4.2 Rail
In 1998, there existed around 200 licensed rail operators in Germany43. About 30 are 
independent passenger rail operators, many more are involved in freight. Many are
42 Report cited in Power in Europe, February 3rd 2000.
43 Internal EBA document, 1998.
operational units of DB AG, others are non-federal and private undertakings. A 
number of new entrants have been recorded, one of the most important being KAP 
Lock, a logistics company jointly owned by the federal postal operator Deutsche 
Post AG and UPS. Access to the federal network by national and international rail 
services (often high-speed services) is increasing. The success of the existing high­
speed passenger services has led DB AG to invest heavily in the expansion of its 
high-speed tracks.
On local level, all of the larger German cities have undertaken substantial investment 
in urban and sub-urban public transport networks. One of the largest investment 
projects is the major refurbishment of 25 railway stations (e.g in Stuttgart, Mtinchen, 
and Frankfurt), with surface tracks being brought underground to free city centre 
building pace.
The devolution of responsibility introduced by the regulatory reform has enabled 
local service providers to display greater initiative in terms of service innovation. An 
example of regional projects is provided by the local railways in Diiren, cited in 
Hass-Klau et al. (1998). The Durer Kreisbahn is 45km long and runs between 
Cologne and Aachen. In 1993, DB AG wanted to close the line but a local campaign 
prevented this, and instead the line was taken over by the local transport operator in 
Diiren. The operator had so far been running the public bus services in the town of 
91,000 inhabitants. The tracks were bought for 1 DM from DB AG. New lighter and 
cheaper trains were specially developed and build for the route. Moreover, the 
timetable was changed to an hourly service with interchange facilities to other public 
transport services along the route. Flexible timetabling was made available for 
special events. In 1996, a 360% increase in passenger numbers with respect to 1989
had been realised. Funding for the operation was to 60% provided by the state 
government of North Rhine -  Westphalia.
A big problem remaining for entrants in the German rail sector is access to rolling 
stock. Rolling stock is a large investment for new companies and DB AG is at an 
advantage disposing of large existing stock and it often entertains preferential 
relationships with the big rolling stock companies. Nonetheless, two ways to address 
this problem have emerged. Subsidies of 50% and above are available from the states 
for the purchase of new rolling stock. Moreover, franchise periods for private firms 
are generally longer (7-10 years) than those offered to DB AG (2-4 years) to take the 
greater need to recover fixed set-up cost into account.
4.3 Telecommunications
Every two years the RegTP is held to present a report on its activity to the two 
chambers of the German parliament, Bundestag and Bundesrat. The first of the 
regulatory reports was submitted in December 1999 (RegTP 1999), and it highlights 
the successful introduction of competition in the first two years of the liberalised 
market.
At the end of June 2000, 150 providers of voice telephony offered their services 
(RegTP 2000b). Among them, over 90 possess own network facilities, and over 50 
specialise in resale44. Overall, over 1,800 companies were offering 
telecommunications services mid-2000. This number includes the growing group of
internet service providers (ISPs). Three new fixed network operators with national 
scope, o.tel.o, Viag Intercom and Arcor, have entered the market since 1996. Their 
networks are based on existing backbone infrastructure (electricity transmission in 
the case of o.tel.o and Viag Intercom and railway infrastructure in the case of Arcor). 
Other network operators have restricted their infrastructure to a region or city. So- 
called ‘city carriers’ include NetCologne or ISIS, but many of these carriers are at 
present expanding the scope of their operations by connecting their local networks. 
Competing network operators have mainly invested in optic fibre technology, and by 
the end of 1999 the combined length of the optic fibre network operated by 
companies other than DT AG reached over 40% of DT AG’s optic fibre network 
(RegTP 2000a).
The sector regulator also draws attention to the emergence of inter-carrier business 
as new growing market segment. Revenues from interconnection deals between 
fixed, and fixed and mobile networks have more than doubled between 1998 and 
1999 (RegTP 2000b). Carrier exchanges allow network operators and service 
providers to optimise their investments in call and transmission capacities. 
Brunekreeft and Gross (1999) argue that substantial excess transmission capacity 
exists in the short run as infrastructure entrants have chosen the size of their network 
in anticipation of strongly increasing demand. This explains in part the aggressive 
price competition taking place at present (see below).
44 Considerably more companies have been granted voice telephony network or service licences by the industry
In 1998, the totality of new entrants in the voice telephony market held a market 
share of 4.9% in terms of call volume45. By mid-1999, their part had grown to 14.4%, 
a year later, to 20%. The market share of new entrants is highest for the group of 
long-distance, international and calls-to-mobile services: over 40% of call minutes 
are attributed to competitors of DT AG in July 2000. Traffic growth was 10% in 
1997/98 and 17% in 1998/99, due to the strong increase in internet related traffic and 
fixed-to-mobile calls. The presence of companies other than DT AG in local call 
services and as providers of access services is considerably weaker, but competition 
is also increasing for those services. While in 1998 only 0.5% of the former and 
0.3% of the latter were attributed to new entrants, these numbers had grown to 4.8% 
and 1% by mid-1999.
Competitive end-user access is so far largely achieved using lines rented from DT 
AG, either by city carriers, or by network owners in the process of building universal 
networks. Germany’s regulator has already in 1998 implemented local loop 
unbundling obligations for DT AG, and by mid-2000 82 local loop contracts had 
been concluded between the incumbent and competitors for access services. Entrants 
are also increasingly exploiting two further means of bridging the final link to the 
end users, the first being the wireless local loop (WLL), the other broadband cable 
connections. In 1999 and 2000, over 160 WLL frequences were allocated by the 
regulator.
regulator. However, a great number of licence holders have yet to offer services to end consumers. See RegTP’s
Moreover, Germany has one of the world’s most developed cable TV networks. In 
January 1998, 48.2% of all households with TV were connected to broadband cable 
(WIK 1999)46. The percentage of connectable households is even higher with 85.0%. 
While DT AG dominates the trunk cable network, a large number of local providers 
(between 4,000 and 6,000) are active in the local loop segment. Only a third of 
households are directly serviced by DT AG. Using local loop unbundling and 
alternative access techniques, approximately 55 licensed operators offered access 
services to end users by mid-2000.
In July 1999, the telecommunications consumer price index computed by the Federal 
Statistical Office was 12.3% lower than 18 months earlier, at the moment of market 
opening (RegTP 2000a). The price index fell furthest for national long-distance calls: 
for this call category consumers faced prices that were on average 42.5% lower than 
in January 1998 and maximum savings of 85% could be realised. Similar maximum 
savings were realised for the most frequent international call destinations. The cost 
of local calls and telephone connections by contrast has not changed since 
liberalisation, because of re-balancing and the slower take off of competition for 
these services.
Industry turn-over figures show the shift occurring between telecommunications 
activities very clearly (RegTP 2000b). In 1999, overall turn-over increased by 10%
webpage for the full listing o f the 305 licence holders (number as of 30 June 2000).
45 Figures in this paragraph are drawn from WIK (1999) Erttwicklung der Markte fur 
Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen, November 1999, as well as RegTP (2000b).
compared to the previous year. Three new activities drive growth and compensate 
for the 10% fall in turn-over generated by fixed telephony services. First, mobile 
services have grown by 34%, second, inter-carrier business has doubled, and third, 
other activities, including notably internet service providers, have seen their turn­
over increase by 25%.
5. Assessment
The introduction of competition in the German utility markets surveyed in this 
chapter should be qualified as a success. Prices have fallen by double digit figures 
since the liberalisation of the telecommunications and electricity industries, and new 
services and tariff options proliferate in all industries surveyed. However, in view of 
the long-term sustainability of this competition, a number of structural concerns need 
to be noted, notably in the electricity industry.
The over-capacity in generation assets and the resulting price war makes entry into 
the German electricity market at present unprofitable and confers a strong position to 
the consolidating incumbents. While consolidation is driven by the need to reduce 
costs and is arguably desirable in an industry with close to 1,000 players, the 
question remains whether the survivors of the price war will be able to dominate the 
energy market and adopt collusive behaviour and/or errect entry barriers.
We argue that three market developments can help the competition authorities in 
their task to constrain possible future abuse of market power in the electricity
46 In comparison, 65% of US households have cable TV, but the number is only 14% in Spain, 13% in Japan, and
market. First, dominant positions in the German market can be somewhat mitigated 
by competition from abroad. The high degree of interconnectivity of the German 
grid makes entry by foreign competitors possible, subject to the regulation of non- 
discriminatory access terms to the interconnectors. The finalisation of a European 
agreement on trans-border transmission charges by the Florence regulatory forum 
and the European Commission might also improve conditions for cross-border trade. 
Among Germany’s neighbours count some highly competitive power markets, which 
will make it harder for German incumbents to raise prices above the competitive 
level, lest they want to invite competitors from abroad. Second, German consumers 
have very fast adapted their power purchasing behaviour to competitive markets and 
successful strategies such as the formation of consumer pools, are likely to persist 
and keep competition alive as long as there are a sufficient number of offers to 
choose from. Third, the introduction of competition in European electricity markets 
has led to the emergence of standardised power exchanges. These facilitate upstream 
and downstream entry by national or international companies and thus have a 
beneficial effect on the development of competition. In Germany, power exchanges 
have taken up operation in Leipzig and Frankfurt. Moreover, the Amsterdam Power 
Exchange (APX) has opened a regional hub in Germany.
Despite these positive market developments, serious concerns remain regarding the 
German ESI because of the lack of structural separation between the transmission 
system operators and upstream and downstream undertakings. The utilities have
11% in France and Great Britain.
unbundled their accounts following the prescriptions of the European directive, but 
no physical separation has been imposed, and the owners of the monopolistic grid 
are also active in the competitive generation and supply business. Such a setting 
leaves room for doubt about the fairness and non-discrimination of grid access with 
respect to third parties, in particular given the context of self-regulation of grid 
access by the industry. The FCO has shown its determination to protect competition 
in electricity supply; however, no systematic information collection for the purpose 
of benchmarking or cost modelling occurs in the absence of a specialised regulator. 
Without instruments to overcome the information asymmetry between the industry 
and the competition authorities, it might be difficult to assess the anti-competitive 
potential of price and entry strategies in the future market.
The regulation of the monopoly network is also one of the least transparent elements 
of the reformed German rail industry. The principal safeguard against DB AB 
abusing its monopoly is the continued public ownership of its infrastructure unit. 
Access charges are supposed to be cost-based and cover all maintenance costs of the 
track infrastructure. However, there does not exist any formal price control and 
incentives for cost reduction are non-existent. Neither have anti-competitive and 
discriminatory practices—such as volume discounts which favour operational units 
of DB AG—been addressed in a systematic manner.
The incumbent rail operator is constrained in its actions by political forces the 
influence of which remains strong, in particular after the devolution of authority for 
all regional passenger transport services to the Ldnder. The prices published by DB 
AG are often not those eventually paid by regional authorities. Transport service 
contracts are subject to negotiations between regional authorities and DB AG and
public service considerations play an important part. It has to be noted, however, that 
the very flexible approach shows advantages in the emergence of innovative and 
efficient public transport services at regional level.
It is in the telecommunications market that competition is arguably most firmly 
established. The incumbent DT AG has lost up to 40% of market share in the first 
two years of competition and prices are falling rapidly. The entry of numerous 
operators with own transmission capacity means that the industry is at present 
displaying over-capacity and price competition is fierce, a development very similar 
to the electricity market. The significant difference between the two industries is that 
over-capacity in telecommunications is caused by competitive entry into the 
infrastructure domain, thus eroding the network monopoly argument47. Moreover, the 
telecommunications market is still expanding rapidly, leaving room for new entrants 
and services. In electricity, duplication of the grid infrastructure is still considered 
uneconomic, and over-capacity in generation will only disappear in the medium term 
to leave room for more efficient generating plant to replace current plant.
6. Concluding remarks
While not one of the pioneering countries of liberalisation in Europe, Germany has 
in the past decade gone far regarding the introduction of competition into the three 
network utilities discussed in this chapter, that is, electricity, rail and 
telecommunications. German reforms embrace the principles of European legislation
for the industries in question, they have however gone beyond the minimal 
prescriptions of the European directives where electricity and rail are concerned. An 
important conclusion from the overview provided in this chapter is that unique 
national features, in particular the decentralised nature of electricity supply and of 
rail transport services, have shaped the regulatory framework that has been set up in 
parallel to the introduction of competition. Only in the telecommunications industry 
has a sector-specific regulatory body been established, emulating what has become 
the UK model. For both the electricity and rail industries, it is the Federal Cartel 
Office that acts as guardian of competition. Medium and long-term structural 
problems remain in electricity and rail, but in the short term, the overall success of 
the liberalisation measures in bringing about cost savings for the German consumers, 
at least in electricity and telecommunications, cannot be questioned.
47 Consolidation because of over-capacities is also occurring in the telecommunications industry. Arcor bought 
o.tel.o in April 1999 so that only two o f the initial three alternative national network operators remained. 
However, new entrants keep concentration ratios low even in the network activities.
Chapter 3: An estimation of UK telephone access demand 
using pseudo-panel data
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been rising concern about the impact of liberalisation on 
universal service in the telecommunications industry. The gradual removal of 
internal cross-subsidies as practised in the monopolistic telecom markets has brought 
about a rebalancing of telephone tariff structures. The opening of the market to 
competitive forces has forced the alignment of tariffs with costs. There is concern 
that the increase in connection and rental charges, as well as in local call charges, 
that has accompanied the fall in long distance and international call prices, may have 
a negative impact on the universal affordability of the telephone service. Reflecting 
this concern, national and European regulatory agencies have emphasized the 
importance of maintaining the high, pre-liberalisation standard of universal 
accessibility and affordability. The general feeling is that measures are needed to 
avoid the tendency for lucrative corporate user market benefits to be realized at the 
expense of some categories of residential customers.
In this chapter we address three questions. First, what is the impact of access price 
variations on residential telephone access in the UK? Second, which socio­
demographic variables influence telephone access beyond the price dimension? And 
finally, are certain socio-demographic groups -  low income, the elderly, single 
mothers - burdened disproportionately by the rebalancing of prices?
We estimate a telephone access demand model to obtain elasticity measures allowing 
us to assess the threat of drop-off caused by increased access charges. Earlier studies 
of telephone access demand commonly find that demand is quite inelastic with 
respect to price. However, small access elasticities for the population at large might
mask much larger values for specific groups. Evidence from the US based on micro- 
data seems to support this argument. See for instance Cain and Macdonald (1991). 
Targeted support programs for these population groups should be considered to 
improve their access to the telephone. The identification of characteristics which 
make a household more or less likely to have telephone access facilitates the 
formulation of targeted subsidy programs. We believe such subsidy programs are an 
economically efficient tool for maintaining universal service goals and improving 
telephone penetration among marginalised population groups.
The main objective of this chapter is the estimation of a demand model for telephone 
access based on UK household data. This objective is motivated by a gap in the 
literature. Very little evidence in the UK concentrates on access and few studies are 
based on household data. One explanation for the relative lack of evidence on access 
demand in the UK compared with North America is the structure of the telecoms 
market in Europe. In Europe, the monopolistic provision of telecommunication 
services was accompanied by a uniform pricing policy which has remained in place 
even after liberalisation efforts. This excludes the use of pure cross-section studies 
for the purpose of assessing price elasticities (the “North American” model). In order 
to estimate the impact of price movements on household access despite this market 
organisation, we construct a data set with a repeated cross-section structure. The 
estimation method based on pseudo-panels makes it possible to consistently estimate 
elasticities from this data. Thus we can model the household decision on telephone 
access in a discrete choice framework where the telephone service decision is related 
to the cost of connection, household income and a host of other socio-demographic 
factors. Our results suggest UK price elasticities lying within the spectrum of results 
reported for North America. We also find evidence of substantially higher access
elasticities for lower income groups thus confirming the marked income sensitivity 
of access.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief 
overview of the evidence on telephone access elasticities in North America and the 
UK. Section 3 describes our modelling approach and the data used. Section 4 
outlines the pseudo-panel econometric technique. In section 5 we summarize and 
assess the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Review of the evidence
2.1 North America
One of the main sources of information on telephone demand is Taylor’s (1980 and 
1994) survey of the theoretical and empirical literature. Taylor notes that the erosion 
of the internal cross-subsidies in the telecoms industry meant that US research in the 
1980’s has seen an increase in the number of studies on the demand for residential 
access. The literature on access remains meagre, however, compared to that on call 
demand. One of the main reasons for this limited evidence stems from the fact that 
historically the US market has been characterized by local calls and access being 
bundled together48. Consequently much of the literature analyses this bundled service 
and not access as a separate service. The empirical debate in the US has centered 
around the question of whether or not elasticities are significantly different from 
zero. Taylor (1994) reports of only eight studies which had been published on
48 In the case of bundled local service, a unique fixed rental charge includes an unlimited number of local calls. 
Measured local service was gradually introduced throughout the US in the 1980s.
telephone access pre-1980. Five of these use aggregate time-series data49. The 
remaining three use cross-section data, but only Perl (1978) estimates a model based 
on household data50. Taylor (1994) summarizes the evidence on access by giving a 
range for the basic service charge elasticity of -0.06 to -0.17, with a mean of around - 
0.1. Considerably smaller figures are quoted for the initial connection charge (-0.02 
to -0.04). Income elasticities were centered around 0.5. Taylor suggests that 
residential access price elasticities have fallen somewhat during the 1980’s due to 
higher penetration rates. Overall Taylor concludes that: “a very small price elasticity 
and a moderate, but yet decidedly inelastic income elasticity is precisely what one 
should expect for basic telephone service: access to the telephone system is not a 
plaything of the rich....but has become a basic necessity for virtually all income 
groups.” (Taylor, 1994, p279).
The small, but nevertheless nonzero, access elasticities obtained pre-1980 have been 
confirmed and sharpened in the 1980’s. See for instance Perl (1983), Taylor and 
Kirdel (1990), and Cain and Macdonald (1991). More recently, a number of applied 
studies using increasingly sophisticated quantal choice models have allowed for the 
fact that today residential users in the US face a multiple tariff choice for telephone 
access. Studies analyzing access elasticities in the context of multiple tariff options
49 The five time-series studies mentioned by Taylor are Rash (1971); Davis et al. (1973); Waverman (1974); 
Pousette (1976); and Southern New England Telephone Co. (1977). Waverman and Pousette use the only 
European, namely Swedish, data.
50 The three studies are Alleman (1977) who uses data on a city level, Feldman (1976) who uses data on state 
level, and Perl (1978) who uses 1970 Census data.
include Kirdel (1988), Kirdel and Taylor (1993), Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva 
(1987), Train, Ben-Akiva and Atherton (1989) and Train (1994).
From access demand studies for the US, the consensus emerges that the probability 
of having a telephone is sensitive to price, but the sensitivity is quantitatively small 
in aggregated terms. However, early on, Perl (1978) found that access elasticities are 
sensitive to the level of household income. This result has been confirmed in 
subsequent studies. Cain and Macdonald (1991) focus on this particular aspect and 
find that some elasticities are up to twice as high for the poorest income households.
Households most vulnerable to drop-off due to rising local rates are young, low- 
income, poorly educated households living in rural areas.
2.2 United Kingdom
There is little formal work on access demand in the UK. British Telecom (BT) has 
conducted a number of studies on telephone demand, the results of which have been 
published in Cracknell (1982 and 1988), Cracknell and White (1989), and Cracknell 
and Knott (1995). The models yield estimates of the income and price elasticities for 
different services, mainly with the aim of improving commercial prediction and 
assessment of marketing strategies. This focus makes it more difficult to achieve a 
meaningful direct comparison with other studies in the field.
BT’s statistics of residential system growth separately identify demand for new 
exchange lines, cessations and takeovers of existing lines and therefore allow a more 
detailed analysis of access behaviour (Cracknell, 1988). A working line was left for 
take-over in 84% of houses where the previous occupant had moved out. 92% of 
these takeover offers where taken up by the new occupant. Even among previously 
untelephoned households take-up was 85%. These rates are much higher than the 7%
of non-movers who joined the network. The statistics show that, in the UK, 
household mobility provides a substantial impetus to the expansion of the telephone 
network, while the popularity of taking over service confirms evidence that 
installation charges can be a powerful deterrent. Analysis of cross-section take-up 
rates at different prices for different customer groups (e.g. new customers, moved 
customers, or take-up) gives an implied price elasticity of the order of -0.85 
(Cracknell 1988)51.
BT has also undertaken market research into the reasons for residential cessations 
(Cracknell and White, 1989). For a sample of 450 household in which there had been 
a change of telephone service in the previous year, 25% were customers who had not 
moved and had ceased their lines. In 7% of cases, service was subsequently 
reprovided to the same number. The majority of disconnections are due to 
conversion of premises, demolition or delay in re-occupation. A demographic 
analysis of the non-moving ceasers showed that they tend to be younger households, 
who are either in unskilled manual work or unemployed with recently bom children, 
living in council accommodation. In a cross-section analysis based on BT’s market 
panel, income proved the most powerful variable to explain residential system 
growth with a cross-section elasticity of 0.47. Other significant correlations were 
found between penetration rate and household size, rural versus inner city location, 
employment status, and number of rooms occupied (a measure of household wealth).
51 This result is so much higher than others reviewed so far because the price range considered is very different: 
the connection charge for a new customer is GBP 105, while take-ever only costs GBP 16 (Cracknell, 1988,
Type of tenancy was not found to be a significant influence. A (non-significant) 
price elasticity of -0.063 with respect to the annual rental charge was established by 
a BT study quoted in Cracknell and White (1989).
In an empirical study based on data from the telephone system in Hull (UK)52, 
Trotter (1989 and 1996) produces separate demand estimates for access, local and 
trunk call prices. The focus of his access demand estimation is for access on a 
particular tariff, rather than for access as a whole. This is due to the fact that the Hull 
system has had multi-tariff characteristics during a long period and there is thus no 
single access charge. Trotter uses aggregate time-series data covering the period 
1974/75 to 1986/87. The price variables are complemented by aggregate measures of 
GDP and variables linked to alternative tariff choices (essentially rentals of 
alternative options available to residential users).
When analyzing the main residential tariff, Trotter (1996) finds that neither levels 
nor changes in rentals seem to play a meaningful role in explaining the number of 
customers on the main residential tariff. Nor does the connection charge. This may 
be because it was relatively stable over the period or because it is lower than the BT 
equivalent. The lagged number of customers on the tariff is highly explanatory. 
However, this is to be expected considering the strong time trend present in the
presumably 1987 prices excl. VAT). Other access studies only consider the variation in the connection charge for 
new customers.
52 Kingston Communications (Hull) pic is a telecommunications company wholly owned by Kingston-upon-Hull 
City Council. It holds a licence under the 1984 Telecommunications Act to provide all telecommunications 
network services in the Hull licensed area. This area has a population of around 350 000 people serviced by some 
150 000 exchange connections.
telephone penetration variable. Because of the small number of observations, the 
results are not very stable. Nevertheless, Trotter reports a short-run access elasticity 
of 0.6 with respect to income and of -0.1 with respect to the rental charge of the main 
residential tariff.
Summing up, some general conclusions appear to hold for North America and the 
UK. Price elasticities for telephone services are small but greater than zero and 
increase with distance, with access being the smallest in absolute terms and 
international calls the largest. The assessment of access elasticities and the 
comparison of US and UK evidence is, however, less than straightforward. Many of 
the US studies refer to basic local service, i.e. bundled local access and local calls, 
whereas UK studies are rare and mostly based on time series. Reported rental 
elasticities (“basic local service”) have an average size of -0.1 in the US, their UK 
counterpart (line rental only) ranges between -0.06 and -0.1. Income elasticities of 
access center around 0.5 for the US, and vary between 0.5 and 0.6 in the UK. For 
connection charges, US elasticity estimates are in the range of -0.02 to -0.04, for the 
UK only Cracknell (1988) gives an estimation of a connection charge elasticity 
which is -0.85. Unfortunately, the method used in calculating this last number differs 
too much from the other estimates to allow any direct comparison. Overall, we 
believe that, despite the similarities in the size of the estimates, a comparison across 
the Atlantic needs to be done with caution. The differences in the respective 
telecoms environments have to be taken into account, as have the different 
definitions for various services. Cracknell and Knott (1995) stress the sensitivity of 
elasticity calculations with respect to the underlying data.
However, the similarity in the range of the results across the Atlantic is notable. The 
socio-demographic variables playing a role in determining access include income, 
age, education and employment status on both sides of the Atlantic.
3. Model and data
3.1 Model
One of the most important features of telecommunications demand is the 
interdependence between telephone access and telephone usage. Access refers to the 
consumer’s ability to make and receive53 telephone calls, and logically precedes 
usage, which refers to calls actually made. Making a telephone call is dependent on a 
prior decision to subscribe to the telephone network. However, telephone access 
does not automatically imply usage. Due to option demand, a consumer may desire 
to have access even though no calls are made. Option demand refers to the benefits 
that come from being able to make and receive calls which are not in fact made or 
received. The most quoted example is the ability to call medical or rescue services in 
an emergency. It is easy to imagine that consumers are willing to pay for this benefit 
separately.
The theoretical basis for most access demand studies is the consumer surplus 
framework, in which the demand for access to a telephone network is related to the 
net benefit from usage of the network, as measured by consumer surplus. 
Households will decide to have a telephone if the value of consumer surplus from
53 Note that the distinction between making and receiving calls is increasingly important in the face of regulatory 
tendencies emerging at present. Disconnection from the telephone service is replaced by a policy of barring 
outgoing calls due to concerns about universal service.
using a telephone exceeds the price of access. Wenders (1987) argues that the 
consumer surplus obtained from the surface area below the call demand curve should 
be augmented by the value to the consumer of receiving incoming calls, plus the 
“option value” of being able to make or receive further calls if she wishes.
The consumer surplus framework easily lends itself to the formulation of a quantal- 
choice model by viewing consumer surplus as a random variable whose mean is 
related to prices, income and other relevant socio-demographic variables. A normal 
distribution leads to the probit model, while a logistic distribution leads to the logit 
model. Probit/logit models can alternatively be derived in a random utility 
framework, as in, for example, the models of Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva 
(1987) and Train (1994).
Taylor draws on previous work by several authors to derive a cohesive theoretical 
structure to model telephone demand. The key elements of his discussion are 
outlined here54.
We assume the individual maximizes a utility function:
U = u(8q, x, 8N) (1)
where
8 = 1 if the consumer is connected to the telephone system, 0 if not;
54 See Taylor 1994, pp23-35, for full details.
q = the number of telephone calls; 
x = consumption of composite good;
N = number of subscribers to the system
subject to a budget constraint
S(r + 7tq) + px = p (2)
where
7t = price of a call; 
p = price of a composite good x; 
r = price of access to the system55; 
p = income of the consumer.
The demand functions are derived by a two-step procedure: maximisation of (1) 
subject to (2) assuming 5 = 1 ,  and comparison of the resulting consumer’s surplus 
with that if 5 = 0. The first step leads to the following expression for the consumer’s 
surplus (S) from making q' calls, where g(.) is the inverse demand function for calls:
(3)
o
55 The price of access to the system is the non-traffic sensitive part of the cost o f being connected to the 
telephone network. It is mostly twofold. First, there is a unique connection (or installation) charge to be paid the 
moment access to the network is desired, then a line rental charge has to be paid with every bill.
In step two these benefits are compared with the cost of access to the system, and the 
consumer will subscribe if the former exceeds the latter:
The analysis is then extended to an entire population. The demand for use is now 
identified with the total number of calls, Q, whereas the demand for access is 
equated with the proportion of the total population that subscribes to the telephone 
system. Q is given by
Defining 5n as either 1 or 0 according to whether individual n is a subscriber,
(5)
n«l
The quantity that we wish to explain is the proportion of the population which does 
subscribe, N/M, where M is the total population.
Define Sn analogously to S above:
= \g„(q,p,N,fi„ -r )d q -n q n' (6)
0
Each individual will again compare his or her value of Sn with r. 6n will vary across 
individual consumers because of differences in either tastes or income. Taylor 
assumes that all consumers have the same preferences, so that it is income that 
varies. More precisely, given a distribution of income, N will be determined by the 
probability that S„ is greater than r:
Q = Q fa, P, r, N, Y) (4)
where f ( S n) and F(Sn) are the density and distribution functions of S». The 
distribution of Sn will be related to that of income via the “change of variable” from 
fjn to S„ defined in (6). p. is a random variable. In fact Taylor shows that (7) can be 
rewritten as
j ;  = p (S .>r)  = P[M„>P*(r)\ 
(8)
=  1 -  \h (jJn)dM„
0
where h(fi^ is the density function of /i and fj.*(r) is the income of the marginal 
subscriber.
Equation (8) gives
7 7 = ‘[KPnWn (9)
M  A r )
More generally (5) can be rewritten as
where <D(.) is a composite function embodying Sn, the change in variable from/ to h, 
and the integral in (9). Taylor concludes that equations (4) and (10) “comprise, in 
general form, a bare-bones model of telephone demand for a population of 
residential consumers” (Taylor 1994, p31).
The presence of N as an argument in both these equations brings out the second 
feature mentioned above, the role of externalities. These are of two types. One is the 
call externality, by which one person making a call affects (normally positively) the 
utility of the person being called. In general this is assumed to be internalised 
between the two beneficiaries.
The other externality concerns access, and derives from the extra utility accruing to 
one subscriber if the number of other subscribers in the system increases. Its effect 
will be to reinforce the access-usage interdependence. The practical consequence is 
that we would expect demand to be more than unit elastic with respect to the number 
of customers on the system. Taylor (1980, p i6) argues “it [the access externality] 
gives the telephone the dimension of a public good, since the benefit that a new 
subscriber confers on existing subscribers is shared in common.” This argument has 
been used to support the case for subsidizing access, as the benefit as perceived by 
the individual subscriber will tend to understate the total benefit to society.
3.2 Data
The data set we use is based on 12 years of the UK Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES) spanning the period from 1985 to 1996. The FES is a continuous household 
survey that generates random samples of the population every year56. 10,000 UK 
households are selected every year. Of these approximately 7,000 complete the 
survey procedure and are included in the data set. Thus, our original sample 
comprises some 92,000 UK households. The sample period chosen avoids
complications with respect to structural changes in the UK telephone industry, as 
1984 is the year British Telecom was privatized. Moreover, price data becomes very 
difficult to trace for the pre-1984 period.
Beside very detailed information on expenditure on consumption and investment 
goods, the FES provides data on household characteristics. The socio-demographic 
information we use, such as education or sex, refers to the head of household. Other 
variables, such as income, refer to the household as a unit. In contrast to the US 
census survey, the FES does not comprise any information about the ethnic origin or 
the native language of the household, two variables which have been used in US 
studies on telephone demand to account for the size of the “calling circle” of a 
household. The FES survey includes a question about telephone access with the 
wording: “Is there a telephone installed in your accommodation?”. We coded the 
answer in a binary 0-1 mode. Telephone access in this model is therefore defined in 
terms of access within the home.
4. Method of estimation
The key difference between the US and the UK in terms of modelling telephone 
demand stems from the different organizational structure of the industry in the two 
countries. US studies are mainly based on countrywide census data. See, for 
example, Perl (1983), Cain and Macdonald (1991) , or Taylor and Kirdel (1990). 
Due to the presence of a multitude of telephone operators created after the divestiture
56 We are grateful to the ESRC Data Archive in Essex for providing us with the FES data.
of AT&T in 198457, different prices for telephone access and call services are 
charged in different regions and cities of the US at any given moment. Therefore, a 
single countrywide US data set comprises not only variation in socio-demographic 
variables, but also variation in price variables. By contrast, most European countries, 
including the UK, have a long history of monopoly provision accompanied by a 
policy of uniform pricing at the national level. Even after the liberalisation of the UK 
telecommunications market in 1984, British Telecom retains almost the entire 
market of residential access58. For this reason, there is still predominantly a unique 
price for telephone connection and quarterly line rental. Because of this market 
structure, price variation necessary to estimate the access elasticities of telephone 
demand is only available across time. Thus, a unique cross-section data set such as 
generated by one set of census data will not provide the necessary price dimension 
for our analysis. To remedy this problem, we base our study on a combined time 
series/cross-section data set. In this way, a simultaneous analysis of the influence of 
socio-demographic and price variables is possible.
We compile 12 years of the UK FES data to estimate the model outlined in the 
previous section and to find empirical values for the price and income elasticities of 
telephone access. In order to consistently estimate a model based on data generated 
by repeated and independent cross-sections, econometric techniques adapted to this
57 Known as Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).
58 At the same time, the more lucrative corporate and long-distance call market has become increasingly 
competitive. Also, this assessment of B Ps share of the residential access market is valid for the sample period 
used, i.e. 1985-1996. At the moment of the publication of this paper, cable companies are busy eroding B Ps 
share in the residential market, a phenomenon which would have to be taken into account in future analysis.
data structure have to be employed. In his seminal article, Deaton (1985) shows that 
a fixed effect model can be identified and consistently estimated from repeated 
cross-section (RCS) data. He suggests grouping individuals sharing some common 
observed characteristics, like age or sex, into cohorts. The averages within these 
cohorts are then treated as observations in a pseudo-panel (or synthetic panel, 
Verbeek, 1992) to which standard techniques for panel data estimation can be 
applied. Such synthetic panels might even have certain advantages over pure panel 
data, notably the preservation of randomness due to the absence of attrition.
4.1 Pseudo panel estimation
Suppose that y it is a 0-1 variable indicating whether a household has access to a 
telephone or not, and that this indicator variable is a linear function of explanatory 
variables. We acknowledge this being an unusual assumption as in reality it is not 
possible for a 0-1 indicator to be a linear function of variables, since the linear 
function can take any value whereas the indicator is binary. However, the estimation 
procedure which we have adopted involves subsequent aggregation of the individual 
data. We need yu to be linear in the explanatory vriables in order for the aggregation 
to give a relation between the share of l ’s and the average of the explanatory 
variables59.
Consider now the basic linear individual effect model
y it = a, + X up  + uit i = 1 ,....#; t = 1 ,..T (11)
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where Xu is a (K * 1) vector of explanatory variables which we assume exogenous to 
the model, index t and i refer to time and individuals respectively. Note that as we 
are not dealing with a real panel, N  can vary from period to period while T is fixed. 
The disturbances of the model (11) are assumed to be i.i.d., with zero mean and 
variance cj\  . We also assume that the individual effects a, are i.i.d. with finite mean
and variance <rl. If the a f  s are assumed to be the same across all units, OLS
provides consistent estimators of a  and p. Complications arise from the fact that the 
individual effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the disturbances but 
potentially correlated with the regressors. If the individual effects are uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables Xih the model can easily be estimated from RCS by 
pooling all observations and performing OLS treating a, + uit as a composite error 
term. However, in many applications the individual effects a, are likely to be 
correlated with Xlh so that estimation procedures treating the a/’s as random 
drawings from some distribution, such as simple pooling or the random effects 
model, lead to inconsistent estimators, unless the correlation is explicitly taken into 
account. When panel data are available, this problem can be solved by treating the 
a f  s as unknown, but estimable, parameters. Obviously this strategy no longer 
applies if no repeated observations on the same individuals are available. When the 
model is to be identified by means of RCS data, an additional incidental parameter 
problem arises: NT + K  parameters have to be estimated from NT observations.
59 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this problem of an aggregation bias created by the
Deaton (1985) suggests the use of cohorts to obtain consistent estimators for p  in 
(11) if repeated cross-sections are available and the individual effects are correlated 
with the regressors.
Define C cohorts, which are groups of individuals sharing some common 
characteristics like sex or date of birth. These groups are defined in such a manner 
that each individual is a member of exactly one cohort, and remains a member of this 
cohort for all periods. For example, a particular cohort may consist of all male 
individuals bom in 1945-1949. Assuming, for simplicity, that there is a unique 
regressor (K -  1), if we aggregate all observations to cohort level, the resulting 
model can be written as
y ct = act + Pxa +ua c = l,...C (12)
  j»/
If we define nct as being the size of group c at time t, xct = n~] ^  xis is the average
iec
value of all observed x/,'s in cohort c at time /, and analogously for the other 
variables in the model. The resulting data set is a pseudo panel with repeated 
observations over T periods and C cohorts. The main problem with estimating (12) is
that a ct depends on t, is unobserved and is still likely to be correlated with xct.
Therefore, treating a  a as random error is likely to lead to inconsistent estimators, 
while treating them as fixed unknown parameters results in an identification problem
unless the variations over t can be ignored ( a ct = a c). If the cohort averages are
estimation method.
based on a large number of individual observations, this assumption seems 
reasonable (see for instance Verbeek and Nijman, 1992, on the asymptotic properties 
of the cohort estimators). Under these assumptions, a natural estimator for p  is the
A
covariance, or within, estimator Pw used on the weighted cohort means60.
f  T V 1
Let = 2 xctnct be the time average of the observed cohort means for
v < * i  /
cohort c, and define yc likewise. The weighted within estimator on the pseudo panel 
observations is, for the case of a single regressor:
A -
(  C T - v
V C=1 /- I
C T
Z £«<,(*«-*e)2 Z Z
V  C=1 / *  l
(13)
p w is biased in small samples but consistent as the size of each group nct tends to
infinity, provided standard assumptions on the second moments of the regressors 
hold (Moffitt, 1993). When the size of each cohort is large enough, the sample mean 
of the fixed effects provides a consistent estimator of the time-invariant population 
mean and the estimator given in (13) is consistent. Consequently, when nc is 
reasonably large, most applied studies ignore the errors-in-variables problem caused
by the possible time variation in a ct and use standard estimators like the within 
estimator. See for example Browning et al. (1985). Our study falls into this category 
as the average cohort size for our sample is sufficiently large.
60 The weights are introduced to account for heteroscedasticity across cohorts.
Note also that there is a trade-off between the number of observations in the pseudo 
panel and the accuracy of these observations. The larger nc, the smaller C. In the case
A
of the standard within estimator /3W , this means a trade-off between the bias and 
variance of the estimator.
5. Empirical results
We model the demand for telephone access as a function of two groups of variables: 
price variables and socio-demographic variables. These variables determine the 
calling pattern of the household and therefore its access demand. The model we 
specify seeks to explain telephone access as a function of real connection charges 
and real line rental, which we expect to have a negative impact on telephone access, 
as well as real net household income, which has an expected positive influence. We 
also introduce household income in squared form to account for possible non- 
linearities. The total number of household members is equally expected to increase 
the demand for telephone usage and therefore for telephone access. In addition, we 
introduce measures for retired and female heads of household. Socio-economic 
studies about the “untelephoned” (see for instance OFTEL, 1994) find that these 
groups are more likely to be connected to the telephone, possibly reflecting higher 
option demand. We include the presence of children under five partly to adjust the 
household size variable for structural differences in household composition, and 
partly to test for another possible option demand effect.
Other household characteristics included are variables denoting a single-person 
household, the presence of an unemployed/unoccupied head of household, the age at 
which the head of household left full-time education, moreover a variable indicating 
rented accommodation, a “recent mover” variable, and finally a variable which
denotes an area with low population density. Single household status has been found 
to have a negative impact on telephone access in studies in the United States. The 
presence of an unemployed or unoccupied head of household is included to test for 
an influence beyond the income effect. The age at which the head of household left 
full-time education should influence the demand for telephone access positively. As 
far as variables related to the household accommodation are concerned, we expect 
households living in rented accommodation to have a lower access demand because 
of the type of housing included in this category. It has also been argued that the 
calling circle of households living in rented accommodation is smaller than for 
households owning their accommodation (Cain and Macdonald, 1991). The recent 
mover variable has been included to account for households not yet having had the 
time to get connected to the telephone. The final explanatory variable denotes 
households living in administrative areas with under 3.2 persons per acre (7.9 
persons per hectare) and is included to account for spacial patterns in the telephone 
penetration rate.
For the estimation of our model, we divide the individual households into groups 
based on the date of birth of the head of household. We include households whose 
head was bom between 1910 and 1963, that is, heads of household who were 
between 22 and 74 years old in 1985, the initial year of our sample. To form the 
pseudo-panel cohorts, we regroup the date of birth groups into pairs. Thus, the first 
cohort comprises households whose head was bom in 1910 or 1911, the second 
households whose head was bom in 1912 or 1913, and so on. This guarantees a 
sufficiently large number of observations in each cohort. In this manner, we create a 
pseudo-panel comprising 27 cohorts over 12 years, i.e. a sample with 324 
observations overall. Our mean cohort size is 226. The total number of households
forming the basis of the overall cohort sample is approximately 73,300. Note that 
while the original model as defined in theoretical terms in (11) is a binary model in 
the dependent variable and in a number of the explanatory variables, once the 
cohorts are formed, the observations take on the value of cohort means and represent 
proportions. The binary variable indicating a female head of household, for example, 
is now the proportion of households headed by a woman for a given cohort at a given 
time. We perform a logarithmic transformation on the dependent variable to make 
sure that the proportion estimated is bound by the [0,1] interval. The price variables 
included in the model are the connection charge BT charges new customers as well 
as BT’s annual line rental charge61. The connection charge varied between £77.5 and 
£121 in real terms (1987 prices) between 1985 and 1996, the real annual line rental 
between £54 and £80. The evolution of the two access prices over time can be seen 
in Figure 1. The annual mean telephone penetration rate calculated from our sample 
over the same time period is pictured in Figure 2.
61 We are grateful to Eurodata, London, for providing us with the telephone price data used in this article.
Figure 1: BT connection charges and annual line rental
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Figure 2: Telephone penetration rates
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We estimate the model by means of the weighted within estimator given in (13). The 
results of the estimation are reported in the second column of Table 1. Given the 
original form of the data, namely random samples taken from a large population, we 
have undertaken a Hausman test to test the specification of the model as fixed rather
than random effect model. The null hypothesis of orthogonality of the ctj and Xjt is 
rejected and the fixed effect specification is therefore accepted as appropriate.
Table 1: Estimation Results
Indep. variable* Coefficients (t-stat in parentheses)
Overall sample Low-Educ. Sample
connection charge -0.0056 (-5.01) -0.0062 (-4.64)
rental charge -0.0043 (-1.67) -0.0067 (-2.3)
household income 0.006 (4.32) 0.0065 (3.68)
household income2 -9.06e-07 (-2.39) -1.03e-06 (-1.99)
retired HoH 1.27 (5.03) 1.12 (4.17)
female HoH 3.03 (5.00) 2.49 (4.63)
rented accomod. -4.46 (-8.32) -3.24 (-7.35)
person total in HH -0.013 (-0.125) -0.02 (-0.17)
%age of child <5 -0.574 (-0.585) -2.24 (-2.1)
unem./unocc.HoH 0.87 (1.75) 0.66 (1.41)
single person HH -0.774 (-1.24) -0.21 (-0.35)
left f-t education 0.283 (3.5) 0.33 (2.72)
recent mover -3.69 (-3.39) -1.79 (-1.66)
area density 0.89 (2.05) 0.34 (0.834)
const. -2.92 (-2.16) -3.2 (-1.8)
F-Test 1.31 1.21
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.685
Ey 0.14 0.176
ec -0.065 -0.1
er -0.033 -0.07
mean cohort size 226 129
*HoH = head of household, HH = household
The coefficients of household income and the connection charge have the expected 
sign and are statistically highly significant. The coefficient of the annual rental 
charge is negative, and while the statistical significance level for this price variable is 
lower, it is still within the 10% confidence interval. The small but negative 
coefficients for the two price variables confirm the deterrent represented by 
telephone access charges. Calculated at the sample mean, the coefficient for the
connection charge gives rise to an access elasticity of -0.065 which lies above the 
range of connection charge elasticities reviewed by Taylor (1980) (-0.02 to -0.04), 
but within the results quoted by Cain and McDonald (1991). The coefficient for 
annual line rental in turn suggests an elasticity measure of -0.033 which is lower than 
the results reviewed earlier in this article. Our results suggest that it is primarily the 
connection charge which represents a barrier to telephone ownership. This argument 
is supported by the findings of the 1994 OFTEL report on the untelephoned. For 
household income, the coefficient leads to an income elasticity of 0.14, which is 
lower than the average results reported earlier. However, our result is in line with the 
findings of Waverman (1974) and Perl (1976). In both cases the estimate of the 
income elasticity is 0.15 (Taylor, 1994, p279). Like Perl’s, our elasticity is estimated 
with a model in which other factors related to income, such as education or type of 
housing, are taken into account. Thus a smaller income elasticity is probably to be 
expected. The significant coefficient of the squared income variable suggests that 
there might be a non-linear effect in this variable.
A majority of the socio-demographic variables included as explanatory variables for 
access demand have significant coefficients. Households headed by someone with 
higher education level are more likely to have a telephone in their living quarters, as 
are households headed by a retired or female person. This seems to suggest a higher 
option demand for this population group. However, other variables included to 
account for household structure, such as household size or the percentage of children 
under five, do not seem to have a statistically significant impact on telephone access 
demand.
Neither does the single person household status. A household headed by an 
unemployed person or one without occupation has a positive coefficient indicating a 
higher probability of telephone access for this population group. This result might 
partly be due to the definition of this category. In particular the latter group included 
in the category unemployed/unoccupied might contain households with a high 
propensity for telephone access. There may also be an effect due to a social security 
system which accords allowances for utility bills. Living in rented accommodation 
influences telephone access negatively, which is to be expected as most of the 
dwellings included in the category “rented accommodation” in the UK are council 
housing or belong to housing associations. Households living in rented 
accommodation are therefore likely to have a lower than average income. Having 
recently moved to the current address has a statistically strong effect and diminishes 
the probability of the household being connected to the telephone. Living in an area 
with very low population density also leads to a higher demand for telephone access 
as could be expected given the higher cost of alternative means of communication, 
such as personal visits, for households living in remote areas.
Overall, it is income and variables related to income such as education or type of 
housing, together with variables indicating female or retired heads of household 
which have the strongest impact on telephone access among the socio-economic 
variables. This result corroborates the findings of the main US studies surveyed in 
Section 2. A “recent mover effect” can also be clearly identified.
5.1 Differentiation of the resuits according to income
Progress toward universal service is generally measured by the percentage of
households with telephone service. Despite a high aggregate level of the household 
penetration rate, an important differential between population groups exists. Cain
and Macdonald (1991) find that price elasticities differ substantially between low 
and high income groups. The impact of higher fixed charges will therefore be bom 
disproportionately by the low-income part of the population. The (arc) price 
elasticities for connection charges calculated by Cain and Macdonald (1991) range 
from -0.04 to -0.2 with greater elasticities in households with lower initial 
connection probability, mainly low-income households from minority groups. In 
order to test the sensitivity of the access elasticity with respect to income in our 
sample, we divide our data into two subgroups. We create cohorts which are not only 
based on date of birth, but also on the age at which the head of household left full­
time education. This latter variable serves as a time-invariant proxy for household 
income and allows us to partition our sample according to a variable strongly 
correlated with income. We define people who left full-time education at or below 
the legal age as belonging to a “lower education” group62. We then apply the pseudo­
panel technique to the lower education sample to test for differences in the results for 
this subgroup. The estimation results for the “lower-education” sample are reported 
in column 3 of Table 1.
The heads of roughly 42,000 households bom between 1910 and 1963 left school at 
or below the legal school leaving age. We regroup them into two-year cohorts 
following the same procedure outlined above. The mean cohort size is 129. Column
62 We also need to account for the fact that the legal age for school leavers has changed over time. Our sample 
includes individuals bom between 1910 and 1963. While these were at school, the legal age first changed from 
14 to 15 (1946) and then from 15 to 16 (1973). A person bom for instance in 1930 is thus “higher-educated”' if 
they left school at 16, while another, bom for instance in 1960, is “lower-educated” if they left school at the same 
age of 16.
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3 shows us that the income and price variables have significant coefficients which 
give rise to elasticities of 0.176 for income and -0.1 and -0.07 for connection charge 
and line rental respectively (all calculated at sample mean values). The price 
elasticities in the lower-education population are therefore 50% and 100% higher 
than the elasticities calculated for the overall population. We conclude that the lower 
education/lower income group is indeed more sensitive to changes in telephone 
access charges than the overall population. The income elasticity is also higher, 
although its rise by 25% is not quite as marked as that of the price variable 
elasticities. There is little change of behaviour among the socio-demographic 
variables. Retirement, gender and education have a statistically significant positive 
influence on the telephone penetration rate, while living in rented accommodation 
has a strong negative effect. Household size is still statistically non-significant, but 
our results suggest that the number of children under five has a negative influence on 
telephone access among the lower-education population, whereas it did not have a 
significant impact in the overall sample. This result might be interpreted in terms of 
a liquidity effect. The presence of infants in low-income households might present a 
strain on household income which can be seen in lower telephone access rates, a 
phenomenon which is not apparent in the population at large. Moving into the 
present dwelling within the last four months still has a negative sign but its 
significance level has dropped. Living in an area of under 3.2 persons per acre is no 
longer statistically significant for households in the lower-education sample.
5.2 Assessment of results
The small but mostly significant negative price elasticities for connection and rental 
charges suggest that a substantial increase in these prices will have a noticeable 
negative effect on telephone penetration and therefore on the objective of achieving
universal access across all groups of the population. Small elasticities can lead to 
large numbers when applied to a large population base63. The numbers give even 
more cause to concern if they are higher for disadvantaged, low-income groups as 
our results suggest. However, the elasticities calculated in this study should not be 
used in an unconditional manner to quantify drop-off. First, adjustment to increasing 
residential access charges will take place over time and not instantaneously. Second, 
telephone penetration is driven by a host of factors other than price which might 
evolve so as to counteract the effect of rising price levels.
Telephone penetration rates in the UK have risen steadily since the 1984 
liberalisation despite changes in connection and line rental charges. One possible 
explanation is the change in the household structure during the same period. When 
focusing on the household characteristics which we identified as most influential on 
telephone access demand, we see that average weekly household income has 
increased from £183 to £213 (1987 prices) between 1985 and 1996, even though the 
growth of this variable has slowed in the first half of the 1990s. Also according to 
the FES data, the proportion of households headed by a retired or female person has 
increased over the same time period. The former group’s share among total 
households has risen from 22 to 26%, the latter’s from 23 to 26%M. The average 
education level measured by the age when full-time education ceased has risen from
63 According to the 1991 population census there were 21 441 000 households in the UK at this moment. The 
telephone penetration rate calculated from the FES survey for that year was 90.4%, i.e. 19 383 000 households 
had in house access to the telephone. According to our elasticity calculation and assuming ceteris paribus, a 25% 
increase in the connection charge would lead to a 1.625% decrease in the quantity of people connected, which 
would signify 315 000 households less among those with telephone connection.
15.5 to 16.1 years, in line with the increase in the compulsory schooling age. At the 
same time the frequency of rented accommodation decreased from 30.4 to 23.6% 
due to the government sale of council housing to their respective occupiers. To the 
extent that households with higher incomes, or headed by a retired person or a 
woman, as well as households living in owned accommodation have a higher 
demand for telephone access, we will expect rising telephone penetration as the 
household structure changes over time.
Is the evolution of factors influencing telephone penetration in the overall population 
mirrored in those parts of the population most likely not to have a telephone? It is the 
lowest income groups which are most threatened by further marginalisation due to 
increasing fixed charges. We select those households in the lowest ten percent 
income percentile for each year in the sample to search for potential differences in 
the behaviour of the socio-demographic variables for this population group. The 
most noteworthy difference between the overall sample and the lowest ten percent 
income group is the difference in their respective age structures. The average age 
among the lowest income populations is 60.7 years. This is ten years above the 
average age of all heads of household included in the FES survey between 1985 and 
1996. Over the same period, the percentage of households headed by retired persons 
has risen from 41.6 to 57%, the proportion of those headed by women varied 
between 59 and 65%. For the greatest part the tendencies observed in the overall 
population are however mirrored by the households in the lowest ten percent income
64 There is an obvious overlap between the variables though.
bracket. Average weekly household income has risen from £48 to £52.2 for this 
income group. The average education level has also increased from 14.4 to 14.9 
years. The percentage of households living in rented accommodation has decreased 
from 48.4% in 1988 to 35.7% in 1995.
In view of the evolution of the variables identified in our model as influencing 
telephone access demand, we can find no evidence for the UK that there is an 
increase in the probability of marginalisation for the poorest population group as far 
as telephone access is concerned. This conclusion is confirmed by Figure 3. It shows 
the evolution of telephone penetration rates between 1985 and 1996 for the overall 
FES population sample and for the lowest 10% income households in this sample. 
The figure suggests a narrowing of the gap between the two groups. This narrowing 
appears to be mainly due to the increase in income and in the share of households 
headed by elderly and women in this population group.
Figure 3: Telephone penetration rates differentiated according to income
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6. C oncluding  rem arks
The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and the rebalancing of the tariff 
structure associated with it has raised questions about the impact the rise in access 
charges will have on residential customers. The issue is of particular interest in view 
of universal service objectives proclaimed at national and European level. Through 
the creation of a repeated cross section data set based on the annual UK Family 
Expenditure Survey we were able to estimate the impact of tariff variations on 
residential telephone access demand.
Our work shares one drawback with other studies in this area. Our elasticity 
measures do not allow us to separate the impact on telephone penetration rates into 
“drop-off resulting from higher connection and rental charges, and failure to “drop- 
in” by those still untelephoned. In view of this, our work is, however, useful in 
establishing two facts. First, the cost of access expressed by connection and rental 
charges has a negative effect, albeit small, on the probability of a household having a 
telephone. Second, we have identified a number of socio-demographic and economic 
household characteristics associated with telephone access.
By creating a subsample of low-education households to approximate low-income 
households, we also find a strong sensitivity of access elasticities with respect to 
income. Our study confirms the validity of US experience for the UK. For the overall 
sample, our price elasticity of -0.06 with respect to connection charges lies above the 
average of price elasticities summarized by Taylor (1994) but is in line with 
estimates found by Cain and Macdonald (1991). For the lower education sample, the 
corresponding price elasticity is -0.1. As far as the impact of the rental charge is 
concerned, the results show a negative impact on telephone access, the statistical 
significance of the results is however lower for this price variable, suggesting that 
the one-off connection charge is the main price barrier to telephone ownership. For 
the overall sample, we found a price elasticity with respect to the rental charge of - 
0.033. The measure is statistically more stable for the low-education sample were it 
leads to an elasticity of -0.07. The income elasticity of access is 0.14 for our overall 
sample. This is lower than the average estimate of 0.5 reported in studies surveyed 
by Taylor (1994), but in line with estimates reported by Waverman (1973) and Perl 
(1976). The fact that our estimate is lower is very likely a consequence of the 
inclusion of income related variables such as education or type of housing in our 
estimation model. Taylor (1994) argues that elasticities decrease as the penetration 
rate increases. If this argument holds for the UK, our results, based on the period 
1985-1996, and very similar to results found up to 20 years ago for the US, would 
suggest that overall the absolute level of telephone access elasticities is higher in the 
UK than in the US.
Among the socio-demographic and economic household characteristics strongly 
influencing telephone access demand are household income and variables linked to 
income such as education and type of dwelling. The presence of a retired or female
head of household also influences telephone access positively and suggests a 
stronger option demand for these population groups. We also found a clear “recent- 
mover” effect.
We can see from Figure 2.1 that after initial increases, BT’s connection charge has 
fallen in real terms over the last few years, mainly because of the regulator’s concern 
about disconnections. The negative price elasticities found in this study confirm that 
such regulatory efforts may help maintain and improve access levels. Nonetheless 
we believe that containing the access price at a below-cost level for the whole 
population is not necessary to improve telephone penetration among the low-income 
population. An economically more efficient way is offered by targeted subsidy 
programs, which offer lower access charges for those truly threatened by exclusion. 
In the following chapter, we will review such programs, introduced in the wake of 
liberalisation of the telecommunications industry in the US and the UK. Targeted 
subsidy programs can take one of two forms: either they are based on some means- 
tested criteria (in some US states for instance telephone connection is facilitated for 
recipients of food stamps), or they take the form of optional (or self-selection) tariffs. 
This latter category of targeted subsidy programs has very desirable efficiency 
features. US results suggest that access demand is primarily a function of minimum 
rather than average access charges (Cain and Macdonald, 1991, and Train, 1994). 
This suggests that the provision of social tariffs can be expected to maintain 
relatively high levels of access demand even in the face of overall access charge 
rises. Tariffs with relatively low access but high usage charges for instance should 
appeal to low user groups such as certain elderly or lone parents which have a 
relatively small calling circle but a high option demand.
Finally, we note the following. In his 1994 survey of telephone demand, Taylor 
observes that while liberalization and technical progress have improved the quality 
of data on telephone demand, competition and privatisation has led to increased 
difficulties for researchers in obtaining access to data now considered commercially 
sensitive. Trotter (1996) confirms this point for the post-liberalization UK. He states 
in his conclusion that UK work has been hampered by a relative lack of data, partly 
due to technical reasons, and partly due to most of the UK market being supplied by 
one monopoly supplier, which makes any cross-section analysis difficult. While we 
tried to remedy the latter point in this article, we agree with the above observations. 
There remains a need for further work as an input into UK policy decisions. More 
detailed work is however likely to depend on the data being specifically collected, as 
has been the case for several of the main US studies.
Chapter 4: Residential Customer Switching in Electricity 
and Gas: New Evidence from the UK
1. Introduction
The liberalisation of energy markets has made supplier switching a reality even for 
the smallest of customers in Great Britain (GB). The gradual phasing in of 
competition in the domestic gas market started in April 1996 and ended two years 
later, in May 199865. In the domestic electricity market, competition was first 
introduced in September 1998 and was complete for all households by the end of 
May 1999. In this chapter, we use data from an ongoing household panel study (the 
Oxera Energy Panel) to examine the progress of competition, and analyse the 
determinants of switching in domestic energy markets66. The panel data span a 
period of six quarters, from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2001, 
and consist of questionnaire responses received from a representative sample of 
2,110 households in GB.
The timing of this first analysis of the Oxera panel data coincides with the 
publication of the results of the most recent review of supply competition in gas and 
electricity by the energy regulator Ofgem67. The key conclusion of this review is that 
supply competition in domestic gas and electricity markets is well developed and
65 The gradual phasing in of competition was achieved by increasing in steps the geographic scope o f competitive 
supply areas. So was for instance in the case of gas, supplier choice first available for households in Devon, 
Cornwall and Somerset.
661 am grateful to Oxford Economic Research Associates (Oxera) for allowing me to make use o f this data set. 
However, the views expressed in this chapter are my own and not those of Oxera, and the usual disclaimer 
applies.
6 ‘Review of domestic gas and electricity competition and supply price regulation -  Evidence and initial 
proposals’, Ofgem, November 2001.
sufficiently firmly established across all groups of customers to suggest the removal 
of all remaining retail price controls in domestic gas and electricity markets in GB. 
The industry-wide consultation initiated by the publication of the review document 
will provide input into the decision process on whether the suggested withdrawal of 
supply price controls will indeed be implemented from April 2002 onwards or not.
The main intention of this chapter is to add formal quantitative data analysis to the 
body of evidence on energy supply competition. Despite a considerable amount of 
data in the area (collated primarily by Ofgem for its annual review of the state of 
competition), formal analysis has taken second place to descriptive surveys68.
A number of indicators can be used to assess the state of competition in a market, 
including, inter alia, customer awareness of competitive offers, number of active 
suppliers, perceived barriers to entry, market shares and customer switching.
The data analysis in this chapter reviews evidence from the panel data with respect to 
some of these competition indicators, but focuses in particular on switching 
evidence. The ability of customers to switch supplier is a key indicator, since it 
shows whether competition is firmly rooted in customer behaviour and there is an 
absence of switching barriers which could keep customers from exercising their 
choice. Thus, it is important to distinguish between changes in market share that 
result from customers switching, and changes that are the outcome of consolidation
68 An exception to this is a study by Parmar, Price and Waterson (2000). However, Parmar et al. focus on the gas 
sector only, and base their analysis on data collected at the initial stages of competition when the gas market was 
only partially open.
among suppliers. In the context of retail price regulation, switching evidence allows 
to draw conclusions on whether suppliers are indeed constrained in their pricing 
policies by customer behaviour, or whether price-caps are needed to counteract 
market power.
The main question addressed in this chapter concerns the determinants of domestic 
supplier switching and the relative importance of socio-demographic household 
characteristics compared to other factors. The latter concern in particular variables 
linked to potential cost savings, such as payment method or the subscription to dual 
fuel deals, as well as variables linked to previous switching experiences. The 
different variables are tested for their statistical relevance in a probit model. The data 
allow for a direct comparison between gas and electricity markets, and questions 
regarding differences between the two sectors are raised.
The main results from the analysis of the Oxera Energy Panel data are: (i) switching 
rates in both the electricity and gas markets have been increasing over the period 
covered by the panel, confirming evidence of increased customer awareness and 
active competition; (ii) market shares of incumbents are decreasing, but a trend 
towards consolidation is apparent, in particular among electricity suppliers; (iii) 
according to the econometric results, socio-demographic household characteristics 
play a less important role in determining the switching decision than variables linked 
to cost savings and switching experiences in other sectors.
These results corroborate the Ofgem 2001 review findings in that they confirm the 
establishment of competition across all socio-demographic customer groups, with the 
only group arguably deserving continued regulatory attention being elderly 
households. According to the econometric findings, switching is primarily
determined by variables linked to cost savings and by other supply choice 
experiences. Thus, it is important to note the essential role of continued monitoring 
of the number of suppliers, as active customer behaviour will only be effective in an 
environment where the supply market structure offers real choice.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews existing 
evidence regarding supply competition and switching in GB, focussing in particular 
on the latest Ofgem findings. Based on the evidence reviewed, a theoretical model 
for switching in domestic energy markets is set out in section 3. Section 4 describes 
the data used for the subsequent analysis. In section 5, a first descriptive analysis of 
switching trends, market shares and switcher profile is undertaken. These initial 
results are formally tested in section 6 in the context of a probit model. Section 7 
assesses the overall results of the analysis and section 8 concludes.
2. Review of the evidence
Several recent studies have examined the features of energy supply market 
competition in GB, and some also allow useful comparisons with other sectors. The 
most recent discussion of competition in liberalised energy markets is contained in 
Ofgem’s November 2001 ‘Review of domestic gas and electricity competition and 
supply price regulation—Evidence and initial proposals’ (Ofgem 2001c). The review 
is based on data gathered by means of two surveys, one among households69, the
69 ‘Experience of the competitive domestic electricity and gas markets -  Research study conducted for Ofgem by 
MORI’, Ofgem, November 2001.
other among gas and electricity suppliers70. Earlier articles and studies include 
Ofgem (2000 and 2001a), Waddams Price and Bennet (1999), and Ofgas (1997, 
1998a and b). It should be noted that evidence more particularly related to the 
determinants of switching is discussed in section 3.
2.1 Market shares
Prior to liberalisation, British Gas Trading (BGT) and the incumbent public 
electricity suppliers (PESs) had monopoly supply rights nationally (for BGT) and 
regionally (for the PESs). As can be seen in tables 1 and 2, market shares have 
changed significantly over the last few years, indicating a loss of market share for 
the incumbent suppliers, and entry of new suppliers with growing market shares.
Table 1 gives BGT’s market share as a function of the three principal payment 
methods for energy. The most frequent payment method has traditionally been 
quarterly bill, payable in arrears after a meter reading. This extends credit to 
customers and thus carries a risk of non-payment. Partly in response to this, an 
alternative, pre-payment system was developed where smart cards or keys are 
charged in advance and inserted into meters to release a flow of energy, permitting 
‘self-disconnection’ for consumers unable to afford fuel.
Pre-payment is the most expensive method of payment for a utility to administer. 
The cheapest system is regular monthly direct debit payments from a bank, with an 
annual reconciliation. De facto, direct debit payment implies that customers extent
70 ‘Domestic gas and electricity supply market survey 2001 Ofgem, July 2001.
credit to the energy supplier. With the onset of competition, energy suppliers have 
increasingly integrated the cost differences between payment methods in their tariffs, 
which had hitherto contained some cross-subsidy by the direct debit customers 
towards those who used pre-payment and quarterly credit. As a consequence of the 
potential negative impact such tariff re-balancing can have on marginal users, 
considerable debate on the distributional effects of liberalisation has taken place (see, 
for example, Price and Young 2001).
The particular status of pre-payment customers in gas is reflected in the relative price 
regulation regime BGT is currently subject to71, and Ofgem has paid particular 
attention to the development of competition in different payment method markets in 
its review.
71 The relative price regulation regime for gas implies that the regulator fixes a maximum differential between 
BGT’s LatePay/PrePayment prices and its Direct Debit prices.
Table 1: BGT gas supply market share (%) by payment method
Monthly direct debit Standard credit Pre-payment
September 1999 70 78 88
March 2000 69 75 84
September 2000 67 74 83
March 2001 64 73 82
June 2001 63 71 82
Source: Ofgem (2001c)
According to Ofgem, BGT now has around 67% of the total customers in the market 
(around 70% of the market in volume terms). However, as table 1 shows, the speed 
of market share loss in general appears to be slowing and the pre-payment market 
has seen much less movement than the other payment methods. The explanation for 
the persistence of a high market share for the incumbent in the pre-payment market 
is that until recently, suppliers have competed mostly for attractive direct debit 
customers, and alternative offers for pre-payment customers have been few. 
However, Ofgem (2001c) notes that over the 12 months to October 2001, the number 
of suppliers offering lower pre-payment tariffs has doubled to 6, suggesting more 
active competition in this market segment.
Table 2: Domestic electricity suppliers market share (%) by customers
supplied (September 2001)
Market sh a re
Innogy/Yorkshire/Northem 19
BGT 17
TXU Energi 15
SSE Energy 14
London 10
Scottish Power 10
Powergen 8
Seeboard 6
Other suppliers <2
Source: Ofgem (2001c)
For the electricity market, the effects of liberalisation are complicated by the recent 
consolidation amongst suppliers and the former regional structure that means a small 
national market share can disguise very strong regional market power. As can be 
seen in table 2, no single company has a market share (by customer number) of more 
than 19% nationwide, in stark contrast to the position of BGT in the gas market. 
However, when the regional structures are taken into consideration (table 3), the 
pattern of market share loss is much more similar to that of BGT in table 1.
Table 3: Average market shares (%) of ex-PES suppliers ‘in area’ by payment
method
Monthly direct debit Standard credit Pre-payment
March 2000 78 85 94
September 2000 72 80 90
March 2001 67 76 85
June 2001 64 73 80
Source: Ofgem (2001c)
Interestingly, BGT is now the second largest electricity supplier, with 17% of the 
market. In the gas market, the total market share of all suppliers competing with
BGT is only 33%. As will be confirmed on the basis of the panel data in section 5, 
no one company has succeeded to establish themselves in the gas market as strongly 
as BGT has in the electricity market.
2.2 Switching trends
The Ofgem review classifies switching into three categories: (a) gross switching 
(referring to all transfers from one supplier to another); (b) net switching (referring 
only to switching away for the incumbent gas or electricity suppliers, and abstracting 
from ‘return’ switching to BGT or the ex-PESs); and (c) chum, where gross 
switching is broken up into net switching, return switching and switching among 
non-incumbent suppliers.
In table 4 gross switching rates in gas and electricity show that weekly transfer 
numbers have increased in the year to September 2001.
Table 4: Weekly transfers in gas and electricity supply markets
Gas Electricity
Sep. 2000 to Sep. 2001 70,000 100,000
Sep. 1999 to Sep. 2000 56,000 94,000
Source: Ofgem (2001c)
Transfers away from the incumbents in gas and electricity are declining as share in 
total (from 49% to 46% in the case of BGT, and from 79% to 74% in the case of ex- 
PESs), while chum, i.e. transfers among non-incumbent suppliers is increasing (from 
23% to 28% in the case of gas, and from 6% to 9% in the case of electricity). Return 
switching is more or less stable for both gas and electricity, lying at 26% in the year 
up to September 2001 for BGT and at 16% for the same period for ex-PESs. The 
lower numbers for electricity are likely to be due to the fact that the gas market has 
been opened to competition a year earlier than electricity.
Overall switching numbers in gas have increased from 29% in Summer 2000 to 37% 
a year later; the equivalent numbers for electricity are 19% and 38% respectively. 
Among all switchers, the proportion who have switched supplier more than once 
continues to increase. Ofgem (2001c) only quotes numbers for gas, with the 
proportion of multiple switchers among all gas switchers being 28%. Most of the 
multiple switchers have switched just one more time, and nearly half (46%) have 
returned to BGT.
The Ofgem survey also focuses on the switching behaviour for particular groups of 
customers—those with special needs and those with outstanding debt problems. The 
results of this assessment are encouraging. Table 5 shows that, apart from pensioners 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, rural customers, the majority of special groups 
have switching rates in gas and electricity markets similar to the average. 
Differences found in previous years are evening out, with formerly disadvantaged 
groups catching up on the average.
Table 5: Proportion of special groups having switched in gas and electricity
markets (Summer 2001, %)
Gas Electricity
All customers 37 38
Very low income customers 38 43
Disabled 35 44
Single parent families 39 43
Pensioners 29 30
Rural customers 35 32
Source: Ofgem (2001c)
Efforts directed at customers with an outstanding debt, or who have experienced 
payment difficulties, also show results. Switching rates in this category are no lower
than average in the case of gas (at 35%), and even significantly higher than average 
in the case of electricity (53% have switched supplier).
3. A switching model
In this section, a theoretical model of supplier switching in energy markets is set out. 
First, evidence linked to determinants of switching is reviewed, then, on the basis of 
the conclusions drawn from the evidence, a theoretical cost-benefit model is 
established.
3.1 Determinants of switching
A research study released by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 2000 
under the title ‘Switching suppliers’ (DTI 2000) looks at switching in energy 
services, fixed and mobile telecommunications, mortgages, current and savings 
accounts, and home and car insurance. In the study, the determinants of switching 
are identified to be the result of interaction between three factors: first, opportunity, 
i.e. accessibility of competitors and the extent to which consumers can shift easily; 
second, inclination, i.e. the perceived benefits of switching and/or the desire to leave 
a company which has provided unsatisfactory service; third, perception of risk or 
disinclination.
Whether a person switches to another supplier or not is a function of where the
balance lies between these different factors. The DTI study comes to the conclusion
that in most markets, the balance of factors is tipped in favour of existing suppliers.
There is lack of knowledge and trust in alternative suppliers (in other words, the
reputation of a company plays an important role in customer choice), high perception
of risk and apathy, and in some cases genuine barriers (e.g. presence of penalty
clauses, or fuel debts). Ofgem (200Id) quotes high satisfaction levels with the
existing supplier as main reason for not switching, followed by ‘too much hassle’, 
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which can be taken to symbolise high searching and administrative costs of 
switching. In Ventura (1999), an additional reason for not switching is identified as 
‘waiting to see what happens’.
In terms of information needs, it is interesting to note that the DTI study concludes 
that consumers have easy access to information on what companies offer, but they do 
not find it easy to identify the right company or package to suit their individual 
needs. This is confirmed by Ofgem (2001a) where it is reported that 33% of 
respondents said that they found it either fairly or very difficult to compare prices72.
Surveys agree that the main driver of switching counteracting the switching costs 
listed is cost savings (DTI (2000), Oftel (2000), Ofgem (2001a and c))73. In the case 
of gas and electricity markets, the convenience of dual fuel deals also ranks high on 
the list of reasons for switching (Ofgem 2001c), it is however disputable whether this 
refers to veritable convenience reasons rather than further price discounts offered for 
dual fuel deals74.
Various studies also seem to concur on the finding that those who have switched do 
not find the experience inherently difficult. According to the DTI study, 75% of 
switchers found it easy, and a further 20% found it fairly easy to switch. It should 
also be highlighted that those who have shifted in one market, are the ones most
72 This result might suggest a problem of excessive product differentiation in the energy market. On this subject 
see for instance Mankiev and Whinston (1986).
73 In view of the reputational effect identified with respect to switching barriers, it is interesting to note that in 
Venture (1999) the leading factor influencing customer preferences is not price, but the identity o f the company 
or the brand supplying the service.
likely to shift in other markets, a finding confirmed by Oftel (2000)—those who 
switched their telecoms supplier were also more likely than average to have switched 
supplier of other utilities. Two possible interpretations of this last result are possible. 
First, repeated switching experiences reflect inherent consumer characteristics linked 
to lower risk aversion, and thus overall lower barriers to switching for selected 
households. Second, the result could also suggest that switching behaviour is ‘habit 
forming’, in the sense that a successful switching influence will lower switching 
barriers through a reduction of the perceived uncertainty.
Among the markets surveyed in DTI (2000), switching levels vary significantly, and 
specific reasons can be found for the variations. The highest levels of switching were 
reported in the insurance market, with 53% of consumers having switched their car 
insurance provider in the 5 year period considered by the survey, and 30% of 
consumers home insurance. A possible explanation for these high switching rates is 
that many insurance contracts require active renewal after a given period (e.g. every 
year). This automatically increases switching opportunities. Moreover, a number of 
competitive insurance suppliers will contact households about to renew their 
contract, thus reducing the search costs for the household.
The deregulated energy markets are also reported to have high levels of switching, a 
fact that is mainly attributed to the highly proactive marketing and sales techniques 
employed in the industry. Numbers of 37% for gas, and 26% for electricity are
74 Note for instance that most dual fuel subscribers will still receive separate bills.
quoted in the DTI study, but it should be noted that these numbers are somewhat in 
contradiction with evidence from Ofgem (2000), where number of 29% and 19% 
respectively are quoted. The discrepancy is likely to stem from the fact that the 
reference periods in the two studies are not identical. Moreover, different wordings 
of the question might have caused different responses.
Financial services have among the lowest levels of switching. Only 12% of 
respondents have switched mortgage provider in the 5 year period prior to the 
survey, and only 6% of customers had changed their current account bank in the 
same period. In addition to particularly high aversion of risk in these services, the 
result might also be influenced by the fact that penalty clauses are often integrated in 
mortgage contract, preventing customers from switching.
The telecommunications sector is revealed as a liberalised utility sector with fairly 
low switching rates in terms of fixed line provider—only 11% of customers had 
done so75. However, the numbers are higher in the mobile sector with 20% of 
customers having switched. Oftel (2000) broadly confirms the DTI (2000) results for 
mobile telephone, reporting 25% of mobile network switchers, but also indicates 
higher levels of switching in the fixed telephony sector.
3.2 A theoretical cost-benefit model
In view of the evidence reviewed in the previous section, a theoretical model of 
supplier switching can be constructed. In addition to being guided by the conclusions
from the reviewed evidence, the model follows the framework set out in Parmar et 
al. (2000).
Formally, the probability P  that the event ‘switching supplier’ S occurs can be 
expressed as a function of switching costs C and switching benefits B for household 
i.
Pt = P(s  = 1),. = P(N; < N,) = Fqc„Bl9r)  (1)
where y represents a set of parameters and F is the distribution of (unobserved) net 
benefits N .  N j*  is the critical (or threshold) value for household i beyond which 
switching occurs.
Switching costs can be classified into several categories. First, time costs refer to the 
search and evaluation costs of finding the most appropriate offer, and possible 
administrative time for filling in forms. In customer surveys, time costs are most 
likely to be reflected in the answer that switching is ‘too much hassle’. Time costs 
are likely to be positively related to the opportunity cost of alternative activities, and 
hence to income (Y) and/or employment status (EM) and household size (HS). The 
effect of education (ED) is ambiguous, since higher education may on the one hand 
reduce the time required to reach and implement a switching decision, but may on 
the other signal a higher opportunity cost, falling into the same variable category as 
income and employment status.
75 This is likely to be at least partly caused by the possibility of indirect access which allows customers to
In addition to time costs, psychological barriers are likely to be important in terms of 
switching costs. Psychological barriers are likely to be positively related to 
household characteristics like age (A). Previous experience of switching in turn is 
likely to lower psychological barriers, in case such experiences have been successful 
and easy as they are reported to be in the majority of cases. Thus, switching in other 
markets like telecoms (1) or the alternative energy market (ALT) are likely to lower 
the cost of switching.
Finally, ‘true’ barriers to switching need to be taken into account. Despite recent 
targeted efforts in this area, one such barrier might still be outstanding debt. In 
particular in the case of gas, the use of prepayment meters (PPM) can be used as 
proxy for this barrier (Ofgem 2001c)76. Another real barrier might according to the 
latest Ofgem review be present in Scotland (SCOT): less door-to-door sales occur in 
this area, and lower overall switching rates are observed.
The above conceptualisation of switching costs leads to the following cost function:
C = C(Y / EM, ED, HS, A, T, ALT, PPM, SCOT) (2)
Regarding switching benefits, the primary driver behind switching is the potential 
saving in fuel costs. Cost savings will depend on the amount of energy used, and as 
such on household size (HS), and the size of premises inhabited (HOUSE and 
ROOMS). Importantly, cost savings are also related to payment method. As
exercise choice without actually having to switch their fixed line provider.
discussed in the previous section, customers using direct debit payment (DD) will 
have benefited from the most attractive price offers. Switching of payment method 
(SWIPMM) can be used as variable capturing customers who have switched payment 
method in order to benefit from larger price discounts. Last, a variable for zero 
standing charges is considered: in particular for customers with low usage, price 
offers considering variable charges only can be attractive in terms of cost savings.
Hence, the following benefit function can be assumed:
B = B(HS, HOUSE, ROOMS, DD, DUAL, SWIPMM, STANDS) (3)
The model outlined above will be estimated within a probit framework in Section 6. 
However, prior to reporting the econometric results, section 4 describes the data set 
underlying the analysis, and section 5 draws first conclusions from the descriptive 
analysis of the data.
4. The OXERA Energy Panel
The data analysed in this chapter has been gathered in the context of a panel study 
designed and set up by Oxford Economic Research Associates (Oxera) in 2001. The 
field work was undertaken by the market research company Ipsos-RSL.
76 According to the same Ofgem reference, customers in debt are more evenly spread across all payment methods 
in the case of electricity.
The study is designed in three waves, with data collection taking place by means of 
questionnaires mailed to a representative sample of GB households77. The data 
gathered from each household falls into two categories: (a) information related to 
energy supplier and consumption, and (b) information on socio-demographic 
household characteristics. Energy-related information concerns in particular the 
identity of the supplier of gas and electricity in each of the quarters, and payment 
method used. The socio-demographic control variables collected include household 
size, income category and social grade, age and education level of head of 
household, as well as geographic location.
The data gathered by means of the three questionnaires span the eight quarters 
between the first quarter of 2000 and the fourth quarter of 2001. This chapter refers 
only to data gathered in response to the first questionnaire, covering the four quarters 
of 2000, and the first two quarters of 2001. Data from the next two waves was not 
yet available at the time of writing.
2,110 households have replied to the first questionnaire and are included in the next 
wave. However, in the subsequent analysis less households will generally form the 
base of the analysis, as partially completed questionnaires where information on 
some question or another might not have been recorded need to be considered.
77 Households residing in England, Wales and Scotland are included in the sample. However, households 
residing in Northern Ireland or other UK islands are excluded.
5. Data analysis
5.1 Market shares
During the period of time the Oxera Energy Panel refers to, 24 electricity and gas 
suppliers could be identified as being active in GB78. Tables 6 and 7 below 
summarise the market shares of these suppliers.
The dynamic development of competition in UK domestic energy markets is 
apparent in the tables. For the ex-PESs, the evolution of market shares reflects a 
combination of loss of customers in former exclusive supply areas and gains in other 
newly accessible markets. According to table 6, the combined market share of the 
former regional monopolies is 58.5% in Summer 2001, which compares to 70% 
reported by Ofgem (2001c). Explanations for this difference might partly be found in 
the fact that Ofgem’s numbers are based on a survey of suppliers as opposed to a 
survey of consumers. Moreover, Ofgem surveys the total customer base, while in the 
case of the panel data, a sample representative of the entire GB population is used, 
which might lead to survey differences for variables where the regional aspect is 
very important. The possibility of households not knowing exactly who their supplier 
is, thus inducing an error in the variables, also needs to be considered.
A difference with Ofgem’s figures is also apparent in the gas market (table 7), with 
BGT having seen a reduction in its market share from 62.6% to 56.77% in the six 
quarters surveyed. This is ten percentage points lower than Ofgem’s figure of 67% in
78 The difference to Ofgem’s lower count o f active suppliers (Ofgem 2001c) stems from the fact that here 
suppliers active in the joint energy market have been considered, and that mergers between suppliers that have 
occurred over the period are not apparent in the tables.
July 2001 (Ofgem 2001c). However, the relative loss of market share (6% over 6 
quarters) is similar to Ofgem’s estimates (4% over 4 quarters).
In both the gas and the electricity markets, the data makes the increasing integration 
of the gas and electricity markets evident, with the former PESs acting as active 
entrants in the domestic gas market, and BGT having become the largest domestic 
electricity supplier. It is worth re-iterating that none of the ex-PESs entering the gas 
market has managed to gain as significant a market share as BGT in the electricity 
market. This is likely to reflect BGT’s ability to attract customers on the basis of a 
national reputation, while the ex-PESs’ reputation and brand attraction is mostly of 
regional scope. It should also be highlighted that according to table 6, BGT is now 
the single largest domestic supplier of electricity, while it is classified as second 
largest after Innogy by Ofgem.
Table 6: Market shares in the electricity supply market 2000/01 (% of
respondent households)
Electricity/Gas
supplier
Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2000 Q1 2001 Q2 2001
Amerada 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.37 0.82
British
Gas/Scottish Gas
13.87 14.41 15.65 17.53 19.37 21.37
Calor/Calortex 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.15
East Midlands 
Electricity
1.47 1.45 1.32 1.02 1.00 0.82
Eastern
Gas/Electricity
9.72 9.72 9.17 8.41 8.13 7.85
Independent
Energy
0.44 0.45 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.15
LEB/London
Electricity
3.44 3.41 3.35 3.18 2.85 2.86
Manweb 3.82 3.69 3.46 3.18 2.9 2.86
Midlands Gas 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.10
Midlands
Electriclty/MEB
2.79 2.29 1.7 1.46 1.27 1.27
National Power 3.66 4.13 4.94 5.93 7.02 6.83
Northern
Electric/Gas
6.12 5.92 5.66 5.34 5.17 5.05
Norweb/Energi 7.21 7.15 7.30 7.07 6.28 5.97
Saga 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.21 0.25
(Scottish) Hydro 
Electric
2.73 2.74 2.64 2.64 2.48 2.45
Scottish Power 5.19 5.47 5.55 5.23 5.07 5.15
Powergen 8.08 8.27 8.73 9.22 9.29 9.33
Seeboard 6.23 6.2 6.15 5.77 5.54 4.74
Southern
Electric(ity)/Gas
9.39 9.44 9.34 9.17 8.76 8.26
Sterling 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00
SWALEC 2.84 2.85 2.86 2.97 3.06 2.55
SWEB 2.95 2.85 2.69 2.54 2.37 2.09
Yorkshire
Electricity/Gas
7.86 7.82 7.41 7.17 6.91 6.58
Other 1.64 1.23 1.26 1.19 1.53 2.50
Number of
respondent
households
1,831 1,790 1,821 1,854 1,895 1,961
Note: Former incumbents are identified through bold italics script. Source: Oxera Household Panel
Table 7: Market shares in the gas supply market 2000/01 (% of respondent
households)
Electricity/Gas
supplier
Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2000 Q1 2001 Q2 2001
Amerada 1.64 1.76 1.99 2.33 2.48 2.16
British
Gas/Scottish Gas
62.6 62.26 61.52 60.38 58.75 56.77
Calor/Calortex 1.77 1.69 1.48 1.32 1.18 1.14
East Midlands 
Electricity
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.24
Eastern
Gas/Electricity
4.49 4.11 3.93 3.79 3.85 3.66
Independent
Energy
0.19 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.12 0.06
LEB/London
Electricity
0.82 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.78
Manweb 0.69 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36
Midlands Gas 0.32 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.18
Midlands
Electricity/MEB
0.19 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
National Power 2.4 2.54 3.09 4.1 5.21 5.22
Northern
Electric/Gas
3.98 4.17 3.73 3.6 3.6 3.42
Norweb/Energl 3.22 3.13 3.35 3.66 3.23 3.48
Saga 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.25 0.3
(Scottish) Hydro 
Electric
0.19 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.42
Scottish Power 3.03 3.19 3.28 3.03 3.04 3
Powergen 3.92 4.5 4.89 5.3 5.83 6.18
Seeboard 1.26 1.37 1.48 1.51 1.8 1.56
Southern
Electric(ity)/Gas
3.35 3.32 3.6 3.53 3.6 4.14
Sterling 0.06 0 0.06 0.06 0 0
SWALEC 1.45 1.5 1.48 1.26 1.3 1.26
SWEB 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.32 0.19 0.3
Yorkshire
Electricity/Gas
2.34 2.54 2.51 2.33 2.36 2.52
Other 1.39 1.24 1.09 1.2 1.49 2.76
Number of
respondent
households
1,583 1,534 1,554 1,585 1,812 1,668
Note: Former incumbents are identified through bold italics script. Source: Oxera Household Panel
A fact that needs to be taken into consideration in the analysis of the supply market 
situation is that not all suppliers listed in tables 6 and 7 are independent, and that 
consolidation is an important feature of the market. Ofgem (2001c) estimates that 
despite the considerable number of supply licence holders, only 14 gas suppliers and 
10 electricity suppliers are active in the market. To illustrate this point, table 8 
consolidates for the electricity market the above market shares as a function of 
common ownership. Companies are ranked according to their relative size, and only 
the information referring to the second quarter 2001 is considered79.
Table 8: Consolidated market shares in the UK electricity supply market
Controlling company Controlled suppliers Consolidated market share 
<%)
Innogy Calor, Independent Energy, Midlands 
Electricity, National Power, Northern 
Electric, Yorkshire Electricity
20.05
TXU Europe Eastern Electricity, Norweb 13.82
Scottish and Southern 
Electricity
Scottish Hydro Power, Southern 
Electricity, Swalec
13.26
PowerGen East Midlands Electricity, PowerGen 10.15
Scottish Power Manweb, Scottish Power 8.01
EDF London Electricity, Sweb 4.95
Share of total electricity 
supply market
70.24
Source: Oxera Energy Panel
5.2 Switching evidence
Table 9 summarises the evidence on switching rates provided by the first 
questionnaire of the Oxera Energy Panel. The numbers indicate a strong 
uninterrupted upward trend in domestic switching, with quarterly rates for electricity
79 Further consolidation has occurred since the Summer 2001, e.g. London Electricity (owned by EDF) has
increasing from 2.32% between the first two quarters of 2000 to 10.56% for the 
equivalent period a year later. For gas, the trend is very similar, with quarterly 
switching rates increasing from 2.24% between the first two quarters of 2000, to 
9.31% for the equivalent period a year later80. If switching between any of the six 
quarters surveyed in the first wave of the panel is considered, switching rates of 
33.7% for gas, and 35.6% for electricity are achieved. The comparison with the 
Ofgem numbers of 37% and 38% quoted in section 2.2 is not straightforward, as the 
Ofgem numbers refer to switching that has occurred since the completion of the 
liberalised energy markets, while the panel data takes the first quarter of 2000 as 
starting point. However, the results seem similar in their range and the increase per 
quarter.
Table 9 also provides insight into the importance of dual fuel deals in residential 
energy supply. In particular in the gas sector, an ever increasing majority of 
switchers change for dual fuel deals, but the trend seems less clear-cut in electricity.
acquired TXU Europe’s distribution business.
80 In the numbers quoted, switching between all available suppliers is accounted for and multiple switchers will 
be counted at each instance of switching.
Table 9: Switching in the residential energy sector 2000/01 (% of
respondents)1
Q1/Q2
2000
Q2/Q3
2000
Q3/Q4
2000
Q4 2000/ 
Q1 2001
Q1/Q2
2001
Entire
period2
Electricity 2.32% 4.55% 4.96% 6.53% 10.56% 35.64%
Among these: 
switching to dual 
fuel supply
14.63% 8.64% 8.89% 8.26% 15.08%
Gas 2.24% 4.85% 5.69% 6.86% 9.31% 33.74%
Among these: 
switching to dual 
fuel supply
50.00% 70.27% 70.45% 74.07% 85.23%
Note: 1 Switchers are defined as households reporting to use different energy suppliers from one 
reference quarter to the other. 2 Switching numbers are cumulated across all 6 quarters, i.e. across 5
switching occasions. Source: Oxera Energy Panel
The growing prevalence of dual fuel supply is confirmed by the increasing number 
of respondents reporting identical gas and electricity suppliers set out in table 10. It 
needs to be highlighted that the numbers calculated on the basis of the panel 
responses are higher than those reported by Ofgem in its latest market review 
(Ofgem 2001c). According to Ofgem’s estimates, 36% of gas customers, and 30% of 
electricity customers were subscribing to dual fuel offers in July 2001. However, 
Ofgem also states that four out of five switchers are now buying gas and electricity 
from the same supplier, which is very much in line with the panel data in the case of 
gas switchers.
Table 10: Dual fuel supply In the energy sector 2000/01 (% of respondents)
Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2000 Q1 2001 Q2 2001
Respondents with 
identical gas and 
electricity supplier
39.13% 39.68% 42.70% 46.36% 49.87% 55.12%
Source: Oxera Energy Panel
Another interesting feature that can be examined with help of the data gathered in the 
panel is ‘return switching’, i.e. households who return to their incumbent energy 
supplier after having initially switched to a competitor. Return switching implies 
multiple switching, and it can be expected that, as the period of full energy market 
liberalisation lengthens, customers become more confident in the switching process 
and multiple switching increases. In the gas sector, return switching implies 
switching to BGT, the former incumbent. According to the panel data, over the entire 
period quarter 1 2000 to quarter 2 2001, 29% of gas switchers were return switchers. 
This compares to 26% reported by Ofgem (Ofgem 2001c).
Calculating return switching rates from the panel data is more complex in the 
electricity sector—there is no single incumbent as in gas, but 14 former regional 
monopoly suppliers (ex-PESs). It is not possible to identify with complete accuracy 
return switchers as the geographic regions of GB recorded in the panel do not 
overlap perfectly with the PES regions. Nevertheless, an estimation of the 
phenomenon has been attempted by matching as closely as possible the regional 
variable contained in the household data with the incumbent PES regions. The 
percentage of return switchers calculated over the entire period quarter 1 2000 to 
quarter 2 2001 is 23.5%, which is significantly higher than Ofgem’s estimation of 
16%. Given that the domestic electricity market has been opened to supply 
competition a year less than the gas market, it can be expected that return switching 
is less frequent in electricity than in gas. However, as in several cases above, the 
difference between the panel and Ofgem’s figures warrants further investigation.
5.3 Payment method
Tables 11 and 12 summarise evidence concerning the use made of the different 
payment methods in the domestic gas and electricity markets. Direct debit is the
most choice both for gas and electricity bill payment. However, the relative share of 
direct debit in gas is higher than in electricity, with 59.9% of gas customers and 
54.7% of electricity customers making use of this payment method in Summer 2001.
Table 11: Relative share of payment methods in electricity 2000/01 (%)
Payment method Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2000 Q1 2001 Q2 2001
Quarterly payment 29.44 29.26 29.12 28.97 28.27 27.85
Direct debit 52.54 53.11 53.33 53.33 53.22 54.71
Pre-payment meter 18.02 17.63 17.7 17.7 18.51 17.45
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Oxera Energy Panel
Table 12: Relative share of payment methods in gas 2000/01 (%)
Payment method Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2000 Q1 2001 Q2 2001
Quarterly payment 32.12 31.45 30.97 30.64 29.88 29.23
Direct debit 57.24 57.99 58.47 58.67 59.14 59.82
Pre-payment meter 10.64 10.57 10.57 10.38 10.99 10.96
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Oxera Energy Panel
The relative share of direct debit has increased slightly over the period surveyed, 
having grown from 52.54% to 54.71% in electricity, and from 57.24% to 59.82% in 
gas. This is consistent with the fact that a number of switchers will combine the 
change in suppliers with a change in payment method in favour of direct debit where 
additional discounts can be obtained.
Quarterly payment methods comprise payment by cheque by mail, payment by 
cheque or cash at the bank or a post office, and also payment by telephone (with a 
debit or credit card) or payment online on the internet. The share of all these
quarterly payment methods is decreasing in tune with the rise in direct debit. The 
combined share of pre-payment meters among all payment methods is fairly stable in 
both electricity and gas, and it is notable that this payment method is significantly 
more widespread in electricity than gas.
The relative importance of the payment method in the switching process, and in 
particular the prevalence of simultaneous switching of supplier and payment method 
to direct debit in order to maximise the savings available is examined in table 13.
Table 13: Switching of payment methods 2000/01
% of respondents 
recording different 
payment methods 
between quarters
Q1/Q2
2000
Q2/Q3
2000
Q3/Q4
2000
Q4 2000/ 
Q1 2001
Q1/Q2
2001
Q1
2000/Q1
2001
Electricity 0.45% 1.44% 0.76% 1.56% 2.07% 6.16%
Gas 0.65% 0.91% 1.02% 1.13% 2.42% 6.20%
Sim ultaneous sw itching of supplier and  paym ent m ethod (% of total sw itchers)
Electricity 4.88% 9.88% 6.67% 9.09% 8.04% -
Gas 14.71% 9.46% 7.95% 6.48% 12.75% -
Switching to  d irect deb it (% of total paym ent m ethod sw itchers)
Electricity 62.50% 61.54% 57.14% 58.62% 69.23% -
Gas 80.00% 64.29% 68.75% 83.33% 58.97% -
Source: Oxera Energy Panel
The numbers in table 13 confirm that overall, switching of payment method is less 
frequent than switching of supplier, but increases also steadily over the period 
surveyed. In electricity, 6.16% of respondents have switched payment method 
between any of the quarters surveyed, in gas, the number is very similar at 6.2%. 
This similarity confirms a fact already evident in the switching rates: despite the fact 
that the electricity market has been fully liberalised a year less long than the gas 
market, there is today very little difference between the two. This implies that
competition in the electricity sector has unfolded more quickly than in the gas sector, 
a possible explanation for this being the ever stronger integration of the two sectors 
and a spill-over of customer experience in switching from gas to electricity.
It should also be noted that an increasing proportion of total switchers in electricity 
are simultaneous switchers of supplier and payment method. Approximately 5% of 
all switchers in electricity have simultaneously switched payment method between 
the first and second quarter 2000, a year later, this number has increased to 8%. The 
absolute proportion of simultaneous supplier and payment method switchers is 
higher in gas (the equivalent numbers for Q1/Q2 2000 and Q1/Q2 2001 are 15% and 
13% respectively), however, the trend in gas seems to be declining rather than 
increasing.
Last, table 13 shows that the overwhelming majority of payment method switchers 
change for direct debit, confirming that this payment method in particular has gained 
in attractiveness since liberalisation. Competing suppliers have initially concentrated 
their efforts on this customer group, and following unwinding of cross-subsidies 
between payment categories, customers have been able to realise important cost 
savings by switching to direct debit.
5.4 Switcher profile
The above paragraphs have highlighted the increased prevalence of domestic energy 
supplier switching and the importance of supply features such as payment method 
and dual fuel offers. To complement the picture, figures 1 to 4 below compare 
graphically some of the most important socio-demographic characteristics between 
switchers and non-switchers. The variables considered are income category, social
grade, age and household size. Electricity and gas switching rates compounded over 
the 6 quarter period are considered.
Figure 1 shows the profile of switchers compared to non-switchers by income 
category for electricity and gas. In electricity, the income category with the highest 
proportion of switchers compared to non-switchers is the category GBP 5,000-9,999. 
This is the one but lowest category, and suggests that the option of supplier 
switching is taken up by less privileged households, a result corroborating the Ofgem 
(2001c) finding of very low income households catching up with the average (see 
also table 5). Where the other income categories are concerned, no clear pattern 
emerges, both the categories GBP 20,000-24,999 and GBP 35,000-44,999 having 
higher proportions of electricity supplier switchers than non-switchers, but the 
difference is less marked than for the GBP 5,000-9,999 income category. Looking at 
the opposite aspect of dominance of non-switchers over switchers, this is strongest in 
the middle income category GBP 15,000-19,999. Two possible explanations for this 
result can be offered. First, this population group might have been the first to benefit 
from switching offers and fewer households are now switching in this category, 
second the net benefits from switching might be lower for this income group.
In the gas market, switchers are disproportionately well represented in the three 
middle income groups GBP 10,000-14,999, 15,000-19,999 and 20,000-24,999. The 
largest difference between switchers and non-switchers exists for the last of the three 
categories. Compared to electricity, the two lowest income categories have 
proportionately less switchers. Again, similar to electricity, the lowest proportion of 
switchers is observed in a middle income category, i.e. the GBP 25,000-34,999 
category.
Figure 1: Switcher and non-switcher profile by income category
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Profiling switchers and non-switchers by social grade in figure 2, overall confirms 
the results obtained for the income categories. No clear trend is distinguishable in 
electricity, by contrast, switchers in gas are concentrated in the middle categories of 
skilled working class and lower middle class. The pre-dominance of poorer 
households among electricity switchers is less obvious in the categorisation of the 
population into social grades compared to income categories. The lowest social 
grades are not showing higher switcher than non-switcher proportions, and the two 
categories with a disproportionate share of electricity switchers are the skilled 
working class and the middle class.
Figure 2: Switcher and non-switcher profile by social grade
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A very clear picture emerges in terms of the age profile of switchers in figure 3. 
There is a strong predominance of households headed by young persons among 
switchers. In both the gas and electricity sector, the two categories of heads of 
household under 29 years, and heads of households between 30 and 39 years are the 
household categories with a disproportionate share of switchers compared to non­
switchers.
Figure 3: Switcher and non-switcher profile by age
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Last, switchers and non-switchers are profiled as a function of household size in 
figure 4. There are similarities between the two sectors, with both gas and electricity 
showing the highest proportion of switchers in medium-sized households of three to 
four persons. The trend is slightly more pronounced in the case of gas.
Figure 4: Switcher and non-switcher profile by household size
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Summing up, the evidence obtained from a first descriptive analysis of the data 
suggests several conclusions with regard to the socio-demographic make-up of 
switchers. Confirming the Ofgem results set out in table 5, there does not seem to be 
discrimination against lower income groups or lower social grades. On the contrary, 
middle to higher income households have lower switching rates than the former 
categories, suggesting, in the context of the theoretical model outlined above, a 
combination of higher switching costs and lower benefits from switching. There 
might also be a link to the prevalent form of marketing in the energy sectors: the 
surveyed evidence seems to suggest that doorstep sales account for a large 
proportion of switching, and it is possible that lower income households (e.g. headed 
by unemployed or part-time workers, etc.) are more likely to be at home to receive a 
salesperson.
Age clearly influences switching, with households headed by younger persons being 
the predominant switchers in both gas and electricity. Again, this mirrors the Ofgem 
results set out in table 5. In terms of theory, this confirms the hypothesis that net 
benefits of switching decrease with age, with perceived benefits less likely to 
outweigh costs. Last, household size shows no clear linear relationship with
switching numbers, switching seeming to be clustered in medium size households 
rather than very small or very large households.
6. A probit model of switching in the energy sector
In order to formally test which factors influence switching and whether there are 
differences between the sectors or between population groups, a probit model is 
estimated in this section on the basis of the theoretical cost-benefit switching model 
set out in section 3.
The model has been estimated taking into account switching rates across all quarters 
included in the panel, i.e. from the first quarter 2000, to the second quarter 2001. The 
variable to be explained represents actual switching and takes a binary 0-1 form. The 
model is estimated separately for the gas and the electricity sector.
The explanatory variables considered correspond to those identified in the previous 
sections. In terms of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the 
household, they include household size, age of head of household, income category, 
educational level attained by head of household, type of housing, number of rooms, 
and a regional dummy for households resident in Scotland.
A further set of explanatory variables is related to alternative switching experiences. 
Switching in fixed or mobile telephony and switching in the alternative energy sector 
are included in this second group of explanatory variables.
The last group of explanatory variables considers aspects related to cost savings. The 
variables in this group include dummies for the use of direct debit, or the use of a 
pre-payment meter81, and whether a household has been subscribing to a dual-fuel 
deal in the period considered. A further variable takes the fact into account that 
switching of payment method has occurred over the period considered, implying 
with some probability that a household will have wanted to reap further price 
discounts by switching to direct debit. Finally, the possibility that a household pays 
no standing charge on their energy consumption is included as it can represent cost 
savings in particular for low volume users.
The results of the estimation are presented in table 14 for both gas and electricity.
81 The payment method dummies refer to the method used by a household at the end of the survey period, i.e. in 
the second quarter 2001.
Table 14: Probit estimation results
Independent variable
Supplier switching in gas Supplier switching in 
electricity
Dependent variables Coefficient1 DF/dx* Coefficient1 DF/dx*
Household size NS NS NS NS
Head of household below 29 years3 0.20** 0.053** NS NS
Income category NS NS NS NS
Education level of head of household NS NS NS NS
Living in a house3 NS NS NS NS
Number of rooms NS NS NS NS
Resident of Scotland3 NS NS NS NS
Switched in fixed or mobile telephony3 NS NS NS NS
Switched in the alternative energy 
sector3
1.5*** 0.47*** 1.44*** 0.47***
Switched payment method3 0.99*** 0.34*** 0.27* 0.08*
Direct debit user3 0.19* 0.05** NS NS
Pre-payment user3 -0.44** -0.09** NS NS
Dual fuel offer subscriber3 0.47*** 0.12*** 1.1*** 0.27***
Zero standing charge3 -0.48*** -0.11***
ICOo 0.13***
Predicted probability at sample average 0.17 0.18
Notes: 1 Coefficients with a statistical confidence interval below 90% are not reported and denoted with ‘non- 
significant’ (NS). For reported coefficients, the statistical confidence levels are indicated by stars, where * stands 
for statistical significance within a 10% interval, ** within a 5% interval, and *** within a 1% interval.2 dF/dx 
represents the change in probability of a unit change in the dependent variable, all other variables being held at 
sample average.3 dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, all other variables being held at 
sample average.
The estimation results reported in table 14 suggest a number of conclusions greatly 
in line with the previous analysis set out in this chapter. In both gas and electricity, 
socio-demographic characteristics of a household seem to play a less important role 
in determining the probability of switching than alternative switching experiences 
and variables related to cost savings. In neither of the two sectors do factors such as
household income, household size or education display significant coefficients. The 
type of housing (house as opposed to flat) plays no statistically significant role, and 
neither does the number of rooms occupied by a household. Whether or not a 
household resides in Scotland also has no significant impact on the switching 
probability.
One demographic variable impacting the switching probability, but only in the case 
of gas, is the age of the head of household. The variable has the predicted sign, i.e. 
households headed by young persons are more likely to switch than others. However, 
age is not significant in the case of electricity.
The single most important variable to impact switching probability in gas and 
electricity is switching in the alternative energy sector. Having made the experience 
of supplier switching in either gas or electricity will increase the average probability 
of a household switching in the other sector by almost 0.5 (0.47 in gas and 0.46 in 
electricity). This result can be interpreted as reflecting unobserved household 
characteristics, with households with low risk aversion and/or high sensitivity to cost 
savings being likely to be multiple switchers. In addition, a learning or habit 
formation effect is also likely to influence the result. Moreover, the interaction 
between the two energy sectors might also play a role. In this context, the separate 
dual-fuel dummy has a highly significant positive coefficient in both the electricity 
and gas sectors, confirming the importance of dual-fuel deals in the switching 
experience. As the evidence reviewed in the previous sections shows, a majority of 
switchers are now subscribing to dual fuel deals, with the attraction of these deals 
lying arguably more in the additional discounts offered than in increased 
convenience for the customer.
It should also be noted that the alternative energy switching experience is more 
significant than switching experiences regarding telephony suppliers, the former 
overriding the impact of the latter.
More highly significant coefficients are estimated in both the gas and electricity 
sector for the variable representing switching of payment method. In the case of gas, 
having switched payment method over the period considered will increase the 
average probability of switching by 0.3. The result is less strong in the case of 
electricity (0.08), but still significant. The switching payment method coefficient is 
most likely to pick up a cost savings factor linked to direct debit. As the figures in 
table 13 show, switching to direct debit is the most frequent form of payment method 
switching, and is motivated by the attractive price offers available to this customer 
group.
Another interesting result is that, in gas, the fact that a household has a bill structure 
with zero standing charge decreases the probability of supplier switching, while in 
electricity, it increases it. A possible interpretation of this result would be that the 
marketing strategy of zero standing charge introduced by BTG does indeed increase 
customer retention, in particular among lower volume users. The opposite result in 
electricity could possibly be caused by electricity customers switching to BGT in 
order to benefit from its zero standing charge policy.
The impact of payment method on switching probability differs between gas and 
electricity. The results suggest that users of gas pre-payment meters are less likely to 
have switched over the period surveyed, while users of direct debit are more likely to 
have done so. In the case of pre-payment meters, the result in gas might be driven by 
the fact that the proportion of customers in debt is largely above average among gas
pre-payment customers, and the negative coefficient might pick up real barriers to 
switching which might have existed for such customers. The debt problem among 
pre-payment customers is a lot less pronounced for electricity, which might be the 
explanation why the pre-payment meter dummy is not statistically significant in 
electricity.
The difference between the two sectors is less straightforward to explain in the case 
of direct debit. While the positive impact of direct debit usage on switching 
probability in gas is expected, there does not seem any impact of this payment 
method in the case of electricity. A possible reason for this might be that the cost 
savings effect targeted by the direct debit variable is already picked up by other 
variables.
7. Assessment
There is consensus among survey results about the fact that the main driver behind 
switching is perceived cost savings, but that customers also display a considerable 
amount of inertia and risk aversion that need to be overcome in order for switching 
to take place. The estimation results from the probit model suggest that variables 
linked to such savings are indeed exerting a significant positive impact on the 
probability of switching. Among the variables linked to cost savings count duel fuel 
offers, switching of payment method, and ‘zero standing charge’ tariffs.
However, according to the estimation results, the variable that has the strongest 
predictive power for the probability of switching is switching in the alternative 
energy sector. The impact of this variable is likely to combine several effects, the 
most important arguably being that it approximates unobserved lower risk aversion 
for certain households. Arguments of ‘habit formation’ after successful switching
experiences have also been advanced and can explain the result. It is however also 
likely to pick up the increased integration of the two sectors, with the positive impact 
of the separate dual fuel variable confirming this last point.
Supplier switching is often combined with switching of payment method, in 
particular in favour of direct debit, in order to maximise the savings offered by 
alternative suppliers. This observation is also supported by the model, with switching 
of payment method being linked to a higher probability of supplier switching.
The relative insignificance of socio-economic and demographic household variables, 
in particular income category and variables related to income (such as type of 
dwelling or number of rooms occupied), seems to confirm that the switching 
experience is not (or no longer) confined to better-off households. Thus, the latest 
Ofgem findings suggesting a move towards a more even distribution of switching 
benefits across the population are corroborated. One demographic variable impacting 
on the probability of switching in the case of gas is the age of the head of household, 
with households headed by older persons less likely to switch. Elderly households 
also count among the few population groups singled out by Ofgem because of their 
lower than average switching rates. It stands to believe that at lease the psychological 
costs of switching are higher for these households.
It is interesting to compare the results in table 14 with the probit model results 
reported by Parmar et al. (2000). In their results, income, age, educational level and 
employment status did not seem to affect switching levels, thus corroborating the 
results in table 14. However, switching probability increased with household size, 
possibly suggesting that household characteristics of switchers in the early periods of 
liberalisation somewhat differed from later periods.
It should also be noted that the results found by Parmar et al. (2000) suggest some 
difference between analysing attitudes to switching as opposed to actual switching 
rates82. In the case of attitudes to switching, consumers were found more likely to 
consider switching suppliers if they had already switched telecom suppliers, and less 
likely to consider it if they were over 65. The likelihood of switching was also 
positively related to income.
One of the main reasons given by Ofgem for the proposed withdrawal of all price 
controls in GB’s gas and electricity markets from April 2002 is that the differences 
between special customers groups have evened out. The market is thus moving to a 
situation where all customer groups are equally likely to benefit from choice between 
suppliers. In particular, differentials in competition for different payment method 
customers have lessened over the past year, and disadvantages faced notably by pre­
payment customers are disappearing.
The results from the Oxera panel are mixed with respect to this issue. On the one 
had, the payment method used by a household does not seems to impact the 
probability of switching in the case of electricity, on the other, in gas, pre-payment 
meter customers display a lower likelihood of switching, while direct debit 
customers display a higher one. A possible explanation for the difference between 
gas and electricity is that customers in debt are predominantly using pre-payment 
meters in gas, while they are evenly spread across all payment methods in electricity.
82 The relevant variable in the former case is the response of customers to the question whether they would
In order to account for the dynamic evolution of switching rates in the context of 
payment methods, figures 5(a) and 5(b) depict switching rates according to the main 
payment methods. Figure 5(a) refers to switching at the beginning of the panel 
period, i.e. switching between the first two quarters of 2000, figure 5(b) to switching 
at the end, i.e. switching between the first two quarters of 2001.
Figures 5(a) shows that at the beginning of 2000 switching was over-represented 
among customers paying by standard quarterly payment methods and by direct debit, 
while pre-payment meter customers were a lot less likely to switch. A year later, this 
has changed according to figure 5(b). While pre-payment customers are still being 
under-represented in terms of switchers, the difference between payment methods 
are certainly evening out, and in particular in electricity, and the structural gap 
between direct debit and pre-payment meter customers is disappearing.
Figure 5(a): Switcher and non-switcher profile according to payment
method—Electricity
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Figure 5(b): Switcher and non-switcher profile according to payment
method—Gas
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In this chapter, determinants of supplier switching in gas and electricity are analysed 
on the basis of data collated via the Oxera Energy Panel, the data spanning 6 quarters 
from the first quarter 2000 to the second quarter 2001. The analysis complements 
recent survey results regarding the state of competition in UK residential energy 
markets, in particular Ofgem’s latest supply competition review (Ofgem 2001c). 
Using a probit model, formal data analysis is undertaken in order to add to the body 
of evidence so far dominated by descriptive analysis. The results of the econometric 
model offer insights regarding the impact of different socio-demographic and energy 
consumption specific variables on the likelihood of switching of gas and electricity 
supplier.
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The estimation results suggest that supplier switching in the gas and electricity sector 
is mainly driven by variables linked to cost savings, including duel fuel offers, 
switching of payment method, and ‘zero standing charge’ tariffs. Moreover, 
switching in either of the two energy sectors is linked positively to switching in the 
alternative sector. This can be interpreted as picking up intrinsic unobserved 
household characteristics such as lower aversion to risk, but might also point to a 
‘habit formation’ effect.
The result of importance of cost savings and parallel switching experience is paired 
with evidence of relative insignificance of socio-economic and demographic 
household characteristics. The latter result is more particularly important as it 
corroborates findings that switching has become more evenly spread across all 
population groups since liberalisation has become fully effective, and that the 
benefits of competition are distributed so as not to disadvantage marginal customer 
groups.
The combined evidence of the descriptive and formal panel data analysis presented 
in this chapter paints a favourable picture of the competitive situation in the domestic 
energy market in GB. Switching rates both in electricity and gas display an upward 
trend, and competition seems indeed be driven by customers seeking out the most 
advantageous offers, with real barriers to switching being very limited.
However, in view of the consolidation witnessed over the past year, in particular in 
the electricity supply market, the importance of maintaining a sufficient number of 
suppliers needs to be stressed. The positive assessment of competitive conditions is 
only valid as long as there is a sufficient number of competing independent suppliers 
among which customers can exercise their choice. It is therefore of upmost
importance that the energy regulator exercises its competition surveillance powers 
the sector and that future consolidation is closely monitored.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In this thesis the theoretical principles underlying the liberalisation and regulation of 
network utilities have been reviewed, and some particular aspects of the process of 
regulatory reform have been analysed in detail. The thesis has two parts, each 
comprising two chapters.
In the first part of the thesis, chapter 1 sets out the general principles of network 
utilities reform which started in the UK with the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications industry and the privatisiation of BT. In the first chapter, the 
three key ideas of regulatory reform—introduction of competition in all but the core 
natural monopoly areas, incentive price-cap regulation, and independent sector 
regulators—are introduced and discussed.
Many complex issues need to be solved in the process of transforming markets 
supplied by incumbent monopolies into competitive markets. Transition requires 
acknowledgement that there is no unique solution, but that each case for reform will 
need to be considered in its own context. Competition can take on different forms, 
and which best meets efficiency criteria depends upon the market and government 
failures which arise in each industry and country. Moreover, transitional pitfalls are 
many, and technological progress can change the competitive potential of markets 
along the way.
However, despite of all the different individual cases, consensus on many regulatory 
principles has emerged around the UK model. The UK experience has provided 
valuable lessons for the European countries, embarking on the path of regulatory 
reform in utility networks some 16 years after BT was privatised. The principles of 
the UK model are echoed in the European liberalisation directives. Nevertheless,
unique national characteristics imply that regulatory reform has taken different forms 
in different European countries, a proposition which is illustrated for the particular 
case of Germany in chapter 2.
In the second chapter, the theoretical framework set out in chapter 1 is used to 
examine the transformation three German utility network services have undergone in 
the recent past—i.e., electricity, telecommunications and rail transport services. 
While not one of the pioneering countries of liberalisation in Europe, Germany has 
in the recent past implemented far reaching reform measures in these three sectors. 
An outstanding feature of the German market is the decentralised character of its 
electricity industry, and, albeit to a lesser extent, of its rail transport services. It is 
found that the decentralised structure of these services is reflected in the regulatory 
framework.
The German electricity industry is characterised by a fragmented market with a great 
number of players. This market structure is at the origin of the minimal sector- 
specific regulation Germany’s authorities have imposed on the sector at the moment 
of full liberalisation in 1998. Because of the large number of players, the potential 
for the rapid emergence of effective competition was judged favourably and the 
industry was granted a high degree of self-regulation. However, close supervision of 
the industry by the general competition authorities seems necessary in order to avoid 
collusion between the major incumbent companies and to address barriers to entry.
In the German rail sector, far reaching reform measures were introduced in 1994. 
However, much of the regulatory control in the sector is still exercised directly by 
the federal government, which is still the sole owner of Deutsche Bahn AG. The 
sector-specific regulator set up during the reform process is responsible primarily for
technical regulations and has an advisory role. However, the rail reform has also 
strengthened the regional element in the sector, devolving powers to regional and 
local transport authorities which have considerable scope to shape the form of their 
public transport services.
Finally, where the telecommunications sector is concerned, the German liberalisation 
process was largely influenced by European policy. In response to the monolithic 
pre-liberalisation structure of the sector, similar to the UK situation at the outset of 
liberalisation, Germany has set up its only independent sector regulator in the area of 
telecommunications.
In the second part of the thesis, chapter 3 and 4 analyse two specific aspects of utility 
network liberalisation and regulation, making use of econometric techniques. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis looks at the impact liberalisation has had on marginal 
households in the context of fixed telephony access. The liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector and the rebalancing of the tariff structure associated with 
it, i.e. the rise in fixed charges and the fall in call charges, has raised questions about 
the impact the rise in access charges will have on universal telephone access. 
Through the creation of a repeated cross section data set based on the annual UK 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES), the impact of access tariff variation on domestic 
fixed telephony access demand is evaluated.
The results establish two main facts. First, the cost of access expressed by 
connection and rental charges has a negative effect, albeit small, on the probability 
of a household having a fixed-line telephone. All other things equal, the rebalancing 
of tariffs can therefore have a negative impact on telephone penetration rates. 
Second, by creating a subsample of low-education households to approximate low-
income households, a strong sensitivity of access elasticities with respect to income 
is found. The price elasticity with respect to one-off telephone connection charges, 
identified as main price barrier to telephone ownership, is about 50% higher in the 
low-education sample than in the overall sample (-0.1 and -0.06 respectively). This 
suggests that it is notably vulnerable, low income households who bear the burden of 
rebalancing. The results found on the basis of UK data corroborate evidence from 
North-American studies.
However, the results of chapter 3 need to be interpreted in the light of several recent 
developments. First, the data underlying the analysis spans the period 1985 to 1996. 
Since then, technological progress and, in particular, the rapid rise of mobile 
telephony have changed the picture of the industry. The fierce competition between 
mobile operators and the availability of affordable pre-pay mobile handsets have 
profoundly affected the nature of the debate of exclusion from communication 
services. The focus has shifted from fixed to mobile telephony. Nevertheless, access 
to fixed telephony network plays still a role for access to new internet based services.
Similar to chapter 3, the analysis in chapter 4 is based on formal data analysis. In this 
last chapter, determinants of supplier switching in gas and electricity are analysed on 
the basis of data collated via the Oxera Energy Panel, the data spanning 6 quarters 
from the first quarter 2000 to the second quarter 2001. The analysis complements 
recent survey results regarding the state of competition in UK residential energy 
markets, in particular Ofgem’s latest supply competition review. Using a probit 
model, formal data analysis is undertaken in order to add to the body of evidence so 
far dominated by descriptive analysis. The results of the econometric model offer 
insights regarding the impact of different socio-demographic and energy
consumption specific variables on the likelihood of switching of gas and electricity 
supplier.
The estimation results suggest that supplier switching in the gas and electricity sector 
is mainly driven by variables linked to cost savings, including duel fuel offers, 
switching of payment method, and ‘zero standing charge’ tariffs. Moreover, 
switching in either of the two energy sectors is linked positively to switching in the 
alternative sector. The result of importance of cost-savings and parallel switching 
experience is paired with evidence of relative insignificance of socio-economic and 
demographic household characteristics. The latter result is more particularly 
important as it corroborates findings that switching has become more evenly spread 
across all population groups since liberalisation has become fully effective.
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